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Abstract
Airio I. Change of Norm? – In-Work Poverty in a Comparative Perspective. Helsinki: 
The Social Insurance Institution, Finland, Studies in social security and health 92, 
2008. 134 pp. ISBN 978-951-669-762-1 (print), ISBN 978-951-669-763-8 (pdf).
This study is taking an internationally comparative view on in-work 
poverty. Main focus is on so-called EU15 countries but long time 
span comparisons between selected OECD countries are made as 
well. Recent debate of in-work poverty in EU is clearly showing 
that traditional concepts like “wage-earner welfare state” and “male 
breadwinner model” are losing their importance. Study analyses 
in-work poverty from four different approaches: 1) How in-work 
poverty has developed in different OECD countries during the 
years 1970–2000? 2) How picture of poverty among the working 
households changes in EU countries by different poverty measures? 
3) What are the factors behind working poor problem in EU 
countries? 4) What is the nature of in-work poverty dynamics in 
EU-countries? Data that is used is derived from the Luxembourg 
Income Study (LIS), Finnish Household Budget Surveys and from 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP). The results show 
that there are no common trends of in-work poverty. The theory of 
Europe sliding towards the Anglo-American working poor situation 
does not get support from results. Different poverty measures have 
a limited overlap and variation between in-work poverty rates is 
large in EU countries. Still, different poverty measures identify quite 
well same population groups as risk groups of in-work poverty. 
Differences are more depending on country-specific features than 
a product of different measures. Over a half of poor households 
have not suffered from labour market problems. Just labour market 
problems are the reason behind in-work poverty in about 8 percent 
of all working poor households. Although, working poor is yet a 
temporary problem. Two thirds of the working poor households 
have experienced poverty only once. The current working poor 
problem in EU countries is in some extent result of the fact that one 
wage is not always enough to secure household’s economic well-
being. Two-earner model has become a new norm of working, which 
is reflected on living costs and level of wages. In the era of insecure 
labour markets and increasing single adult and single parent 
households this model could turn out to be harmful. 
Keywords: in-work poverty, comparative research, labour markets, 
welfare state 
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Tiivistelmä
Airio I. Normin muutos? – Työtä tekevien köyhyys vertailevasta näkökulmasta. 
Helsinki: Kela, Sosiaali ja terveysturvan tutkimuksia 92, 2008. 134 s. 
ISBN 978-951-669-762-1 (nid.), ISBN 978-951-669-763-8 (pdf).
Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan työssä käyvien köyhyyttä kansain-
välisesti vertailevasta näkökulmasta. Tarkastelu keskittyy pääosin ns. 
EU15-maihin, mutta tarkastelussa on myös valikoituja OECD-maita. 
Perinteiset työmarkkinoita kuvaavat käsitteet, kuten palkansaajien 
hyvinvointivaltio ja mieselättäjämalli, ovat menettämässä yhteis-
kunnallista merkitystään. Työssä käyvien köyhyyttä tarkastellaan 
neljästä eri näkökulmasta: 1) Miten työssä käyvien köyhyys on 
kehittynyt eri OECD-maissa vuosien 1970–2000 välisenä aikana? 
2) Miten köyhyyden kuva muuttuu EU-maissa, kun käytetään eri 
köyhyysmittareita? 3) Mitkä ovat työssä käyvien köyhyyden taustalla 
olevat tekijät EU-maissa? 4) Millainen on työssä käyvien köyhyyden 
dynamiikka EU-maissa? Aineistoina ovat Luxembourg Income 
Study -aineistot (LIS), Suomen Kulutustutkimukset ja European 
Community Household Panel -aineisto (ECHP). Tulokset osoitta-
vat, että yhteisiä kehityssuuntia työssä käyvien köyhyydelle ei löydy. 
Teoria, jonka mukaan Euroopan maat ovat ajautumassa kohti anglo-
amerikkalaista työköyhälistöä, ei saa tukea tuloksista. Eri köyhyys-
mittarit ovat EU-maissa vain osittain päällekkäisiä ja variaatio työssä 
käyvien köyhyysasteilla on suuri. Kuitenkin eri mittarit identifioivat 
melko hyvin samoja väestöryhmiä köyhyyden riskiryhmiksi. Erot 
maiden välillä johtunevat enemmän maiden yksilöllisistä piirteistä 
kuin köyhyysmittareista. Yli puolet köyhistä kotitalouksista ei ole  
kokenut mitään työmarkkinaongelmaa. Pelkästään työmarkkina-
lähtöiset ongelmat ovat köyhyyden taustalla 8 prosentilla kaikista 
köyhistä kotitalouksista. Silti työssä käyvien köyhyys osoittautui 
väliaikaiseksi ongelmaksi. Kaksi kolmesta kotitaloudesta oli kokenut 
köyhyyttä vain yhtenä vuonna. Työssä käyvien köyhyys on EU-mais-
sa monilta osin seurausta siitä, että yksi palkka ei ole aina riittävä 
turva kotitalouden taloudelliselle hyvinvoinnille. Kahden ansaitsijan 
mallista näyttää tulleen uusi työnteon normi, joka heijastuu elin-
kustannuksiin ja palkkatasoon. Malli voi osoittautua haitalliseksi 
aikana, jolle on tyypillistä työmarkkinoiden epävarmuus ja yhden 
aikuisen sekä yksinhuoltajakotitalouksien määrän lisääntyminen. 
– Yhteenveto s. 111–114.
Avainsanat: työssä käyvien köyhyys, vertaileva tutkimus, työmark-
kinat, hyvinvointivaltio
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Sammandrag
Airio I. Förändring av norm? – Fattigdom bland dem som har arbete ur ett jäm-
förande perspektiv. Helsingfors: FPA, Social trygghet och hälsa: Undersökningar 92, 
2008. 134 s. ISBN 978-951-669-762-1 (inh.), ISBN 978-951-669-763-8 (pdf).
I denna studie granskas fattigdomen bland dem som har arbete ur 
ett internationellt jämförande perspektiv. Studien fokuserar i huvud-
sak på de s.k. EU15-länderna men omfattar även utvalda OECD-län-
der. De traditionella begrepp som kännetecknat arbetsmarknaden, 
som ”löntagarnas välfärdsstat” och ”den manliga försörjarmodellen”, 
håller på att mista sin samhälleliga betydelse. Fattigdomen bland 
dem som har arbete granskas ur fyra olika perspektiv: 1) Hur har fat-
tigdomen bland dem som har arbete utvecklats i de olika OECD-län-
derna under åren 1970–2000? 2) Hur förändras bilden av fattigdom 
i EU-länderna då man använder olika mått? 3) Vilka faktorer ligger 
bakom fattigdomen bland dem som har arbete i EU-länderna? 4) 
Hurudan är fattigdomens dynamik bland dem som har arbete i EU-
länderna? Material från Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), Suomen 
Kulutustutkimukset och European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP) har använts för studien. Resultaten indikerar att det inte 
finns någon gemensam utvecklingsriktning för fattigdomen bland 
dem som har arbete.  Teorin enligt vilken de europeiska länderna 
håller på att få ett arbetarproletariat enligt angloamerikansk modell 
får inget stöd på basis av resultaten. De olika måtten på fattigdom i 
EU-länderna är endast delvis överlappande och variationen i graden 
av fattigdom bland dem som har arbete är stor. Däremot identifierar 
de olika måtten rätt väl samma befolkningsgrupper som riskgrup-
per vad gäller fattigdom. Skillnaderna mellan länderna torde snarare 
bero på nationella särdrag än på de olika måtten på fattigdom. Över 
hälften av de fattiga hushållen har inte upplevt några arbetsmark-
nadsproblem. Problem som endast är arbetsmarknadsrelaterade 
ligger bakom fattigdomen hos 8 procent av alla fattiga hushåll. Trots 
detta visade sig fattigdom vara ett tillfälligt problem bland dem som 
har arbete. Två av tre hushåll hade upplevt fattigdom endast under 
ett år. Fattigdomen bland dem som har arbete är i EU-länderna i 
många avseenden en följd av att en lön inte räcker till för att trygga 
hushållets ekonomiska välfärd. Modellen med två försörjare ser ut 
att ha blivit en ny norm, något som reflekteras i levnadskostnaderna 
och lönenivån. Denna modell kan visa sig vara skadlig i en tid som 
kännetecknas av osäkerhet på arbetsmarknaden och där hushåll be-
stående av en vuxen och ensamförsörjarhushåll blivit allt vanligare.
Nyckelord: fattigdom bland dem som har arbete, jämförande studie, 
arbetsmarknad, välfärdsstat
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1  INTrODuCTION
1.1  Why study in-work poverty?
Common sense tells that there should be a negative connection between work and 
poverty. In fact, there is no better way to secure one’s welfare than work. Economic 
well-being is maintained with the wages people receive from paid work. In addition, 
work organises everyday life and enables maintenance of social relationships. Work 
prevents social deprivation and it assists in keeping individuals active in the functions 
of modern society (Warr and Wall 1975; Jahoda 1982).
Yet, in the 1980’s researchers in the United States found out that a large proportion 
of poor households’ family members were actually working (Levitan and Taggart 
1983; Danziger and Gottschalk 1986; Klein and Rones 1989; Bane and Ellwood 1991). 
This phenomenon, which is called “working poor”, has since then been a common 
feature of the United States’ poverty research. In 1979 there were 7 million working 
poor in the USA according to the official poverty line (Levitan and Taggart 1983, 20). 
In 2004 official statistics showed that the number of working poor was 7.8 million 
(U.S. Department of Labor 2006); that is 5.6 percent of persons in the labour force. 
Thus, in-work poverty has been very persistent and widespread in the USA during 
the last decades. 
The debate around in-work poverty has also increased in Europe during the past few 
years. Poverty has been found to be more and more common among the active – in 
economic terms working – population. (Peña-Casas and Latta 2004, 1–3.) Concerns 
have been raised that in-work poverty may become a problem in Europe too. Moreover, 
even the European Commission (2003) highlighted in-work poverty in the Commis-
sion’s initiative against poverty and social exclusion. A recent study focusing on so-
called EU15 countries (Bardone and Guio 2005) shows that approximately 7 percent 
of all workers were poor in 2001. This means that around 11 million workers in EU15 
countries appeared to be living in a poor household. 
Comparisons of official statistics of the USA and the EU are not very fruitful because 
of the different population sizes (the USA has approximately 300 million and the 
EU15 countries 385 million inhabitants) and different poverty measures. The USA’s 
official poverty line (see Orshansky 1965; Rank 2004, 22–23) is adjusted to take into 
account inflation, but compared to median income the level of the poverty line has 
been falling in relative value since its creation in the mid 1960’s. In 1959 the poverty 
threshold for a family of four was approximately 50 percent of the median four-person 
family income. In 1980 it was 35 percent and in 2000 only 28 percent. Basically this 
means that in 1959, households just below the poverty threshold lived much closer to 
the economic midpoint than they did in 2000. (Rank 2004 23–24; Zuberi 2006.) In 
Europe, the poverty threshold is connected to the 60 percent of median disposable 
incomes. The USA’s poverty line is thus a much harsher measure than the method 
used in the EU (Glennerster 2002).
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Nevertheless, all this information about poverty among the working population should 
be rather disturbing because it is by no means wrong to say that paid work is the 
core value of modern societies. After World War II, continuous and rapid economic 
growth and building of welfare states moulded modern societies into a direction 
where the working population had material security. Gösta Esping-Andersen (1996) 
has described the years before the first oil crisis as a “Golden Age of welfare states”. 
The era was characterized by neo-corporatist bargaining systems, fallback systems 
of social security, division of labour between men and women (the so-called male 
breadwinner model), standardized working conditions and working career trajectories 
(Beck 2000, 17–18). 
The traditional concept of welfare states was built around the norm that the average 
employee was a male whose earned wages were covering his domestic responsibili-
ties. It meant that wages were supposed to be high enough to support also a wife and 
children. Paid wages were not “individual” but more of a “family wage”. This system 
has been called a “wage-earner’s welfare state”. (See e.g. Castles 1985.) 
All this is in a process of change. The change that has occurred in labour markets and 
welfare states could be characterized by the decline of paid employment, individuali-
sation, globalisation and erosion of families. The environment where welfare states 
operate is under pressure. On the one hand, old social risks (unemployment, popula-
tion ageing, etc.) still cause a lot of problems, but on the other hand, new social risks 
have also emerged. These include unstable labour markets, changing family patterns 
and difficulties of combining work and care responsibilities. At the same time as new 
social risks have occurred, welfare states have been criticised for preventing economic 
growth, creating negative incentives to work and being incapable of responding to 
the risks and needs of the new global economy. (Esping-Andersen 1999; Beck 2000; 
Pierson 2001a; Bonoli 2002; Taylor-Gooby 2004.) 
We might have witnessed “a change of norm”. Traditional thought patterns of how 
things should be arranged could still be in effect, but the reality in which labour 
market and welfare state institutions operate has changed. It just might be the case 
that the traditional one-earner model is no longer sufficient to secure well-being for 
the entire household. There is a possibility that the norm has changed from a wage-
earner’s welfare state to a two-earners welfare state, which again might have led to 
new social problems – like in-work poverty.
The ultimate goal of this study is therefore to take an internationally comparative view 
of in-work poverty, which is currently one of the most debated social policy issues. The 
objective is to analyze in-work poverty from different perspectives and thus to detect 
whether there has happened a change of norm in labour markets’ and welfare states’ 
institutional setting. This study is rooted in the tradition of international comparative 
welfare research (Buhmann et al. 1988; O’Higgins and Jenkins 1990; Mitchell 1991; 
Smeeding et al. 1993). From the 1980’s onwards, the use of comparable micro-data 
has been possible for researchers. The Luxembourg Income Study project (LIS) started 
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to compile comparable data in 1983, and the European Union launched European 
Community Household Panel study in 1994. These have helped researchers to assess 
how macro-level variations impact on the lives of individuals. 
 
It is difficult to make international comparisons on the occurrence of new social risks 
because the magnitude of problems and methods of solving them vary from country to 
country. But on the other hand, as for example Robert Goodin et al. (1999, 259) have 
noticed, all countries have governments which are “forces of good”; whether defined in 
terms of reducing poverty, increasing equality, promoting integration and stability or 
furthering autonomy. This notion both justifies and provides a valid basis for making 
international comparisons of in-work poverty. The goal of improving the well-being 
of citizens is the same everywhere, but the ways in which this goal is pursued vary.
Previous studies of in-work poverty in Anglo-American countries have emphasized 
the deterioration of minimum wages as a core reason behind the vast number of 
working poor. Also, the problems of finding full-year and full-time work in labour 
markets where minimum wages already leave workers under the poverty line make 
the situation even worse. In addition, the working poor have generally low – or no 
– medical benefits, they are excluded from many forms of government support and 
their jobs leave little flexibility for child care or the normal appointments and needs 
of everyday life. The main sources of income redistribution are different in-work 
benefit schemes – the most notable is the USA’s Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), 
which is a negative income tax, paying money for low-income workers. (See e.g. Klein 
and Rones 1989; Bane and Ellwood 1991; Kim 1998; Shulman 2003.)
In Europe, the traditional mechanisms that make work pay, such as organisation of 
labour, wage setting and mandated rights have kept the working population effec-
tively out of poverty (Katzenstein 1985; Freeman 1994; Huber and Stephens 2001). 
In Europe, the debate of in-work poverty has been connected more to issues of oc-
cupational status, i.e. poverty among certain occupations has occurred because of 
low skill requirements or low valuation of particular occupations (see e.g. Erikson 
and Goldthorpe 1992). 
However, in recent years the themes of the Anglo-American debate have been brought 
into Europe. Low-quality employment has become a serious concern in EU coun-
tries. The lack of comparative studies on in-work poverty in Europe has been filled 
in recent years. Those themes that previous studies of working poor in EU countries 
have raised (see e.g. O’Connor and Smeeding 1993; Delhausse 1995; Millar et al. 1997; 
Peña-Casas and Latta 2004; Bardone and Guio 2005) are taken further in this study. 
Earlier studies have concentrated on cross-sectional analyses and they have normally 
utilised one measure of poverty. Here in-work poverty will be analysed over a longer 
time span and, in addition to this, the dynamics of in-work poverty and different 
ways of measuring poverty are also taken into consideration. The extent, nature and 
factors of in-work poverty are well documented in earlier studies, but there are still 
blanks that need to be filled. 
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The need to study in-work poverty in an internationally comparative way has impor-
tant policy-relevance. Like David Shipler (2004) puts it, working poor should be an 
oxymoron. Nobody who works hard should be poor. In-work poverty also threatens 
social stability. The European Commission (2001) has declared that the founding 
basis for the European economic and social models is a competitive economy that 
combines efficiency with high levels of social protection and better jobs. The debate of 
in-work poverty is overshadowing these attempts to improve social inclusion within 
the European Union. 
1.2  Structure of the book
The structure of the book is the following. Chapters 2 and 3 broaden the topics that 
this introductory chapter has outlined. There are two distinct topics that need to be 
addressed. The one is “working” and the other is “poverty”. Chapter 2 broadens the 
frame of reference by taking into consideration both labour market and welfare state 
context. The chapter includes a short history of paid work, labour market arrange-
ments, welfare state regimes and changes at an institutional level. In-work poverty is 
a symptom of the failure of labour markets’ and welfare states’ cooperation. In-work 
poverty is thus set into its institutional perspective.
In Chapter 3, the issue of poverty is spelled out in a more detailed way. When studying 
poverty it is necessary that we know what poverty is, how to measure it and, most of 
all, what it means to people who experience it. Theorisation of poverty is widened to 
touch on working poor. The characteristics and reasons for being working poor are 
examined using what we know from previous studies. 
Research questions, data and research setting are presented in Chapter 4. The main 
objective is to take an internationally comparative view of in-work poverty. The main 
questions are: 
 How in-work poverty has developed in OECD countries during  
 the years 1970–2000? 
 How the picture of poverty among working households changes  
 in EU countries by different poverty measures? 
 What are the factors behind in-work poverty in EU countries? 
 What is the nature of in-work poverty dynamics in EU countries? 
Definitions that are essential for research of working poor are discussed in the 
research setting section. Empirical analyses are based mainly on European Com-
munity Household Panel data (ECHP). The comparative focus of the study is very 
strongly concentrated on so-called EU15 countries whenever possible. Because of lack 
of data, some analyses are made with EU12 or EU10 countries. The countries used 
are explained in more detail in empirical chapters. Historical analyses from OECD 
countries are made with Luxembourg Income Study data (LIS) and with data from 
Finnish Household Budget Surveys. 
1)
2)
3)
4)
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Chapters 5–8 constitute the empirical part. All four main research questions are 
analysed and answered, each in its own exclusive chapter. First, the working poor 
phenomenon is put into larger perspective and changes within six OECD countries 
(Finland, Sweden, Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States) in 
1970–2000 are analysed. The main objective is to study trends of the occurrence of 
in-work poverty in these six countries that represent different welfare state regimes 
(Esping-Andersen 1990). The trends of in-work poverty are analysed in the context of 
changes on an institutional level. This includes changes in labour markets, in family 
structures and in welfare systems. 
Moreover, the 30-year time span enables analysis of how “new” a social risk in-work 
poverty actually is. When studying the town of York, Seebohm Rowntree (1901) no-
ticed that working and having a family was almost a certain way of becoming poor. 
These notions were made over a hundred years ago. There might be significant social 
problems, but for one reason or another they are not issues of prevailing public debate. 
Once in a while some problem may come up as a new problem, although it might 
have been “bubbling under” for a long time (see Abrahamsson 1995). The working 
poor problem in Europe can simultaneously be a new and an old problem. After all, 
it might be that it has never really gone away, but there have been times when it has 
not been a subject of public debate.
After setting the scene, the issue of (in-work) poverty measurement in EU countries is 
examined. The objective is to gain a more thorough understanding of the European 
working poor problem. The question is how the picture of in-work poverty changes 
when different poverty measures are used. In other words, do alternative approaches 
to in-work poverty produce similar or contrasting results of the prevalence and cross-
national differences of in-work poverty? We adopt similar approaches to those which 
have been common in poverty research in general (see Nolan and Whelan 1996; Kangas 
and Ritakallio 1998). We use three measures of poverty side-by-side (relative income 
method, subjective poverty measure and deprivation index) to get a deeper under-
standing of the prevalence of in-work poverty in the EU. This enables us to study the 
multidimensional character of in-work poverty much more thoroughly. It also gives us 
a picture of the extent and nature of in-work poverty in EU countries. Previous studies 
of working poor in EU countries (e.g. Peña-Casas and Latta 2004; Strengmann-Kuhn 
2004; Bardone and Guio 2005) have usually utilised only one poverty measure – the 
relative income method, in which poverty is measured indirectly.
The factors behind in-work poverty in EU countries are the third topic that is re-
searched. Working poor studies in the USA have disclosed three factors that have 
usually been perceived as background factors for in-work poverty (see e.g. Levitan 
and Taggart 1983; Klein and Rones 1989). These factors are low wages, involuntary 
part-time employment and periods of unemployment. The working poor may, 
therefore, actually be poor because their employment does not provide them a suf-
ficient financial income (low-wage employment), but the reasons for their poverty 
may also be related to lack of employment. Contrary to the US-based evidence, the 
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reasons behind the working poor issue in EU countries seem to be more related to 
the household context than to labour market problems (Peña-Casas and Latta 2004; 
Strengmann-Kuhn 2004). 
The final part of the empirical section is dedicated to studying the nature of in-work 
poverty dynamics in EU countries. It is a topic that has been studied very little in EU 
countries (see Peña-Casas and Latta 2004, 25–28), but the question of what happens to 
working poor households over time is an essential one. There are three topics that are 
especially interesting in in-work poverty dynamics. First, what proportion of work-
ing households lives in constant poverty in Europe? Secondly, how large are poverty 
inflows and outflows, i.e. how many households exit, enter or stay in poverty? Thirdly, 
we seek an answer to the question that is often asked but rarely answered: Is there 
a system of social mobility which works as a “career ladder” and enables workers to 
move up to better jobs and increasing earnings, and which eventually lifts working 
poor households over the poverty line? 
The final chapter (Chapter 9) summarises the empirical findings and reviews their 
implications. The concluding chapter gathers together what has happened, and why, 
in the field of working poor in an international perspective. Issues for the future are 
also taken into consideration. These include, for example, topics that should be ad-
dressed in future research and what the future of working poor might bring.
17Change of Norm? In-Work Poverty in a Comparative Perspective
2  ChANGING LAbOur MArKETS, ChANGING WELFArE STATES
2.1  Towards the work society
The history of work was for centuries a history of insecurities and precarious forms 
of work. In the beginning of the 1800’s, the working population was typically without 
a regular or secure source of income. Livelihood for a sizeable part of the population 
consisted of day labouring, begging and even robbing. All this started to change with 
the industrial revolution. The history of paid work is intertwined tightly with its im-
portant “by-product” – the welfare state. Therefore, the history of changing labour 
markets is connected to the development of welfare states.
2.1.1  Beginning of paid work 
The question of how to arrange labour markets in such a way as to best utilise the 
economy has puzzled researchers and politicians for centuries. One of the most fa-
mous classics of economics, Adam Smith’s (1776) ‘Wealth of the Nations’ was one of 
the first attempts to theorise how effective labour markets function. Smith’s theory 
of the “invisible hand” that guides markets is still one of the basic pillars of so-called 
neo-liberal economics. Smith concluded that state’s control over markets should be 
as limited as possible and the “invisible hand” of the free labour market should take 
care of possible failures. 
Smith’s theory was created in a time when corporate entrepreneurship was still in 
its infancy. During the 1800’s, the issue of labour market functioning became more 
and more important because of industrialisation. The rapid increase in the number 
of industrial workers created a new social class. Karl Marx presented his analysis of 
capitalism, which predicted that capitalism was destined to end because of unsol- 
vable problems. In Marx’s thoughts the working class would cause the end of capital-
ism because the constant impoverishment of the working class would finally launch 
revolutionary actions (Pierson 1991, 10–11).
Modern social policy was created as capitalism’s answer to the needs of a growing 
working class. The first public social security systems were introduced in Germany 
in the 1880’s. The basic idea of these systems was to integrate the working class into 
society. The main objective was to reproduce the labour force for the needs of the 
industrial sector, but improvements in the standard of living of workers also dimin-
ished revolutionary thoughts. (Cahnman and Schmitt 1979.) Other industrialised 
European countries followed Germany’s example and created similar systems. In 
short, modern social policy was developed mainly because of this new social class of 
industrial workers.  
In the dawn of the 1900’s, interest in the living conditions of the working population 
was strong. This was especially the case in England, where Charles Booth (1895) in 
London and Seebohm Rowntree (1901) in York surveyed working-class households. 
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They established the tradition of poverty research that today is being called evidence-
based policy (Bradshaw 2001). They were also the first researchers to conclude that 
poverty among the able-bodied (working) population was the result of structural, 
not behavioural factors. Poverty and hopelessness were before seen more as a “God-
given destiny”, but Rowntree, for example, presented in his study that more than half 
of the poor in York were in regular work but their wages were too low to maintain a 
moderate family in a state of physical efficiency. 
Rowntree (1901) presented the so-called traditional life-cycle theory of poverty, which 
suggested that the risk of being poor was highest during childhood, when parenting 
young children and during old age. Similarly, the risk was lower for persons who were 
just entering the labour markets and did not have children and for persons whose 
children had moved away from the family home. Thus, poverty was strongly con-
nected to having children and a low ability to work. 
The working-class population was almost destined to be in poverty in the 1800’s and 
in the beginning of the 1900’s because work was mainly a commodity that employers 
used and in many ways also exploited. Social security systems were so inadequate that 
the working class lived in a constant state of social insecurity. They were not able to 
control their future, and even everyday life was a constant battle to survive. 
2.1.2  Birth of the modern welfare state 
Gösta Esping-Andersen (1996) has referred to the era after World War II as a “Golden 
Age” of capitalism. The modern welfare state, which improved the living conditions 
of the working class, became an intrinsic part of the “Golden Age”. Right after World 
War II, moral approaches became a popular mobilising force behind the growth of 
the welfare state. They were based upon public and elite reactions against the hard-
ships inflicted by early industrialisation. In such accounts, stress was placed on the 
growth of humanitarian sentiment of the governing and middle classes, the growth 
of knowledge of social and medical conditions affecting the industrial sector’s 
workers and a growing awareness of the importance of public health provision. 
(Pierson 1991, 14.)  
These approaches, which suggested that the welfare state’s justifications were based on 
the “guilty conscience” of the governing and middle classes, lost their meaning during 
the 1970’s. The new theory of welfare state development highlighted the coming of the 
welfare state as a product of “the logic of industrialism”. Harold Wilensky was one 
of the most famous advocates of this industrialism thesis. Wilensky (1975 and 1976) 
noticed that the development of industrial societies required new needs. Traditional 
forms of social provision and working life were inadequate in a new situation where 
industry needed a reliable, healthy and literate workforce. Social and economic sys-
tems were arranged to support technological development of industrial production 
and economic growth. Wilensky (1975, 27) theorised that no matter what cultural or 
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political traditions industrialised countries had, economic growth made countries 
more alike in their welfare state strategy. 
“The logic of industrialism” had its competitor in early neo-Marxist accounts (see 
e.g. Offe 1977), which emphasized changing relations of production, i.e. the welfare 
state was a product of “the logic of capitalism”. Both industrialisation theorists and 
neo-Marxist theorists shared a similar functionalist logic. Welfare states were the in-
evitable product of economic forces beyond the control of policy makers that compel 
a common response (see also Giddens 1976; Myles and Quadagno 2002). 
Theories of welfare state development were added during the 1980’s when Walter 
Korpi (1980) presented his “power resource theory” and Margaret Weir, Ann Orloff 
and Theda Skocpol (1988) elaborated an institutionalist approach. Korpi, among 
others (see e.g. Palme 1990; Kangas 1991), empirically tested that major differences in 
welfare state spending among capitalist democracies could be explained by the success 
of left parties. Weir et al. (1988) showed that in the USA the institutional features of 
government and the rules of electoral competition had a strong significance on elec-
toral and policy outcomes, which explained the distinctive development of the U.S. 
welfare institutions compared to (Western) Europe.
The welfare state process, which reigned in OECD countries after the World War II, 
answered rapidly and effectively the biggest problem of the pre-war working popula-
tion: The working class had lived in a constant state of impoverishment and social 
insecurity, but welfare states built totally new and strong social security mechanisms, 
which were connected to the work status. If work excluded people from society before 
the World Wars, after the wars it became the core value and mode of integration in 
modern industrialised societies, even to such an extent that still nowadays almost no 
alternative to being a “full citizen” remains (Beck 2000, 11). 
The welfare state process effectively erased Rowntree’s life-cycle theory of poverty. 
In the twenty-five years following World War II, it was largely a social democratic 
outlook that defined the prevailing orthodoxy of the welfare state (Pierson 1991, 40). 
Expansion of state services and continuous economic growth enabled industrialised 
countries to reduce poverty, and the working population’s well-being was improved. 
Risk groups of poverty became highly selective. These included, for example, the el-
derly population (mainly widows), families with many children and disabled persons 
(Esping-Andersen 1999, 149).
2.2  Varying labour markets of the industrialised countries 
The welfare state process was following T.H. Marshall’s (1950) idea of social rights. 
The question of social rights was thus one of decommodification, i.e. of granting alter-
native means of welfare to that of the market (Esping-Andersen 1990, 21). In practice 
it meant that individuals (workers) were emancipated from market dependence by 
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compulsory state social insurance schemes with fairly strong entitlements. Workers 
were no more under the absolute authority of employers. 
Keeping the working-age population employed became an important objective in 
the 1960’s, and OECD countries handled this task quite well. In the 1960’s and in 
the beginning of the 1970’s, the overall unemployment rate in OECD countries was 
between 3–4 percent (OECD 1992, 43). Even the less educated and less skilled workers 
had full-time and permanent jobs. This was partly because of the Keynesian economic 
policy of the time. John Maynard Keynes originally presented economic policy theories 
that were followed in industrialised countries. Full employment was a major objective 
of societies and high inflation was not seen as that harmful. The foundation of social 
welfare lay in the labour market. When there was full employment then there was 
also low demand for social transfers. In addition to this, full employment secured a 
large tax base to finance social welfare for the aged, the sick and for those few who 
were unemployed. (Myles 1996, 118.)
Family also had an important role in terms of risk management. Especially in central 
Europe, social policy systems both assumed the widespread existence of single wage-
earner families and actively encouraged citizens to form one-earner families. Men 
worked and women took care of domestic responsibilities. This way the reconciliation 
of work and domestic responsibilities took place almost without the help of the public 
sector. (Esping-Andersen 1999, 148–149.) 
Different countries have had different labour market policies since the beginning of the 
1970’s, and these policies have led to different results (see e.g. Stephens 1979; Castles 
1985; Krugman 1994). One of the major reasons for labour market policy changes has 
been the rapid change in employment structures. In 1960 the industrial sector and 
service sector were as big in current EU15 countries (approximately 40% of employees 
worked in both sectors). In the USA the service sector was already widespread; the 
service sector constituted 56 percent of all workers while the industrial sector had 
35 percent of workers in 1960. (OECD 1992.) In 2000 the service sector’s share of all 
workers was 67 percent in EU15 countries and 74 percent in the USA. At the same 
time, the number of industrial workers had decreased to fewer than 30 percent of all 
workers in EU15 countries and 23 percent in the USA (OECD 2001a). 
During the 1970’s, unemployment became a common European phenomenon. 
The oil crisis and inflation were the main reasons behind this development. Anglo-
American countries, especially the USA, took the new neo-classical economic ideas 
(see Friedman 1962) as guidelines of labour market policy. The most notable result of 
the chosen policy was rising income inequality. The dispersion of wages was high in 
Anglo-American countries (see e.g. Myles 1996, 117; Katz and Autor 1999; Peracchi 
1999). By the late 1980’s, wage dispersion in the USA was at the same level as after the 
Great Depression in the 1930’s (Goldin and Margo 1992). 
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The USA maintained a high level of employment in the 1970’s even when unem-
ployment rates grew in Europe. Labour market policy that allowed rising income 
inequalities also enabled low levels of unemployment by creating new low-productive 
jobs. However, inequality of wages divided the workforce into two opposites – those 
who enjoyed a decent living and those who – regardless of working – lived in poverty. 
Paradoxically, even though unemployment decreased, the poverty rates stayed stable. 
This was due to the fact that more and more employed people were falling into poverty 
(Levitan and Taggart 1983). 
In Europe wages were much more inflexible, which meant that during macro-eco-
nomic changes labour markets adjusted the amount of jobs. In practice this meant 
that unemployment increased during recessions. In EU15 countries the average 
unemployment rate was 2.8 percent in 1974 (OECD 1992, 45). In 1987 the average 
unemployment rate had increased to 10.3 percent. The public sector held against 
the dispersion of wages and income inequality. The working population was conse-
quently well protected against macro-economic shocks and poverty focused mainly 
on unemployed (Halleröd 1998, 286). In other words, inequality of wages in the USA 
and unemployment in Europe could actually be considered as two sides of the same 
coin (Krugman 1994). 
It would be oversimplifying to say that European countries could be clustered into one 
“All-European” model of welfare state and labour market policy. Different countries in 
Europe have taken their own routes of labour market policies and income maintenance 
systems to respond to the challenges of economic and social change. There are various 
typologies of welfare state regimes. The first typology was made by Richard Titmuss 
(1958), who separated two distinctive welfare state models: residual and institutional. 
Ramesh Mishra (1984) took the idea further, but it was Gösta Esping-Andersen, whose 
book “Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism” (1990) really made a difference. 
Esping-Andersen’s typology contained three different welfare state regimes, namely 
liberal, social democratic and corporatist. Esping-Andersen’s typology has been criti-
cised because of the weak focus on reconciliation of work and family. Critique has 
pointed out the narrow-mindedness of the approach – according to which women are 
seen either as mothers or workers, but not as both (see e.g. Orloff 1993; Lewis 1998, 15). 
Esping-Andersen’s typology has also been modified. For example, Stephan Leibfried 
(1993) and Maurizio Ferrera (1996) suggested to include a fourth – Southern European 
or Mediterranean – regime. The arrangement of social insurance institutions has been 
also used as a tool of typology (see e.g. Korpi and Palme 1998, 666).
Esping-Andersen’s typology’s first regime, liberal, has closest resemblance to Anglo-
American countries overseas (USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand). The United 
Kingdom and Ireland are typically clustered from EU countries in this regime, al-
though Ireland has been distancing itself in many respects from the UK (Ferrera and 
Hemerijck 2003, 101). Anglo-Saxon “heritage” is probably one of the major factors 
for Ireland’s inclusion in the liberal welfare regime. Traditionally, the liberal regime 
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has been characterised by modest levels of social protection, tough commodification 
incentives and a predilection for targeted provision (Esping-Andersen 1990; Ferrera 
and Hemerijck 2003). This view is in many ways exaggerated, but on the whole, rising 
inequality and a high rate of poverty have been common features in liberal welfare 
regime countries.
The social democratic regime is sometimes also referred to as a Nordic or Scandinavian 
regime, which refers to the fact that typical representatives of this regime have been 
Sweden, Finland and Denmark from the EU15 countries. Again, different emphasizes 
of clusters can be found. For example, Korpi and Palme (1998) clustered Denmark 
with Anglo-American countries in a basic security model. Typical characteristics of 
the social democratic model include universal social protection that is supplemented 
with mandatory occupational social schemes that give additional benefits for workers; 
a wide array of public social services and active labour market programs exist and 
taxation has a dominant role in the financing of the welfare state (Esping-Andersen 
1990; Goodin et al. 1999, 45–51). High rates of labour force participation from both 
genders, low unemployment rates (before the recession in the beginning of the 1990’s) 
and consolidated nationwide wage bargaining systems that comprise government, 
employer unions and employee unions are other distinctive features of the social 
democratic regime.
The corporatist welfare state regime includes Central European countries (Germany, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, France and Austria) of the EU15 countries. 
Bismarckian tradition, which means that support for traditional (male breadwinner) 
family values, where work position and social entitlements are intertwined, is still 
visible both in the field of income maintenance and in the health sector (Ferrera and 
Hemerijck 2003, 107). It should be stressed, though, that corporatist regime countries 
have converged with other OECD countries on family patterns (OECD 2005b, 240). 
Because of highly regulated labour markets, (female) employment levels have been 
low, labour costs have been high and unemployment has been an acute problem for 
decades, and in some countries the youth unemployment rate is very high (especially 
in Belgium and in France) (Esping-Andersen 1996, 18–19; Ferrera and Hemerijck 2003 
107–109; OECD 2005b, 247).
Esping-Andersen’s typology clustered Southern European countries under the corpor-
atist regime, but many researchers have concluded that there is a distinctive fourth 
welfare state regime, which comprises Southern European countries (see e.g. Leibfried 
1993; Ferrera 1996; Petmesidou 1996). This Southern European welfare state regime (or 
Mediterranean or Latin-Rim regime as it is also known) comprises the last four of the 
EU15 countries (Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal). The Southern European welfare 
state regime can be characterised by an undeveloped safety net underneath social 
insurance, the prominent role of occupational funds and social partners in income 
maintenance policy and family having a high importance as a welfare “broker” for its 
members, which affects women’s position in labour markets (Saraceno 1994; Ferrera 
and Hemerijck 2003, 115). Labour markets in Southern European countries are in 
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many ways segmented. Irregular workers, small entrepreneur firms and an extended 
black economy pose efficiency and equity problems (Moreno 2000).
The exceptional increase of income inequality in the USA is in many ways connected 
to the fact that labour markets and wage-setting systems have become highly decen-
tralised. One of the commonly used measures of labour market centralisation is the 
degree of union membership. In the Europe Union, density differs very much between 
countries (see Table 1). Jelle Visser (2006, 45) noticed that during the years 1970 and 
Table 1. Industrial policy systems in EU15 countries and in USA in 2000.
Country union density (%)
union density 
change 1970–2000 
(%)
Collective bargain-
ing coverage (%)
Existence of 
minimum wage 
legislation²
Austria 37 –19 Over 95 No
Belgium 56 15 Over 90 Yes (1162)
Denmark 74 14 Over 80 No
Finland 76 25 Over 90 No
France 10 –12 Over 90 Yes (1150)
Germany 25 –7 68 No
Greece 27 –12¹ n.a. Yes (725)
Ireland 38 –15 n.a. Yes (910)
Italy 35 –2 Over 80 No
Luxembourg 34 –13 Over 60 Yes (1338)
Netherlands 23 –14 Over 80 Yes (1225)
Portugal 24 –37¹ Over 80 Yes (543)
Spain 15 8¹ Over 80 Yes (617)
Sweden 79 11 Over 90 No
United Kingdom 31 –14 Over 30 Yes (983)
USA 15 –14 14 Yes (826)
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 2004.
¹ 1980–2000.
² Source: Clare & Paternoster 2003, monthly minimum wages are converted into an artificial common currency unit called  
   Purchasing Power Standard (PPS). Minimum wages in PPS are in parentheses.
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2003 union density rates fell in practically all OECD countries. Union density had 
increased in only four small economies (Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Belgium). 
These countries are the only ones in which unions are involved in the administration 
and execution of unemployment insurance. These four countries could also be clus-
tered as high union density countries. Density rates in these countries varied between 
Sweden’s 79 percent and Belgium’s 56 percent. France (10%) and Spain (15%) have 
the smallest rates of union density in the EU15 countries. Other EU15 countries had 
density rates between 23 and 37 percent. (OECD 2004; Visser 2006.) 
Union density is just one part of the corporatist framework. Bargaining power of 
unions, coverage of labour contracts negotiated by unions and importance of work-
place-based institutions (“work councils”) are also decisive in how labour relations 
and wage-setting systems function. For example in France, where union density is 
very low, social dialogue in firms is largely made through work councils. Tradition-
ally (see e.g. Katzenstein 1985, 61) France has been a country with highly centralised 
economic planning (the system is often referred as “statism”), which has made the 
effect of councils rather small. In UK labour relations the system consists entirely of 
unions and collective bargaining (see e.g. Rogers and Streeck 1994).
Bargaining coverage is very high in EU countries other than the UK (data from Ireland 
and Greece is missing). Compared to the USA, it is obvious that the labour force in 
Europe is largely integrated with the wage-setting institutions. There are also national 
minimum wage systems in many countries. Minimum wages are a form of regulative 
policy that countries use to stabilise labour markets and to secure adequate wages. 
Nine out of the EU15 countries have some form of minimum wage legislation. These 
countries are the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, the United Kingdom, 
Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal (Clare and Paternoster, 2003). However, there are 
no minimum wage laws in the Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden and Denmark) or 
in Germany, Italy and Austria. 
Use of the purchasing power standard, which is an artificial common currency, to com-
pare minimum wages shows that Mediterranean countries had the lowest minimum 
wages in 2003 (Clare and Paternoster 2003). The USA’s minimum wage was higher 
than those of Portugal, Spain and Greece and approximately on the same level with the 
UK and Ireland. In countries without minimum wage laws wage-setting agreements 
between state, employer unions and employee unions (so-called social corporatism) 
had normally included joint agreements of minimum wage levels. 
EU15 countries can be clustered into different industrial policy systems. The first 
cluster includes the Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden), where union 
density and collective bargaining coverage are high and there is no minimum wage 
legislation. Belgium could be counted in this cluster, although there is minimum 
wage legislation, which is very generous (see Clare and Paternoster 2003, 3). The 
second cluster includes Spain and France, where union density is low but collective 
bargaining coverage is high and there is minimum wage legislation. All other EU15 
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countries could be clustered between these two extremes. The USA is situated some-
where between Spain and France (low union density) and the UK (low collective 
bargaining coverage). 
The working population in EU15 countries is quite well protected. High collective 
bargaining coverage (UK apart) is definitely a useful tool for securing wage equality 
because even those outside of unions receive the same wage levels as their unionised 
compatriots. Low minimum wages, especially in the Southern European countries, 
and diminishing union density in most of the EU countries are features that might 
threaten the economic position of the working population. The union density change 
is an especially strong indicator that the power of collective agreements is getting 
weaker. 
The debate of low-wage jobs is an integral part of the whole issue of well-being of the 
working population. The poverty-reducing effect of minimum wages is widely ques-
tioned in many of the countries that have minimum wage legislation. The low level 
of employment in low-wage jobs is a cause of concern in the countries that do not 
have minimum wage laws. It is widely suggested that the solution to the unemploy-
ment problem in these countries lies in the creation of low-wage jobs. However, some 
researchers have pointed out that increasing flexibility of the labour market not only 
creates low-wage jobs, but can also increase poverty among the working population. 
(Nolan and Marx 1999, 2.) Therefore, different kinds of in-work benefits and tax relief 
systems have been introduced to help workers. 
Probably the most notable in-work benefit system is the USA’s Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC). In addition to tax credits, in-work benefits are available in the form 
of housing allowances or family allowances, or reductions in social security charges 
(Gray 2004, 106). In-work benefit systems have their own problems. First, they might 
be very costly. The EITC program cost approximately 40 billion dollars in 2003, and 
there were a little over 19 million households that received credits (Levitis 2006). The 
UK government’s bill for tax credits in 2002 was around 6.6 billion pounds (Gray 
2004, 106). Secondly, in-work benefits do not reach all forms of work disincentives. 
These include, for example, high travel costs to work, which reduce the net financial 
attractiveness of work and have a similar effect as lower money wage. Tax credit systems 
do not always take these kinds of costs into consideration. Thirdly, in-work benefits 
include a risk that they encourage employers to pay low wages. 
In-work benefits existed in nine of the EU15 countries in 2002 (see Peters et al. 2004, 
91–95). Different kinds of employment-conditional benefits were in use in Germany, 
Ireland and the UK. Employment-conditional tax credit systems could be found in 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, the Netherlands and the UK. Other forms 
of in-work benefits (family allowances and childcare tax relief that are granted for 
low-wage employees) could be found in Finland, Italy and the UK. 
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The tradition of relatively heavy labour market regulation in Europe has also been 
criticised (Treu 1992; OECD 1994). European labour markets are said to suffer from 
“Eurosclerosis”, which means that the seemingly inexorable rise in unemployment 
rates in the 1970’s was caused and upheld mainly because of inflexible labour regula-
tion. Comparisons between Europe and the USA are often highlighted that low federal 
minimum wage and flexible (few restrictions on employers’ power to hire and fire 
employees) labour laws in the USA have created a “job miracle”. The USA has come 
to be held up as a model of successful labour market performance. Deregulation of 
labour contracts, minimal trade union rights and low minimum wages are supposed 
to create more jobs. At the same time, the real wage level of the poorest workers has 
constantly declined and overall insecurity in labour markets has increased. (Gray 2004, 
140–141.) In Europe there have also been demands for acceleration of job growth by 
tearing down policy impediments. These include loosening of employment protection 
regulations, cutting down tax rates (payroll-, income- and consumption taxes) and 
increasing of pay inequalities. 
Thus, synthesis of labour market performance demonstrates that in Europe workers 
have been well protected. They have unions, large bargaining coverage, quite high 
minimum wages and in-work benefit systems that have kept in-work poverty out of the 
European vocabulary. On the other hand, high unemployment has increased demands 
for tearing down of labour force protection in order to improve labour force participa-
tion. The traditional trade-off between high unemployment and low in-work poverty 
in European countries has faced pressures to turn the situation upside down. Sugges-
tions that, for example, the OECD’s Jobs Study (1994) recommended could be leading 
to the trade-off between high unemployment and increasing in-work poverty. 
The flexible, market-oriented labour market system that the USA has practiced and 
the inflexible, government-oriented labour market systems of the EU certainly led to 
very different results in the 1970’s and 1980’s. The USA’s wage dispersion increased but 
unemployment was held at a low level. In Europe the situation was more or less the 
reverse. However, the “standard interpretation” that the USA’s labour market system 
could be described as a “job miracle” while EU countries’ labour market systems 
create mainly structural unemployment has been questioned. Jørgen Goul Andersen 
and Jan Bendix Jensen (2002) provided a broad comparative analysis of EU15 coun-
tries and the USA. Their conclusion was that different labour market systems in the 
beginning of 2000’s no longer followed the pattern of the standard interpretation of 
structural unemployment. From the 1970’s to the middle of the 1990’s the contrast 
between Europe and the USA was very sharp. The labour force participation rate 
increased in the USA but remained constant in EU15 countries. By 2000 inflexible 
European labour markets did not appear to be so poorly adapted to the challenges 
of globalization, and many of the EU15 countries had achieved unemployment rates 
that were far below the previously estimated limits of structural employment. At the 
same time, the USA’s flexible system was not as effective as one might have thought. 
Despite huge wage dispersion, unemployment concentrated in the low educated and 
low skilled population. The claim that high minimum wages and generous social 
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protection are impediments to improved employment was not that obvious anymore. 
(Goul Andersen and Bendix Jensen 2002, 54.) 
These anomalies of the standard interpretation of labour market systems could be 
analogous to the standard interpretation of in-work poverty. The normal way to in-
terpret the working poor phenomenon in the USA, and the absence of it in Europe, 
is to say that in the USA the working poor are poor because of too low minimum 
wages, moderate welfare benefits and the simple fact that job opportunities are avail-
able and poor people are pushed to work. In Europe the situation is converse: there 
is no army of “shoe-polishers”, and poor people are mostly unemployed. But then 
again, for example, Laura Bardone and Anne-Catherine Guio (2005) estimated that 
approximately 7 percent of workers in EU15 countries were poor in 2001. Thus, there 
are strong reasons to suppose that the standard interpretation of in-work poverty is 
not functioning like it should be. Bardone’s and Guio’s figures suggest that the com-
mon belief of well protected workers in Europe is not completely true. There is a vast 
amount of people in EU countries who are working but yet they are poor. 
Although growth of flexibilisation has been rather mild in Europe, it is obvious that 
pressures to diminish rigid employment protection, increasing flexibility of working 
hours and wages and overall improvement of work incentives are real. During the 
1990’s, Europe has managed to overcome pretty well structural mass unemployment 
(“Eurosclerosis”), but the arising debate of in-work poverty is probably indicating that 
labour market regulation and distributive systems of the welfare state are no longer 
working as well as they used to in terms of prevent the working population from 
falling into poverty. Next we will look more closely at the current situation where 
welfare states’ operate.
2.3  Current framework of welfare states
Hugh Heclo (1981) commented on the debate of the welfare state crisis by noting 
that since the day the welfare states were born some experts have seen them as being 
in a state of crisis. A few years later Peter Flora (1986) edited the book “Growth to 
Limits”, where a famous analysis of the European welfare states was presented. Flora 
used the term “Growth to Limits” to show that welfare states had reached a certain 
point of maturation. In terms of coverage and generosity, welfare states were reaching 
maximum extension (Flora 1986). 
Peter Flora’s analysis was quite accurate, but the truth behind the change of welfare 
states and the challenges they posed was even bleaker. Endogenous and exogenous 
challenges from the 1980’s to the middle of the 1990’s created a climate that Paul 
Pierson (2001b) refers to as a “permanent austerity”. Endogenous challenges (changes 
in family structures, in labour market structures and in the life cycle) are analysed 
in more detail in Chapter 2.4.
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Exogenous challenges included changing economic conditions (worries over economic 
growth, recession in the beginning of the 1990’s, European economic and monetary 
integration, unification process in Germany, rising pressures of globalisation etc.) and 
demographic trends, of which the most notable was rapid population ageing (Esping-
Andersen 1996, 7; Pierson 2001b; Ferrera and Hemerijck 2003, 88).
The situation that industrialised welfare states have been in over the last two or three 
decades is far from ideal in many respects. On the one hand, welfare states are facing 
a situation where they are doomed to fail because they are expensive, ineffective, they 
have administrative and legitimation shortfalls, they are disturbing the functions of 
labour markets, eroding incentives to work and social protection mechanisms are not 
responding adequately to new social risks (Okun 1975; Offe 1984, 57–61; Lindbeck 
1994). Answers to the critics are that welfare states require cuts, retrenchment, mod-
ernisation, recasting, restructuring or recalibration – depending on who is observing 
welfare state change (see e.g. European Commission 1997; Ferrera and Rhodes 2000; 
Pierson 2001a; Taylor-Gooby 2004). 
On the other hand, the fight against welfare state spending is a defining character-
istic of the era of austerity (Pierson 2001b, 423). Governments are under pressure to 
finance social expenditure, but at the same time there is even stronger pressure to 
lower taxation, which is one of the major sources of funding of social outlays. The 
fear that high taxes damage economic performance is common in industrialised 
countries. Also, in EU countries deficit reduction has become a high priority, which 
has its own implications for the demands of welfare states’ cost containment. (Pierson 
2001b, 424.) Thus, on the one hand the welfare state is criticised for being ineffective 
and too expensive, and on the other hand financing of the welfare state is on a more 
loose ground than previously. 
During the last few years there has been a lot of debate over the functionality of the 
old social security systems (Pierson 1996; Pierson 2001a). In Europe, the issue of re-
trenchment of services provided by the welfare state has been the subject of widespread 
debate. The Anglo-American flexible model has become more and more popular. At 
the same time the traditional “European model” of tripartite negotiations between 
state, employers and employees has been viewed as too inflexible; some go as far as 
to say that this model is even hampering economic growth. The abolishment of old 
systems and creation of new and more dynamic systems have been demanded. (Pierson 
2001a; Ferrera and Hemerijck 2003.) 
The other major debate is concentrated on the convergence of the welfare states. Paul 
Pierson (2001b) has noticed that the pressure for the retrenchment of the welfare 
states is highest among the countries where welfare systems are the most extensive. 
In practice this means that (Western) Europe should be converging with the USA 
(Zeitlin 2003). The ability of social security systems to actually reduce inequality has 
been questioned everywhere – despite the fact that studies show that countries with 
traditionally effective welfare systems (like the Nordic countries) have been able to 
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maintain the efficiency of these systems (Kautto 2001). In Europe, retrenchment 
has often been replaced with steps aimed at rationalising and improving social wel-
fare systems. This development has often been called “re-calibrating” (Ferrera and 
Hemerijck 2003). 
The third debate that is closely related to those of functionality of welfare systems 
and convergence of welfare states is economic globalisation. It is one of the major 
“suspects” for the changing character of welfare state politics since the 1970’s (Myles 
and Quadagno 2002). Economic globalisation started with providing an exit option 
to capital, which has strengthened the bargaining power of capital owners against 
governments (Mishra 1999). Governments everywhere depend on the owners of 
capital to invest to create jobs and income. Therefore, governments are supposed to 
create a political climate that stimulates business confidence. In theory this means that 
capital is avoiding countries with high taxes and generous social insurance schemes 
and is forcing countries to “race to the bottom”. (Swank 1998 and 2001; Myles and 
Quadagno 2002.) Thus, in recent years globalisation has been a good excuse to defend 
welfare state cutbacks, rising income inequality and unemployment that is caused by 
disappearance of low-productivity industrial jobs (see Schwartz 2001).  
Strangely enough, there has been very little evidence of the supposed causality be-
tween increasing globalisation and diminishing welfare states. In fact, the first studies 
of globalisation and welfare states found the opposite result: open economies had 
larger welfare states (Stephens 1979; Katzenstein 1985). Economic openness increased 
the insecurity of workers and welfare state mechanisms cushioned the impacts of 
international competition. In recent years, similar findings have been made. Duane 
Swank (1998 and 2001) noticed that the effects of capital mobility on welfare effort 
are conditioned by the political institutions that mediate those impacts. Thus, capital 
mobility has put downward pressure on market-oriented, neo-liberal welfare states 
(USA, Canada, Australia, UK), whereas the effects of capital mobility are absent or 
positive on social provision systems in Central European and Nordic countries. 
All three debates are worrisome from the point of view of in-work poverty. Flexi-
bilisation of wage-setting systems, retrenchment of welfare states and the growing 
pressures of globalisation are all features that increase instability of labour markets 
and “pave the way” for in-work poverty. Welfare states handle labour market failures 
– like in-work poverty – with interventions in the process of income distribution 
(see Korpi 1980, 302). It is theorised that the redistributive mechanisms of welfare 
states are weakened and the neo-liberal values are winning more and more ground in 
the way welfare state functions are arranged (Esping-Andersen 1999; Pierson 2001a; 
Taylor-Gooby 2004). On the other hand, there are still clear differences in the effec-
tiveness of welfare state regimes (Kautto 2001). The Nordic welfare states have proven 
their effectiveness in poverty reduction, whereas Central European welfare states are 
intermediate and liberal welfare states are the most ineffective in poverty reduction 
(see e.g. Fritzell and Ritakallio 2004). 
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The debate of new social risks endangering traditional social security systems is also 
working in favour of the Nordic welfare states. In Nordic countries there has been a 
shift of priorities in the direction of young adults – a group that had only a marginal 
role in traditional welfare state policies (Esping-Andersen 1996, 14 and 1999; OECD 
2005a). Adult retraining policies, the prolonged idea of lifelong learning, joint parental 
leave provisions and attempts to secure the economic well-being of all kinds of family 
types are examples of social policy shifts that transform social expenditure trends in 
the direction of young adults. 
On the other hand, Central European countries are based on goals of security and 
stability (Goodin et al. 1999, 55). Therefore, Central European countries have been 
reluctant to change the nexus of welfare state, family and work. This is problematic 
because attempts to preserve the existing social order (familialism, male-earner model, 
etc.) have been contradictory with the “real-life situation” where unemployment and 
women’s integration in the labour market have been high. At the same time, new social 
risks, such as precariousness of working life, have been looming. Some researchers have 
noticed that there is a clear division between population groups in Central European 
countries (Esping-Andersen 1996, 80; Atkinson 1998b). The “insider” labour force 
is dependent on its lifelong job security, and therefore it resists attempts to change 
normal employment patterns and social provision systems. Workers who are not part 
of the normal employment are thus in great danger of being working poor because 
labour markets and welfare state systems are not working in their favour. 
Anglo-Saxon countries have traditionally been weak in their income redistribu-
tion. Free play of market forces and a high degree of individual responsibility are 
fundamental values when it comes to the arrangement of social security. The ability 
to reduce inequalities and poverty in liberal Anglo-Saxon welfare states is weak (see 
e.g. Atkinson et al. 1995; Korpi and Palme 1998; Fritzell and Ritakallio 2004). In the 
1980’s, the level of minimum wages was already lagging behind the rise of price levels 
(Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997), and this trend has continued (Glennerster 2002). 
“The army of working poor” has been approximately the same size for decades in the 
USA, and there is not much evidence that welfare state interventions would downsize 
that army.  
2.4  Welfare state – preventing new social risks
Endogenous challenges of welfare states can be categorised in three different societal 
shifts. First there were changes in family structures, secondly changes in labour market 
structures and thirdly changes in the life cycle. The basic challenge was, and still is, that 
due to these three changes there was a growing disjuncture between social protection 
schemes and needs and risks (Esping-Andersen 1996, 6; Pierson 2001b).  
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2.4.1  Change of families and life cycle
The debate of new social risks has one common factor: “Traditional” risk groups, 
such as the sick and the aged, are still important, but new risk groups have emerged. 
The concern is that the working-age population has witnessed an increased risk of 
being poor because new social risks, such as unstable labour markets, problems of 
reconciliation of work and welfare, and retrenchment of social security systems, are 
concentrating on the active-age population. It is argued that the economic security 
that working has traditionally guaranteed is getting weakened in a new risk society. 
(See e.g. Esping-Andersen 1999; Pierson 2001a; Bonoli 2002; Taylor-Gooby 2004.) 
New social risk factors all increase the risk of being working poor. Unstable labour 
markets make it difficult for families to integrate into working life and persons on the 
margins of labour markets (low educated and low skilled workers) are under constant 
threat of slipping into unemployment. The essential question is to what extent the 
labour markets protect from poverty and what is the role of redistribution of welfare 
states in terms of reducing poverty? Many studies point out that so-called market-
based (where only wages, earned incomes etc. are observed) income inequality and 
poverty are very high in almost all OECD countries (Mitchell 1991; Atkinson et al. 
1995; Goodin et al. 1999, 152–172; Ritakallio 2002). In their study of three OECD 
countries (USA, Germany, the Netherlands) Robert Goodin et al. (1999, 154) noticed 
that in all three countries pre-transfer poverty rates were surprisingly high – ap-
proximately 20 percent. Even the macro-economic trends of a 10-year time span of 
research (1985–1994) had much less difference than might have been expected. Thus, 
the effectiveness of welfare states in reducing (in-work) poverty is essential. The level 
of pre-transfer inequalities after market-based income distribution is approximately 
the same in OECD countries. What makes the difference is how successful welfare 
states’ redistribution is in diminishing inequalities. Europe (especially the Nordic 
countries and some Central European countries) has a definitive advantage over the 
USA in this.
Previous studies have shown that the groups facing the greatest risk of being working 
poor are quite similar in the USA and in the EU. Young, low-educated adults living 
(alone) with children have the greatest poverty risk. When this picture is added to with 
other poverty-enhancing factors, such as part-time working, temporary job contracts, 
unemployment of another adult in the household or absence of another adult, the 
risk of living in a working poor household becomes even higher. (In the EU see e.g. 
Bardone and Guio 2005; in the USA see e.g. U.S. Department of Labor 2006.)
The issue of reconciliation of family life and work is absolutely essential when studying 
the working poor. The debate during recent decades has disclosed a great transfor-
mation of how family life and work are combined (Esping-Andersen 1999, 150–160). 
One principle has nonetheless stayed the same: Full-time, permanent jobs are a good 
way of maintaining a sufficient level of income over time (see e.g. Bardone and Guio 
2005). However, unstable labour markets, atypical work and demands of flexibility 
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have weakened the protecting powers of labour markets (Gray 2004). In the Anglo-
American countries especially, more and more workers have found themselves in a 
situation where either their wages are simply insufficient or there are no full-time 
and/or full-year jobs available, which leads to a situation in which periods of employ-
ment are often followed by periods of unemployment (Kim 1998). In the worst cases 
these factors (low wages and lack of full-time, full-year work) are connected and 
overlapping, and consequently make the situation even worse. 
The most notable change in the patterns of families’ employment is the increase of 
two-earner households. This is mainly due to the fact that women’s participation in 
the labour market has increased rapidly since the 1970’s. In EU15 countries, female 
labour force participation as a percentage of the female population aged 15–64 years 
increased from 42.5 percent in 1970 to 60.2 percent in 2000 (OECD 2001a, 39). It 
should be noted that the increase in the female labour force was much more modest 
in Nordic countries, where female participation rates were already high at the begin-
ning of the 1970’s. 
This change has been explained through issues of gender equality and cultural changes, 
which have made women’s participation in labour markets generally approved and 
even desirable (Lewis 1992 and 2001). On the other hand, the increase of two-earner 
households is also an indication of the fact that more and more households have 
wanted to secure their economic well-being in unstable labour markets. The costs 
of living and wages are more and more dependent on the current general economic 
situation in which households are not usually even expected to make ends meet with 
just one person’s wages. 
The increase in women’s labour force participation has increased the number of two-
earner households, which again has supposedly prevented large-scale occurrence of 
in-work poverty. This is so because two wages are undoubtedly a good protection 
against poverty, at least in Europe (Bardone and Guio 2005, 7). Couples with one 
earner always have (at least in theory) a chance that the non-worker goes to work and 
the financial position of the household subsequently improves. For single adults the 
case of how to make ends meet with one wage is most acute. The supposed norm, by 
which costs of living and wages are determined on the basis of two-earner households, 
may create difficulties for single households. At the same time as the number of two-
earner couples out of all couples has increased, family sizes overall have been reducing. 
There has been a change in life cycle, which has resulted in a situation where persons 
come into working life older than was the case in previous generations and they marry 
and have children at a much older age than previously. Due to the postponement of 
getting married, the proportion of single adult households has risen in OECD coun-
tries. In many countries single adult households are even the most common type of 
household (OECD 2001b, 158–159).
Single parents are in a very difficult situation, as for them the issue of reconciliation 
of work and family life is absolutely vital. It might be very difficult for a single parent 
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to work full time or work in shifts because of domestic responsibilities. In addition, 
the availability of care services and the costs of such services may actually prevent a 
single parent from fully entering labour markets. This is especially a problem in the 
Anglo-American regime countries, where social security systems do not necessarily 
provide such services. (Shulman 2003, 34–37.) 
It is well documented that the traditional one-earner household model has lost its 
ability to prevent households from slipping into poverty (Fritzell and Ritakallio 2004; 
Peña-Casas and Latta 2004; Bardone and Guio 2005). Work contracts have become 
more often temporary in nature and flexibility of working hours and paid wages are 
undermining one-earner model (Gray 2004). It is much rarer nowadays to work for 
a long time in a full-time, full-year job in the same workplace. The insecurities that 
have become more and more regular in working life are possibly one of the major 
reasons why both members of couples have joined the labour force. With two wages, 
households minimise their risk of being working poor and becoming victims of labour 
market insecurities. 
There is still a strong, but at the same time a little misleading, image of the one-earner 
household from the Golden Age of welfare states. That image supposes that one wage 
is adequate to secure a normal level of living for the entire household. It is likely that 
the two-earner model has become the new norm of working, and thus living costs and 
the level of wages are set according to the principle that there are two wage-earners 
in a household. Recent studies have shown strong evidence that this development has 
occurred and, therefore, the risk of being poor grows among one-earner households. 
(See e.g. Castles 1985; Esping-Andersen 1999.)
To summarise: “Change” is the key word. Welfare states have witnessed a change in the 
environment where they operate. The age of economic growth has turned into an era 
of austerity. New needs and fewer resources have challenged welfare states. Demands 
of restructuring and retrenchment are expressed. Welfare states have answered these 
demands by recalibrating systems. As Peter Taylor-Gooby (2002) has noticed, the 
development has gone in the direction of the “Silver Age”, in which welfare is still a 
major objective of social policy but international competition and concerns of cost 
constraints are restricting welfare states’ actions.  
2.4.2  Recent changes of labour markets
Labour markets are also in a process of change. It is a well-known fact that employ-
ment structures in industrialised countries have changed rapidly since the 1970’s. 
Traditional industrial jobs have been replaced by the rapidly expanding number of 
service sector jobs, and the most recent change has been the movement towards the 
so-called knowledge society. This shift from industrial jobs to service sector jobs 
enabled women to participate in the labour markets, but it brought insecurities (low-
wages, part-time work etc.) as well. Recent rapid technological change has led to an 
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increased demand for highly skilled workers, which again has led to the increasing 
polarisation of labour markets (see e.g. Card and DiNardo 2002). 
This recent shift has been from the service sector towards the “knowledge” or “in-
formation” sector (see e.g. Castells 1996; Rifkin 2000). Highly skilled workers need 
the ability to interact with the new information technology. This has been said to 
de-standardise labour (see Beck 1992; Kallinikos 2003), which means that variation 
of working places (work is done at home, during travel to the workplace etc.), working 
times (traditional “9 to 5” working time is not that valid anymore) and polarisation 
between less skilled service sector workers and more highly skilled information sector 
workers has increased. 
In many studies, the poverty status of the self-employed has been taken into consid-
eration (see e.g. Nolan and Whelan 1996; Kangas and Ritakallio 1998). Their poverty 
rates have been noticed to be higher than “regular workers” (see Bardone and Guio 
2005). Flawed income data has been one explanation for these results, but there are 
also reasons to suggest that farmers and small entrepreneurs have an especially high 
risk of being poor. Being employed or self-employed are in some ways two distinct 
phenomena, but in this study both groups are observed together. In this study the 
shifts in employment forms are not analysed in detail, and the question of employed 
vs. self-employed is not researched. What is important is to know that changes in 
labour markets have affected employment structures and that “being in work” has 
many forms. These things certainly have their own implications for the nature of 
in-work poverty. 
Slow growth, high unemployment in Europe and pressures of international competi-
tion have been background factors in labour market restructuring, which has been 
characterised by increasing flexibility of wages, working hours and work contracts. 
The ultimate goal behind labour market restructuring has been to increase labour 
force participation. Labour force participation rates could be increased in many ways; 
reducing unemployment with different labour market policies, keeping the working-
age population in work and improving work incentives to employees and employers 
are ways of increasing labour force participation. Rising labour force participation 
also eases the cost burdens of welfare states because there are more taxpayers and 
fewer people who depend on social security benefits (see e.g. Davidson and Matusz 
2005; Layard et al. 2005; Blanchard 2006). 
What is important is that labour markets are changing in a direction where one of 
the possible outcomes is an increasing number of working poor. This is because in-
creasing labour force participation without looking after the quality of work could 
end up in the creation of minimum waged and minimum protected jobs. This again 
could easily lead to a situation where labour force participation increases but at the 
same time poverty stays unaffected. In other words, unemployed poor just shift into 
working poor. 
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The fight against unemployment has been a major trend in industrialised countries in 
recent decades, as we concluded earlier. The USA’s “job miracle” in the 1970’s and 1980’s 
received popular support in Europe as well, and demands for improving labour force 
participation rates increased at the beginning of the 1990’s. The OECD’s Jobs Study 
(1994) has been one of the most influential guidelines for the labour market policies 
of EU countries. It gave policy recommendations (see OECD 2006, 24) that aimed at 
reducing unemployment and increasing labour force participation and prosperity. 
Recommendations suggested, for example, increasing the flexibility of working time, 
eliminating impediments on the creation and expansion of enterprises, making wage 
and labour costs more flexible and reforming employment security provisions. 
Labour force participation rates have increased in EU15 countries during the last dec-
ade. In 1994 the average participation rate was 67.5 percent in EU15 countries (OECD 
2001a, 38). The highest rate was in Denmark (79%) and the lowest in Italy and Spain 
(59%). In 2005 the average participation rate had increased to 71.3 percent (OECD 
2006, 248). The highest participation rate was still in Denmark (79%) and the lowest 
in Italy (62%). Overall, improvements in labour force participation had been quite 
outstanding. Countries like Ireland, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Portugal all 
had very positive results in tackling unemployment and increasing labour force par-
ticipation. However, EU countries with the most positive labour force development 
have very little in common in their employment strategies (see Goul Andersen and 
Bendix Jensen 2002, 54). The UK has followed a liberal and flexible path, while the 
Netherlands has adopted some liberal reforms such as wage moderation. “The Dutch 
miracle”, as the successful activation policy in the Netherlands has been called, has 
received some criticism mainly because a large part of the job growth has been in 
part-time work, and the labour market and economic situation of the most vulnerable 
groups has not improved (van Oorschot 2002). 
  
When compared to the USA, there has been a clear convergence. In 1994 the USA 
had very high participation rate (77%), but in 2005 it had fallen slightly to 75 percent 
(OECD 2006, 248). It should be stressed that even though the USA has high labour 
force participation, it is not in any way unique. Some European countries (Denmark, 
Sweden, UK, Iceland, Norway and Switzerland) have had as big or even bigger par-
ticipation rates than the USA. It is important to notice that the labour market poli-
cies practised in these countries (UK apart) have been rather different than those 
practised in the USA. 
One suggestion that the OECD’s Jobs Study presented and which is largely used, 
especially in the Nordic countries, is an emphasis on active labour market policies. 
Active labour market policy programmes are aimed at improving the functioning of 
the labour market by enhancing labour market mobility and adjustment and enabling 
people to seize new job opportunities as they arise (OECD 1994). In practice active 
labour market programmes include training and employment incentives both for job 
seekers and employers. Passive labour market policy, on the other hand, includes un-
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employment benefits. Denmark especially has relied heavily on active labour market 
policies. Nearly 2 percent of its GDP is used in active measures (OECD 2006, 271).
High unemployment rates in many EU countries have kept many unskilled workers 
from fully entering to labour markets. Consequently, “an army of unskilled workers” 
has not developed in Europe, at least not on the same scale as it has in the United States 
(see for example Gray 2004, 20–21). There is a significant contrast in the attitudes 
to social and individual responsibilities on the different shores of the Atlantic (Sen 
1999). A high rate of unemployment has been regarded as unacceptable in the USA 
and employment growth has been supported in many ways, for example by cutting 
down unemployment benefits and freezing minimum wage levels. The question of 
who actually is eligible for welfare benefits has been emphasised. Unemployed people 
are often categorised as undeserving because there are lots of job opportunities. In 
Europe unemployment has been a significant problem in some countries for decades, 
but like Amartya Sen (1999, 98) has noticed, the public opinion and governments 
have “tolerated” mass unemployment. In the USA there was a clear shift in attitudes 
towards the social security benefit system during the Reagan years in the 1980’s. A 
new concept – “workfare” – became one of the central guidelines of unemployment 
policy. The basic idea behind workfare is that to be eligible for receiving benefits, a 
person is supposed to work (Mead 1986). The same kinds of workfare reforms car-
ried out in the USA have not been made in Europe – at least not to the same extent. 
However, some workfare reforms could also be found in Europe (see e.g. Standing 
1999, 265; Lødemel 2002; Handler 2005). 
An issue worth consideration is so-called incentive traps, especially so with households 
in which one person is unemployed and the other employed. The problem in this regard 
is most of all related to the problems of co-ordination between benefits and income. 
Social security benefits may actually decrease commensurately as incomes increase 
if the income-tested benefits are based on households’ total incomes. Consequently, 
the well-paid job of the other person may significantly decrease the social security 
benefits of the household.
Another characteristic feature of incentive traps are disincentives in terms of ac-
cepting work (see e.g. Barr 2004, 225–226). This type of incentive trap is called an 
unemployment trap. This means that social security benefits are so good – in com-
parison to income received from available work – that it is not tempting to accept 
work. Dismantling these types of unemployment traps is one of the most important 
goals that for example the EU has set (European Commission 2004, 6). The “violent” 
dismantling of unemployment traps, for example by forcing unemployed people to 
accept any and all kinds of work, may lead to a situation in which the unemployed 
do actually get work but then cannot make a sufficient living through working. This 
has been the case in the USA.
When we consider how unemployment and in-work poverty are connected, we can 
separate two different cases. On the one hand, a person may be periodically employed, 
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in which case periods of employment and unemployment fluctuate. In these kinds of 
cases the persons’ total income (especially annual income) may be below the poverty 
line. On the other hand, unemployment may have an indirect effect. For example, 
a spouse’s unemployment might lead to a situation in which the household’s total 
income is insufficient despite the other person working. 
If we think about the people who suffer from problems related to insufficient incomes 
due to periods of unemployment, but who have nonetheless made it back to working 
life, poverty will most likely disappear over time if the wages they get paid from cur-
rent work are adequate. However, the combined effect of poverty and unemployment 
may at its worst actually emphasise or even multiply the negative aspects of both. In 
other words, unemployment periods in association with unstable work periods and 
constant poverty may eventually lead to permanent exclusion from labour markets 
and deepening poverty.  
One way of evaluating the employment performance of industrialised countries is look-
ing at the quality of work provided. Olivier Blanchard (2006) noticed that employment 
strategies are not protecting workers as well as they should. Many of the new jobs are 
placed in the low-paid private sector where employers are subsidised to hire workers in 
low-productivity and low-paid jobs. This strategy has been tried in Europe, especially 
in Belgium, France and in the Netherlands (Ferrera and Hemerijck 2003). 
Previous studies show that the proportion of low-wage employees in EU countries 
varies considerably. In 2000 proportions varied from 9 percent in Denmark to 19 
percent in the United Kingdom (European Commission 2004, 168). The trends of 
incidence of low pay also varied. In Spain and in Portugal there had been a rather 
marked decline from 1996 to 2000, whereas in the Netherlands and in Germany low 
pay increased during the same time period. The size of wage disparities at the lower 
end of wage distribution is connected to the proportion of low-wage employees. The 
greater the earnings gap, the greater the proportion of low wages tends to be. (Marlier 
and Ponthieux 2000.)
The other issue regarding the quality of work is part-time work. Part-time jobs have 
been an important source of employment expansion in a number of countries. Out of 
all EU15 countries, part-time work is most common in the Netherlands: 35 percent of 
all employed in the Netherlands were part-time workers in 2004. All in all, 17.4 percent 
of employed in EU15 countries were part-time workers. In the USA the figure in 2004 
was 13.2 percent. Between 1990 and 2004, part-time work in EU15 countries increased 
by approximately 4 percentage points (13.3 % – 17.4 %) (OECD 2005b, 254).
Part-time employment is related to working poor through the simple fact that fewer 
working hours also mean smaller wages, which in turn means that earned incomes 
are not sufficient. In terms of part-time work, the thing that should be kept in mind 
is that most part-time workers have consciously chosen a job where they are able to 
work shorter work hours or fewer days. This choice is quite natural for example for 
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students, who may want to work part time to earn extra money, or for people who 
wish to work part-time because of their children. These people are problematic from 
the point of view of defining in-work poverty: for them the low incomes of part-time 
work are more or less a voluntary choice. 
The significance of part-time work in terms of in-work poverty is important in two 
ways. Firstly, it is characteristic of part-time work that it is, almost everywhere, done 
predominantly by women. In EU15 countries in 2004, women did 79 percent of all 
part-time work. (OECD 2005b, 254.) Thus, poverty due to part-time employment is 
also a problem that requires a solution from a gender equality point of view. Secondly, 
it is also a characteristic of part-time work that it is heavily focused on certain fields. 
For example, part-time work is very common within the service sector. Moreover, 
these fields are usually female-dominated (Eurostat 2002, 136–137).
There are also other ways than creating new jobs to improve labour force participa-
tion to help unemployed persons to become employed. One way of improving labour 
force participation is to keep the ageing population in working life. Three long-term 
developments have raised the demands for keeping the ageing population in work-
ing life. The first one is that the population overall is ageing. Population projections 
show that the percentage of the population over 65 years of age in OECD countries 
will rise dramatically during the next couple of decades. The second development is 
tightly connected to the first: growing public expenditures to support the elderly. The 
third development is that the trend toward early retirement reduced the labour force 
participation of 50–64-year olds in many countries. (Quadagno and Myles 1991.) 
This third development has been especially worrisome from the perspective of the 
welfare state’s finance. Early retirement increases the cost burden because the wel-
fare state on the one hand loses early retirees’ wage taxes and on the other hand pays 
retirement benefits for them. Keeping the working-age population in working life is 
a challenge that the EU has addressed in its employment strategy; the trend of early 
retirement has been stopped and the average age of retirement has increased (Bur-
niaux et al. 2004).
To conclude this chapter, it is obvious that industrialised countries have entered an era 
of increasing insecurities. Or like Paul Pierson (2001b) puts it: “the Era of Austerity”. 
Industrialised countries have a problem of how to preserve the cost-containment of 
welfare states. The simple answer is by increasing labour force participation. In that 
way, more active-age persons are working and paying taxes instead of enjoying social 
security benefits with an increasing elderly population. And the bigger the tax-paying 
working population, the more money there is to spend on education, childcare, pension 
allowances, elderly care, unemployment benefits etc. This enables the continuation of 
the “social contract” between generations, where every generation in turn is enjoying 
benefits (children and retirees) or paying them (active-age working population). 
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But the problem of improving labour force participation is that labour markets are 
offering more and more insecurities (part-time work, temporary work contracts, 
minimum wage work etc.). Thus, the equation seems to be that improving labour 
force participation through reducing unemployment is deemed to cause in-work 
poverty because available jobs are not securing an adequate level of living. The USA 
is a “model example” of how unemployed poor have transformed into working poor. 
However, there are certain countries in Europe (especially the Nordic countries) where 
high labour force participation rates are combined with low levels of in-work poverty. 
Thus, pressure to decrease unemployment, even with the cost of increasing in-work 
poverty, is strong in many countries, but there should not necessarily be a trade-off 
between level of unemployment and level of in-work poverty.
What is striking is that although labour market policies in EU countries are in many 
ways protecting workers, there are still millions of working poor (Bardone and Guio 
2005). Something is not right in EU countries according to figures that previous studies 
have estimated. The recent debate of in-work poverty in the EU is clearly showing that 
traditional concepts like the “wage-earner welfare state” and the “male breadwinner 
model” are losing their importance. European societies are very likely entering into 
an “Era of two wage earners”.  
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3  IN-WOrK POvErTy
This chapter is dedicated to operationalising the concept of “in-work poverty”. The 
structure of the chapter is as follows: First we clarify the concept of poverty by answer-
ing the question “What is poverty?” After that we take a brief look at the issue of poverty 
measurement. We then deal with the issue of static and dynamic approach, and the 
final part of the chapter concentrates on assessing the working poor phenomenon.
   
3.1  What is poverty? 
The concept of poverty has many ambiguities. The issues of how to define poverty, how 
to measure it and how to identify the poor are constantly argued in poverty literature 
(see Townsend 1979; Sen 1983; Ringen 1987; Nolan and Whelan 1996; Gordon et al. 
2000). The first division line is normally drawn regarding whether poverty is absolute 
or relative. For example, what is considered poverty in Finland is not the same kind 
of poverty that is experienced in India. At the moment, absolute poverty – starvation, 
extremely bad housing conditions etc. – that can be found in India, which threatens 
physical existence of individuals, is not a well-functioning definition in Western socie-
ties. Poverty, as it stands in modern societies, should be defined relatively, which means 
that it should be defined in relation to the general level of prosperity in a country or 
population group at a given point in time (Atkinson et al. 2002, 78). 
Many definitions of “what is poverty” have been introduced. Possibly the most recog-
nised is made by Peter Townsend (1979, 31). He defined poverty as a lack of resources 
to participate in activities and have the living conditions and amenities that are cus-
tomary in the society to which one belongs. In a similar vein, Aldi Hagenaars (1986, 
37) defined poverty with three characteristics:
 Being poor is lacking some basic necessities
 Being poor is having less than others in society
 Being poor is feeling you do not have enough to get along.
Both these definitions emphasise the relative nature of modern poverty. A minimum 
acceptable way of living depends largely on the prevailing lifestyle in the community 
and on its level of social and economic development. Therefore, poverty is closely 
linked to the time and place of observation. 
It is unsatisfactory to answer the question “what is poverty?” by saying “it depends on 
place and time”. Poverty has always been and always will be enforced lack of ameni-
ties and resources that excludes from the life of the society (Townsend 1979; Mack 
and Lansley 1985). On Townsend’s formulation poverty is seen as relative deprivation. 
Incomes and other financial (material) resources are included in relative deprivation, 
but the hard-to-define style of living is also a component of relative deprivation. Dif-
1)
2)
3)
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ferent sets of indicators to analyse social deprivation are made (see e.g. Townsend 1979; 
Mack and Lansley 1985; Mayer and Jencks 1988; Nolan and Whelan 1996; Gordon 
et al. 2000). 
The basic idea of relative deprivation is that a person is not able to live in a way that 
is common for the society and she/he is in danger of being socially excluded from 
the normal style of living. Therefore, relative deprivation is an inability to obtain the 
types of diet, clothing, housing, household facilities and environmental, educational, 
working and social conditions that are generally regarded as acceptable. The concept 
of poverty as deprivation is normative, and there is plenty of room for value judge-
ments on what amounts to a definition of the components that make up the normal 
style of living. (See e.g. Townsend 1979; Mack and Lansley 1985, 37–45; Nolan and 
Whelan 1996, 72.) 
The concept of poverty is often replaced by the concept of social exclusion, which has 
been a common synonym for poverty in EU vocabulary (see more e.g. Mayes 1995). 
Social exclusion is related to poverty, but there is no clear definition of how they are 
distinct from each other. Analytically they may be separated. Poverty is lack of material 
resources, especially income, but some definitions of poverty include social exclusion, 
understood as lack of participation in social life (see e.g. Walker and Walker 1997, 8; 
Levitas 2001). In this study the concept of poverty is not reinvented. The basic concept 
of how to assess in-work poverty is that working households that lack resources which 
are needed for a minimum acceptable way of living are defined as in-work poor.  
3.2  Measurement of poverty
The most appropriate way of measuring poverty has been a subject of debate for a long 
time (Sen 1983; Ringen 1987; Saunders 1994; Gordon et al. 2000). The starting point 
has been the notion that different measures of poverty identify different population 
groups as risk groups (van den Bosch 2001; Bradshaw and Finch 2003). Using only 
one measure could give too restricted and one-sided a view of the problem. Next we 
will focus on the overall issues of measurement of poverty. 
3.2.1  Approaches to measuring poverty 
According to Nolan and Whelan (1996, 1–2), the core issue is how to define and meas-
ure poverty in a way that is valid, meaningful in the context and valuable for policy- 
making. As Atkinson (1987) has advocated, the diversity of possible judgements should 
be acknowledged and taken into account in the measurement procedure. Atkinson 
(1998a, 24–25) contrasted two approaches of how to define poverty. One is the standard 
of living approach and the other is the minimum rights approach. Deprivation is an 
example of the standard of living approach – poor people fail to reach a minimum 
level of basic needs and goods. The minimum rights approach instead contains an 
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assumption that people are entitled to a minimum income, which is a prerequisite 
for participation in a particular society. 
Stein Ringen (1988) divided poverty measures into direct and indirect measures. 
Measurements that use low resources (like lack of money) as indicators of poverty are 
often referred to as indirect measurements; the term “indirect” refers to the fact that 
lack of resources is assumed to cause poverty. Direct measures include, for example, 
deprivation indexes (see e.g. Townsend 1979; Mack and Lansley 1985). Enforced lack 
of basic goods and services is defined as a direct cause of poverty. Ringen (1988, 361) 
made an argument that poverty should be researched in a way that combines direct 
and indirect measures. Ringen criticised poverty measurement where the definition 
of poverty was direct but the measures used were indirect. If poverty means exclu-
sion from one’s society, it must be visible in the way the poor live. This is covered 
by deprivation measures, which capture low consumption of goods and services. By 
including the criterion of low income, those who have a low standard of consumption 
for reasons other than low income will be excluded from the poverty category. Also 
those are excluded who have a low income but still do not suffer from deprivation. 
Modern poverty literature has several different methods to measure poverty.  Con-
ventional methods of setting poverty standards and measuring the extent of poverty 
include subjective methods, budget standard approaches, food ratio methods, social 
security poverty line approaches, relative income poverty lines and deprivation 
methods. These approaches are widely discussed in poverty literature. As studies have 
shown, different methods have their own strengths and weaknesses, and no single 
satisfactory and convincing method of setting a poverty line that is objective and ap-
propriate for all purposes has emerged. (See e.g. Hagenaars 1986, 15–37; Callan et al. 
1989, 10–27; Nolan and Whelan 1996, 14–22.) 
In this study three methods are used. The first and possibly the simplest way of defin-
ing poverty is the subjective method. In subjective poverty methods people themselves 
define, based on their own experiences, whether they are poor or not. The subjective 
method gives the informants a chance to evaluate the household’s financial situation. 
Subjective definitions have their own problems. When every informant sets her/his 
own poverty line, it becomes very flexible. A well-functioning subjective measure 
also requires that informants associate similar notions of well-being. Thus, subjective 
measures are based on individual experiences of poverty, which makes the use of these 
kinds of measures unreliable. They need objective measures in side. (Hagenaars 1986, 
30–34.) Therefore, the subjective method by itself is inadequate for the evaluation of 
who is eligible to use public social security benefits. A situation where benefits would 
be granted for all those who simply request them would be on very shaky ground if 
we consider what the public opinion towards this kind of system would be. Defini-
tions of the subjective method and other poverty measurement methods used in this 
study are presented in detail in chapter 4.3. 
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The second method that is used is the relative income method, which is the most com-
mon measure used in comparative international poverty studies (see Ringen 1987, 
158; Muffels et al. 1992; Atkinson et al. 1995 and 2002). Victor Fuchs (1965) was one 
of the first researchers to develop the idea. He argued that a definition of poverty was 
required which sets a standard that changes with the growth of real income (see also 
Mitchell 1991, 32–33). In the relative income method the household (or individual) 
is identified as poor if equivalent disposable incomes fall below a certain poverty 
threshold. Usually, the poverty threshold is set according to a certain percentage (40, 
50 or 60% are most common) of median equivalent disposable incomes. 
The relative income method has been a very popular tool for measuring poverty in 
studies and in official statistics, and thus its value for policy-making is indisputable. 
Measuring poverty via disposable incomes has been found to measure more tempo-
rary poverty. In this type of poverty, changes in household incomes or in the size and 
composition of the household affect the poverty status significantly (Halleröd 1995; 
Whelan et al. 2000; van den Bosch 2001). This poverty measure has received criticism, 
particularly because of its indirect method of measurement and the equivalence scales 
used (see e.g. Ringen 1987, 158; Muffels et al. 1992; Kangas and Ritakallio 2007). 
The third method that is used in this study is a deprivation index. Peter Townsend’s 
(1979) study was a starting point for studies which focus directly on patterns of living 
and deprivation. The method that Townsend developed was called the deprivation 
standard. The theory was based on an assumption that there is a poverty threshold in 
income distribution where withdrawal from ordinary lifestyles becomes fast. Many 
researchers have been unconvinced by that exercise and subsequent works in this 
area appeared (see e.g. Mack and Lansley 1985; Mayer and Jencks 1988). Deprivation 
methods are based on a set of deprivation indicators, which are converted into meas-
urement devices by using, for example, sum variables, using certain cut-off points of 
how many indicators of the set could be lacked or using different weighted indexes. 
There are also various problems encountered when using deprivation methods. These 
include how to select and aggregate items that represent deprivation in an indicator 
set and how to take into account the role of tastes versus enforced absence in a depri-
vation indicator (Nolan and Whelan 1996).
Deprivation is a complementary source of information that supplements the infor-
mation collected by the income method. It measures poor living conditions directly. 
Empirical studies have shown that there is a rather low correlation between income 
poverty and deprivation (van den Bosch 2001; Bradshaw and Finch 2003). This 
means that the deprivation method enables us to analyse deprivation that is possibly 
unrecognised by the income poverty measure. For example, low-wage households 
could have a serious lack of material and social resources that is left unnoticed by 
the income measure. 
The concept of poverty in this study is measured mainly with incomes – i.e. indirectly. 
In one empirical chapter (Chapter 6) other measures are used in side of incomes. Heavy 
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reliance on the relative income method occurs mainly because it is widely held as an 
“official measure of poverty” in EU countries and it is rather easily adapted to the use 
of internationally comparative research. In spite of criticism, it gives us information 
about the extent of in-work poverty and we can estimate how many households in 
studied countries contain working family member(s) yet the households’ disposable 
incomes are under the nationally-set poverty line. And no matter what measure is 
used, improving the lives of those households that suffer from (in-work) poverty 
should be the utmost objective of policy actions. 
3.3  Dynamic or static approach?
In order to understand what (in-work) poverty dynamics means in practice, we could 
use Joseph Schumpeter’s (1964) classical theory of an omnibus as an example. It was 
created to explain class differences, but the same basic idea fits in dynamic in-work 
poverty research too. The bus might be packed full of people all the time, but the vital 
question is: Are these people on it through the whole trip? If the “passengers” are the 
same year after year then it is likely that the group is very homogenous. But if the 
bus stops every once in a while to let some of the passengers off and take new ones on 
board, then we have a much more complex issue in hand. There is inflow and outflow, 
which supposes that the passengers are more of a heterogeneous group.
The issue of static (cross-sectional) and dynamic (longitudinal) ways of measuring 
poverty is widely covered in the international poverty literature (see e.g. Goodin et al. 
1999; Jäntti and Danziger 2000). The main problem of static cross-sectional poverty 
measures is that they reveal very little about either the nature or the distribution of 
poverty. Like Robert Walker (1998, 31) notices, the questions that should be asked 
when someone wants to know more about poverty are: What is the nature of poverty? 
What does it mean to the people who experience it? How many experience it? How 
long does it last? How severe is it? The cross-sectional poverty analyses give informa-
tion for the first three questions but issues of duration and severity are much harder 
to reach. The severity of poverty is a difficult issue to handle, even with a longitudinal 
and dynamic approach, but something can be said about the duration. 
The EU has recognised the need for dynamic poverty research. The best example of 
this is the launch of a large household panel study project (ECHP) in the mid 1990’s, 
which has also been used in this study. Some dynamic poverty research has already 
been done using the ECHP (see e.g. Layte and Whelan 2003; Moisio 2004). The re-
sults of these studies have indicated that poverty is more a recurrent than a transient 
problem. Around half of the population has a risk of short spells of poverty whereas 
other half is stayers, which means that they are either never in poverty or always in 
poverty (Moisio 2004, 155). There is a definite lack of dynamic in-work poverty stud-
ies in the EU (see Peña-Casas and Latta 2004, 25–26). This study should shed light on 
the issue and produce results for use in future comparative dynamic in-work studies 
in EU countries.
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Why is it important to capture something continuous when we could rely on cross-
sectional data? Robert Goodin et al. (1999, 2) have shown that the sequences and 
long-term patterns clearly matter to people’s welfare. If bad things keep happening 
to the same people over and over again, then that is more problematic for those peo-
ple compared to those who experience bad things only temporarily. Obviously, high 
inflows and outflows indicate that more people are experiencing poverty and small 
inflows and outflows indicate that fewer people are involved, but those who live in 
poverty experience recurring and deepening economic hardship. 
The dynamic poverty approach also says something about the overall dynamics of 
society. Dynamic change could be seen as a sign of possibilities of social mobility and 
equality of opportunity (Erikson et al. 1982). A society where the poor and non-poor 
never change places would be highly divided. The case of in-work poverty is partic-
ularly interesting from the social mobility point of view because it is often argued that 
low-paid jobs, part-time working and temporary work should be seen as “career lad-
ders” that help workers either move up to a better position or move on to better jobs. 
This kind of argument has typically been behind workfare ideology and defenders of 
low-wage jobs. This “from rags to riches” argument has, although, been questioned. 
In the USA, Peter Gottschalk and Sheldon Danziger (1998) found in their research 
that over a long time period (1968–1993) almost half of those who were in the lowest 
income quintile at the beginning of the study had not moved up. Of those who had 
moved, half were in the second lowest income quintile, which meant that they were 
still under the median wage level.
The issue of mobility is complex in poverty research because changes in household 
incomes and living conditions can often be traced to changes in the size and com-
position of the household itself (Moisio 2004, 50; Airio 2006b). Therefore, moving 
in and out of in-work poverty can happen in many ways. These ways include change 
of individual earnings (by salary increase, moving to better/worse job etc.), change 
of household’s working intensity (spouse gets a job or loses a job etc.) or change of 
household structure (new child is born, child moves out, divorce, marriage etc.). 
Like many things in life, poverty is not a static phenomenon. Life-changing events 
might have an effect on poverty status. Therefore, to deepen our knowledge of the 
essence of in-work poverty, we need to observe the “passengers” on the bus of working 
poor to determine who is travelling, when they are travelling, and why. 
3.4  Characteristics of working poor
When we talk about working poor, it is often quite unclear what it is that we are actu-
ally talking about. In the United States the working poor are defined as people that are 
employed for at least 27 weeks a year, but whose disposable income is less than that 
defined by the official poverty line (U.S. Department of Labor 2006). This definition 
highlights the problems associated with in-work poverty. Instead of being employed 
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full year and full time, some of the poor are people that are marginally involved in 
labour markets and whose work history is characterised mainly by atypical employ-
ment. This problem is also discussed in the European Commission project aimed at 
preventing social exclusion (Atkinson et al. 2005). It has stressed that in-work poverty 
indicators should be defined in a manner which ensures that working poor households 
have a solid connection to labour markets. 
Next we will clarify the concept of “working poor”. Defining working poor starts 
with a short review of previous working poor literature in EU countries. We then 
analyse the moral aspects of what it means to be poor compared to what it means to 
be working poor. After that, the characteristics and factors behind in-work poverty 
are taken into consideration.
3.4.1  Working poor in previous studies
Previous studies of working poor have noticed big differences between countries. For 
example, in the United States there were 7.8 million people in 2004 with disposable 
incomes under the official poverty line despite being employed for at least six months 
during the year (U.S. Department of Labor 2006). This means that 5.6 percent of all 
individuals in the labour force were working poor. 
If we examine the situation in the United States according to Eurostat’s recommended 
poverty indicator, that is 60 percent of equivalised median income, we will see that 
approximately 15 percent of the working population were poor in the year 2000 (Airio 
2006a), whereas according to the official U.S. poverty indicator, the poverty rate in 
that year was just 4.7 percent (U.S. Department of Labor 2005). The massive difference 
between the two poverty rates is caused by the fact that the official U.S. poverty line 
is set at an extremely low level (Rank 2004; Zuberi 2006, 13). Compared to median 
income, the level of poverty line has been falling in relative value since its creation in 
the mid 1960’s. (See also Smeeding et al. 2000.)
In-work poverty has not been studied widely in Europe. Studies of the well-being of 
the working population have focused more on the aspects of work satisfaction and 
working conditions (Paoli and Merllié 2001; Gallie 2002). Poverty among the working 
population has been regarded more as an Anglo-American problem. 
There are at least two reasons for this lack of research on working poor. Firstly, there 
is evidence that indicates that the poverty of working people has not been a signifi-
cant problem in the past (O’Connor and Smeeding 1993; Ritakallio 2002). However, 
it can be argued that the United Kingdom has been an exception in this regard. In 
the beginning of the 1990’s studies suggested that poverty increased among the low-
wage workers in UK (Millar et al. 1997). Secondly, various European welfare studies 
have pointed out that unemployment – especially long-term unemployment – is the 
main reason for poverty among the working age population (Halleröd 1998, 286). 
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As a consequence, academic and public interest has, quite understandably, focused 
more on unemployment.
Some studies of in-work poverty in the 1980’s have been made. Michael Förster (1994, 4) 
studied nine EU countries. Only the UK and Italy had relatively high in-work poverty 
rates according Förster’s results. Inge O’Connor and Timothy Smeeding (1993) had 
similar results in their study of five OECD countries. Sweden and the Netherlands had 
much lower in-work poverty rates in the middle of 1980’s than the UK, which again 
had a much lower in-work poverty rate than the USA and Canada.
Recent years have brought out new studies. Wolfgang Strengmann-Kuhn (2004) 
calculated that 9 percent of all workers were poor in EU countries in 1996 (Sweden 
apart). The highest in-work poverty rates were in Portugal and in Greece. The lowest 
in-work poverty rates were in Denmark and in Germany. Another study focusing on 
EU15 countries (Peña-Casas and Latta 2004, 15) showed that approximately 6 percent 
(7.8 million people) of all workers in EU countries were poor in 1999. Other research 
on the EU countries showed that approximately 14 million workers were below na-
tional poverty lines in 2001 in EU25 countries, and 11 million of those were living in 
EU15 countries. That accounts for 7 percent of the employed population. (Bardone 
and Guio 2005, 3). According to these studies in-work poverty in EU15 countries 
decreased between 1996 and 1999 but then increased again between 1999 and 2001. 
It should be emphasised that the variation between different EU countries is quite 
large. In-work poverty, like poverty in general, seems to be quite significant (7–13% 
of workers are poor) in the Mediterranean countries. In the Nordic countries and in 
some Central European countries the problem is much smaller (3–6% of workers are 
poor). (Bardone and Guio 2005, 4.) 
3.4.2  Why study in-work poverty? 
“When I divorced in the middle of the 1990’s I felt economic hardship. I was working 
part-time, received housing benefit and I supported alone my two teenage children… 
I managed to pay food bill and rent with my wages. There was no cash. Finally I got 
full-time work and I lost my housing benefit and all of my free time, which my kids 
would have needed. My food credit kept on rising and I could not pay it every month.” 
(Woman, divorced, lives with 1 child, occupational health care worker.) 
The extract is an open word comment from the survey that was conducted in the 
Department of Social Policy in the University of Turku in 2005. It tells in its own way 
what it means to be working poor in today’s Finland. Although this extract is just 
one example of occurrence of in-work poverty, it shows that the outcomes of being 
poor or being working poor are very much the same. Typical characteristics of poverty 
include continuous lack of economic resources, worries for the future or no planning 
for the future at all. Above all, there is a knowledge that the way of living is not at 
the level that “normal life” demands. The incentive traps are also obvious from the 
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extract. Increasing incomes easily lead to a situation where benefits will be cut down 
and there is little improvement of quality of life.
The moral logic behind the poverty issue labels the poor population in two distinc-
tive categories: deserving and undeserving poor. Herbert J. Gans (1995) noticed that 
a shift happened in the USA in the 1980’s from “war against poverty” to “war against 
poor”. The reasons behind poverty were seen to occur because of inferior morals. Poor 
people did not behave according to the rules set by mainstream society, poor men were 
lazy in finding work and poor women had babies as adolescents, which made them 
“welfare moms” who usually raised their children alone. The moral logic of society 
required that the undeserving poor alter their values and practices voluntarily or they 
were forced to do so, for example by ending welfare payments or by other kinds of 
punishment. (Gans 1995, 6–7.) 
This simplistic view of poverty caused because of irresponsibility of individuals is far 
from the truth. “Bad apples” exist among the poor, but poverty is more often a result 
of problems that are beyond the scope of poor individuals. For example, David T. 
Ellwood (1988, 43–44) concludes: “When people are poor because they are too sick 
to work, it is their disability that prevents them from working. When the unemployed 
are poor, the problem is that they cannot find work they are willing to take. When 
single mothers are poor, they may be poor because they are trying to balance two 
responsibilities – that of nurturing their children and providing for them – without 
outside support.” 
The working poor could be labelled as “deserving poor” in the clearest meaning of 
the term. A person who is working poor is someone who is working and therefore try-
ing to improve her/his household’s economic situation but for one reason or another 
fails to accomplish the level of living that is normal in a society. The whole concept 
of working poor contradicts the core value of modern societies that work is the centre 
around which everything and everyone revolves and work is the best welfare that keeps 
people from experiencing economic hardship. That seems not to be the case in many 
industrialised societies where in-work poverty has been lifted to the political agenda. 
All in all, in-work poverty should be a very awkward issue for the public decision-
makers. (Bane and Ellwood 1991; Kim 1998; Bardone and Guio 2005.) 
Possibly the most worrisome feature of in-work poverty compared to “regular” pov-
erty is that the ways of solving the problem are very limited. There are two acceptable 
ways to improve the situation of poor households: paid work and social benefits. The 
first (and best) way – and nowadays almost the only option that is given – to secure 
one’s welfare is working (Gray 2004). This is true, but at the same time it is quite 
paradoxical to assume that work is also the best way to secure the welfare of the 
working poor. Some adjustments certainly need to happen (more work hours, better 
wages etc.) before working poor households can be lifted out of poverty. The other 
way of erasing poverty is using the welfare state’s redistributive mechanisms that 
deliver social benefits for those in need. Like we concluded earlier, traditional social 
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security systems were created to prevent the unemployed, the ageing population and 
those with disabilities from falling into poverty. Although social security systems are 
re-calibrated, there is a serious doubt that welfare states are able to help the working 
poor in an adequate manner. 
Thus, there is no reason to suppose that being poor or being working poor is different 
from what comes with everyday struggle. But there are distinctive features of being 
poor or being working poor as well. The reasons behind poverty and the tools to solve 
the problem are well known, but what seems to be the greatest barrier is the fact that 
the easy solution (improvement of social security) does not match with the overall 
value (“all people should work”). Therefore, there is a conundrum that if poor people 
are given money, food or housing, it reduces their pressure and will to work and care 
for themselves (Ellwood 1988, 19). 
On the other hand, the working poor are widely recognised as deserving poor who 
need to be helped, but the problem is that there are few social security mechanisms 
in place that could help them. Thus, the web of moral values, incentives, labour mar-
ket functions and welfare state redistributive systems are bundled in a strange way 
that leaves the working poor (like the woman in the extract at the beginning of this 
chapter), in many cases, waiting for better tomorrow. 
3.4.3  Who are the working poor?
Studies of working poor both in USA and in Europe have shown that there are certain 
background factors that are connected to the risk of being working poor. These factors 
include age, education and household type and, in the USA, also race. These are also 
common denominators of poverty in general. This similarity expresses the fact that 
many mechanisms behind in-work poverty and poverty in general are the same. 
In the USA in 2004, under-25-year-old workers’ poverty rate was twice as high as the 
working poor rate in general (U.S. Department of Labor 2006, 7). In-work poverty 
was even higher for those young workers who had African American or Hispanic eth-
nicity. Similar results could be found in Europe too (e.g. Peña-Casas and Latta 2004, 
56–57). Youth in-work poverty was especially high in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Finland. There were some countries where in-work 
poverty was concentrated more on older workers. These countries included Greece, 
Ireland and Portugal. In countries with relatively large ethnic minorities (e.g. France 
and UK), in-work poverty is much more common for ethnic minority households. 
Education is very clearly connected to in-work poverty. Both in USA and in Europe, 
low-educated workers’ poverty risk is much higher than medium- or highly-educated 
workers’ poverty risk. Household type indicates that the highest poverty risk is in single 
parent households and one-earner couples with children. Poverty studies have noticed 
that labour market statuses within two-adult households have a clear connection with 
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the risk of poverty (see e.g. Saunders 1994; Kangas and Ritakallio 1998; De Graaf and 
Ultee 2000). In one-earner couples, the joblessness of spouse is a risk-enhancing fac-
tor. The big picture is rather similar in the USA and in Europe. Only in the Nordic 
countries is a single parent household’s risk of in-work poverty rather small, as it is in 
countries where single parenthood is a rather rare phenomenon (Greece and Ireland). 
(Peña-Casas and Latta 2004, 41, 56; U.S. Department of Labor 2006, 8, 11.) 
According to in-work poverty studies, women have higher poverty rates than men, 
but this is explained, for example, through their higher rate of part-time working and 
single parenthood. When the impact of these factors is controlled, the odds of being 
working poor are similar for women and men. (Gardner and Herz 1992; Peña-Casas 
and Latta 2004; Bardone and Guio 2005; U.S. Department of Labor 2006.) 
Thus, it is young, low educated people in certain household types (especially single-
person and single parent households) who have the highest poverty rates among the 
working population. The risk of (in-work) poverty increases enormously when dif-
ferent risk-enhancing factors accumulate in the same household. This is well docu-
mented both in USA (see e.g. Kim 1998; Acs et al. 2000) and in Europe (Millar et al. 
1997; Kangas and Ritakallio 1998).
In addition to different population groups, working poor studies have traced the 
reasons behind in-work poverty to certain factors. Three labour market problems 
behind in-work poverty have been disclosed (see e.g. Klein and Rones 1989; Levitan 
and Taggart 1983). These are low-wages, involuntary part-time employment and 
periods of unemployment. In 2004, over 80 percent of the working poor experienced 
at least one of these labour market problems in the USA (U.S. Department of Labor 
2006). The working poor may, therefore, actually be poor because their employment 
does not provide them a sufficient financial income (low-income employment), but 
the reasons for their poverty may also be related to their lack of employment. Insuf-
ficient working hours due to part-time work and the lack of consistent employment 
throughout the year due to short-term temporary employment are often factors af-
fecting the working poor. However, in public discussion the fact that working does 
not always mean full-time, year-round work is often left unmentioned. Furthermore, 
it is also often left unmentioned that at least some part of in-work poverty is due to 
lack of work. 
A low-paid job, one in which earned incomes are below the poverty line, has been 
proved to be the most common and significant factor accounting for the poverty of the 
working population in the United States (see Klein and Rones 1989; Bane and Ellwood 
1991; Kim 1998; Waldron et al. 2004). With low earned incomes, the situation is such 
that even full-time employment does not provide a sufficient livelihood. The reasons 
for this are usually too low minimum wages that do not correspond with costs of 
living. This has been shown to be very common in the United States (see Gottschalk 
and Smeeding 1997; Shipler 2004, 290–291), and also to some extent in the United 
Kingdom (see e.g. Millar et al. 1997) and in Australia (see e.g. Eardley 1998). Recent 
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debate in the EU as a whole (e.g. Peña-Casas and Latta 2004; Bardone and Guio 2005) 
indicates that the problem of too low wages is becoming more and more acute. In-work 
poverty caused by too low wages has a clear, structural nature. It is hard to break the 
“cycle of poverty” when a person cannot make a sufficient living despite working as 
much as is practically possible.
In Europe, Wolfgang Strengmann-Kuhn (2004) estimated that approximately one 
quarter of in-work poverty was the result of low wages. The reason behind the relatively 
low impact of low wages on in-work poverty in Europe can be explained by noticing 
that in-work poverty is related more to the context of household structure than to 
labour market problems (Peña-Casas and Latta 2004; Strengmann-Kuhn 2004). The 
increasing necessity of a second wage and certain characteristics of households (lone 
parenthood, households with many children etc.) have their own significance.  
The finding that low wages do not equal being poor is not a big surprise. For exam-
ple, Brian Nolan and Ive Marx (1999, 5–6) showed in their study that there is only a 
limited overlap between low pay and poverty. Even in the USA, which had the largest 
overlap, only every fourth low-paid employee was living in a poor household. Low-
wage working seems to be very much income supplementing in its nature. It should, 
however, be stressed that the connection between in-work poverty and low wages does 
exist. Like Nolan and Marx (1999, 8) conclude: “While most low paid workers are not 
in poor households, most workers in poor households are themselves low paid.”
We could conclude that the phrase “working is the best welfare” is a little misleading, 
but it is mostly true. Poverty in its true sense is connected to those who are outside 
of paid labour (unemployed, students, retirees with low pensions etc.). But what this 
chapter has tried to emphasise is that in-work poverty has certain features that need 
to be researched. First of all, in-work poverty is a symptom of serious problems in the 
basic pillars of society. Labour markets’ or welfare states’ social security systems, or 
both, are not working as they should. Secondly, we can always blame, for example, 
the unemployed poor for being lazy or not trying hard enough – whether or not that 
is true – but blaming the working poor for not trying hard enough would simply be 
insulting. We should again remember David Shipler’s (2004) sentence: “Working poor 
should be an oxymoron”. It should be a non-existent concept. But still, at the moment, 
it is one of the most debated concepts across the industrialised world. 
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4  rESEArCh quESTIONS, METhODS AND DATA
The empirical part of this study analyses in-work poverty from different approaches. 
One thing that stays the same throughout the empirical section is that analyses are 
made from the comparative view. In this chapter, the methodological framework is 
introduced. First, we take a detailed look in research questions. Secondly, the data 
used are introduced. The final part of the chapter concentrates on the methodological 
choices of each empirical chapter.
4.1  Research questions
There are four main research questions in this study. The main and sub research 
questions are summarised in Table 2 at the end of this chapter. The empirical section 
begins by analysing in-work poverty over a long time span (1970–2000) in six OECD 
countries (Finland, Sweden, Germany, UK, Canada and USA). The first research 
question is: How has in-work poverty developed in the studied countries during the 
years 1970–2000? 
We are drawing a hypothesis that there is an impact of the welfare state regime, which 
affects the severity of in-work poverty and we are examining how this impact has 
developed during the 30 years under study. Welfare state literature has shown evidence 
that in different regimes the outcomes of institutions are different (see e.g. Esping-
Andersen 1990 and 1999; Huber and Stephens 2001). Nordic welfare states (Finland 
and Sweden) are supposedly low-poverty countries where the welfare state’s impact 
on reducing poverty is very visible. Germany is representing Central European wel-
fare states, where mechanisms that prevent poverty are built into the labour market 
system through earnings-related programs. Anglo-Saxon countries (UK, USA and 
Canada) have – according to welfare state typology – high in-work poverty rates and 
ineffective welfare state redistribution mechanisms. Besides changes in welfare state 
regimes, there have been major changes in family types and women’s labour force 
participation. The impact of these changes on incidence of in-work poverty is also 
considered when interpreting the results.
The development of in-work poverty is analysed from different angles. Firstly, the 
extent of change of both in-work poverty itself and in-work poverty compared to 
poverty in general is analysed. This is answered by observing the trends of poverty 
within and between countries over time. Comparing changes of (in-work) poverty 
trends helps to put the historical development of in-work poverty into perspective. 
Secondly, the effectiveness of income transfers is taken into consideration. This enables 
us to compare different countries over time and also what was/is the importance of 
the welfare state regime in tackling poverty.
Thirdly, the change in in-work poverty between different labour market and family 
type combinations is studied. In addition to country differences and trends over time, 
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it reveals what are the implications of two-earner compared to one-earner households, 
what is the relevance of having children, how single adult households differ from 
couples, and what is the “profile” of working poor households in different countries 
and how this profile has changed over decades. The importance of changes in work 
and family life are also analysed.
After putting the historical picture of in-work poverty in place, we focus on EU15 
countries. The second research question is: How does the picture of poverty among 
working households change in EU15 countries by different poverty measures? Our hy-
pothesis is derived from the previous poverty literature. Poverty has been found to 
be a multidimensional problem, and different poverty measures identify different 
groups as poor (see e.g. Callan et al. 1993; van den Bosch 2001; Bradshaw and Finch 
2003). Therefore, our hypothesis is that the picture of working poor changes when 
different poverty measures are used. The resource-based indicator (income method) 
might capture temporary financial problems, whereas the way-of-life-based indicator 
(deprivation) captures long-term economic hardship (see e.g. McGregor and Borooah 
1992; Halleröd 1995). An indicator based on subjective experience gives further infor-
mation on how working households themselves evaluate their economic situation. 
The main concern is whether it is enough to analyse in-work poverty just by incomes. 
Do we miss some important information that the income method is not capturing? 
There are hardly any studies concentrating on multidimensional aspects of poverty 
among the working-age population. The simple question “how does the extent of in-
work poverty change between different measures?” is essential when analysing the 
working poor phenomenon, but nonetheless this question still remains unanswered.
Nonetheless, the existence of working poor in Europe has now been recognised – at 
least when measured by disposable incomes. However, many questions related to this 
problem remain unanswered. Recent studies have clearly shown that quite a signifi-
cant proportion of workers do not have adequate incomes. But what about workers’ 
own subjective interpretations of their situation? Do they define themselves as poor? 
How about their situation in terms of possession of goods and participation in vari-
ous social activities? Are they deprived? As Stein Ringen (1987, 162) has mentioned, 
“Poverty is the result of an accumulation of deprivation in both resources and way 
of life.” This type of “way of life” aspect will be included in the analyses of this study. 
To give a proper picture of how different measures affect in-work poverty, we need to 
answer the question “how do different poverty measures affect different population 
groups?” Recent in-work poverty literature in Europe has suggested that EU countries 
have certain variations in risk groups (see Peña-Casas and Latta 2004; Bardone and 
Guio 2005). This study tests the findings by taking additional poverty measures into 
the side of income measure. 
The third main research question is: What are the factors behind in-work poverty in 
EU countries? The hypothesis is that overall, in-work poverty is a result of household 
context more than labour market problems in Europe. This hypothesis is based on 
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results that have shown a small overlap between in-work poverty and labour market 
problems (see e.g. Nolan and Marx 1999; Strengmann-Kuhn 2004). On the other 
hand, we can also hypothesise that differences between countries are supposedly 
large because previous work on in-work poverty in the EU have shown large country 
variations in the incidence of in-work poverty (Peña-Casas and Latta 2004; Bardone 
and Guio 2005). Countries with strong labour market regulations supposedly have a 
larger proportion of working poor households with labour market problems because 
“typical workers” are well protected by labour markets and the welfare state.  
The analysis is started with an estimation of what proportion of working poor in 
EU countries is having labour market problems (low-wages, part-time work and 
unemployment)? The relationship between labour market problems and household 
context is essential when we are analysing the factors of in-work poverty. Household 
context is divided into two dimensions: household structure and working intensity. 
To separate different household structures, we use a simple division of couple and 
single households and households with or without children. Working intensity is a 
concept that tells us how many of the adults in the household are working. Basically, 
we are comparing households where all adults are working (i.e. 2-earner couples and 
working single adult households) to households where not all adults are working (i.e. 
1-earner couples). 
We are analysing how labour market problems and household context, separately and 
together, affect the incidence of in-work poverty. In Europe the connection between 
labour market problems and in-work poverty is not as visible as in the USA (see 
Strengmann-Kuhn 2004; U.S. Department of Labor 2006). Therefore it is important 
to analyse how household context is affecting in-work poverty. If in-work poverty in 
Europe could not be explained just by the labour market problems, as seems to be the 
case, then we need to know what the importance of other factors is. 
The final part of analysis focuses on estimating what would happen to in-work pov-
erty rates in EU countries if low wages were to be lifted to the level of calculated low 
wages. This analysis gives us information on how supplemental low wages really are 
for working households. If there is not much of a change in poverty rates after estima-
tion then we could assume that erasing in-work poverty requires other actions besides 
taking care of minimum wage levels.
The fourth main question is: What is the nature of in-work poverty dynamics in EU 
countries? Our hypothesis is that in-work poverty dynamics is somewhat different than 
the trends of poverty dynamics in the EU in general. Pasi Moisio (2004) has noticed 
that poverty mobility in EU countries was high but poverty spells concentrated on the 
same people and mobility had striking affinity across EU countries. Our hypothesis 
is built on the fact that in-work poverty rates overall are smaller than poverty rates 
in general. Therefore, poverty mobility flows are supposedly low because most of the 
workers are well protected from poverty. The affinity of poverty mobility could also be 
questioned because there are cross-sectional findings in previous literature suggesting 
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that the variation of in-work poverty is large among countries (see e.g. Peña-Casas 
and Latta 2004; Bardone and Guio 2005). Thus, we could hypothesise that there can 
be country differences found in in-work poverty mobility flows. 
The main question is approached from different angles. First of all it is important to 
estimate what proportion of working households live in constant poverty in the EU 
countries. This shows the persistence of in-work poverty. If only a small number of 
working households have long spells of poverty, then we could conclude that in-work 
poverty is more of a temporary problem. If there are sizeable amount of working 
households spending consecutive years in poverty, then it is possible that we could 
find a certain group of working households that is left permanently in the margins 
of society. We could hypothesise that the total number of passengers on the “bus of 
working poor” is rather low. This statement is backed up by the fact that it is both 
theoretically and empirically obvious that there is no better way to prevent yourself 
and your household from poverty than paid work. Thus, the vast majority of working 
households supposedly never experience poverty.
Secondly, poverty inflows and outflows are measured. This gives a further yardstick of 
how static or dynamic the phenomenon of in-work poverty in EU countries is. Again, 
we could hypothesise that the flow is quite high because, at least in theory, paid work 
is the easiest way to improve the household’s economic situation. Therefore, in-work 
poverty should be only a transitional phase. If a working household stays for a longer 
time in poverty, then there is surely something very wrong if working (and receiving 
wages) is not enough to lift the household over the poverty line. 
Thirdly, the dynamic nature of in-work poverty is studied by analysing the “career 
ladder” effect. Some studies suggest that in-work poverty is not that bad a social prob-
lem because low-wage jobs are working as a ladder to better-paid jobs. This view is 
questioned in the USA (see e.g. Newman 1999; Shulman 2003). This study estimates 
how many working poor households escape from poverty because of increased earn-
ings. Of course, there might also be working households that move into poverty. This 
kind of “downhill slide” effect is problematic because it means that in-work poverty is 
not erased just by hoping that the career ladder effect eventually lifts poor households 
above the poverty line – if at the same time, there are households that sink below the 
poverty line. 
Research questions are summarised in Table 2. The main research questions and sub 
questions will be approached from an internationally comparative view. Observations 
of single countries are made mainly when results indicate something interesting has 
happened in that specific country or when certain countries differ significantly from 
other countries. In some cases countries are combined to ease the interpretation of 
results. This is the case, for example, when analysing the factors behind working 
poor phenomenon. Also, when there are data limitations – such as where individual 
countries have too few cases – countries are combined. This is the case, for example, 
when the “career ladder” effect is studied.
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Table 2. Research questions of the study.
Main questions Sub questions
1. How has in-work poverty developed 
in six OECD countries during the years 
1970–2000?
– How has the extent of poverty in general changed compared to 
in-work poverty?
– What is the effectiveness of income transfers in reducing in-
work poverty?
– How does in-work poverty change between different labour 
market and family type combinations?
2. How does the picture of poverty among 
working households change in EU coun-
tries by different poverty measures?
– How do different poverty measures overlap?
– What is the extent of poverty in EU countries?
– How do different poverty measures affect different population 
groups?
3. What are the factors behind in-work 
poverty in EU countries?
– What share of the working poor problem in EU countries is 
based on labour market problems?
– How does the poverty rate change between different combina-
tions of labour market problems, household structure and 
working intensity?
– What would happen to poverty rates if low-wages were to be 
lifted to the low-wage levels?
4. What is the nature of in-work poverty 
dynamics in EU countries?
– What proportion of working households live in constant poverty 
in EU countries?
– How large are poverty inflows and outflows?
– Is there a “career ladder” effect of earnings that lifts working 
poor households out of poverty?
– What are the causes of “downhill slide” from working non-poor 
to working poor?
There are various research questions which highlight the multifaceted nature of work-
ing poor. By answering these questions we reach a more thorough understanding of 
what working poor is, where it is originated and how it differs when it is studied from 
an internationally comparative view.
4.2  Data 
The data in this study is mainly derived from the European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP). It is a longitudinal social survey containing comparable data from EU15 
countries. It is designed, co-ordinated, collected and distributed by Eurostat – the 
statistical office of the European Communities – with the help of national statistics 
institutes. (Eurostat 2003.)
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All 12 Member States were represented in the first wave in 1994. Austria (in 1995) and 
Finland (in 1996) joined the project later. From 1997 onwards, similar data has been 
available for Sweden as well. The data collection was finished in 2001. The final data 
contains 8 waves and information on some 60 000 households and 130 000 adults. 
(Eurostat 2003.) The rule of thumb in empirical chapters is that all 15 EU countries 
are included in analyses but, due to the lack of data, in some cases the number of 
countries is restricted.
ECHP has many useful qualities. Firstly, the longitudinal panel design makes it pos-
sible to follow up and interview the same set of private households and persons over 
several consecutive years. Secondly, ECHP has a multipurpose nature, which offers 
more ways – besides incomes – to research different features of well-being. 
One of the major problems of ECHP is the attrition between research waves. The extent 
of attrition has differed very much between countries (Peracchi 2002; Lehmann and 
Wirtz 2003). Analyses of social exclusion (like working poor) are especially susceptible 
to attrition for a variety of reasons. For example, “the worst off households” may not 
be reached or they are excluded – for whichever reason – much more easily from the 
data than “average households”. This should be kept in mind when analysing and 
interpreting results. Attrition is especially harmful in longitudinal analyses.
Analyses that are made over a long time span (1970–2000) use data that is derived 
from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). It is an international cooperative project 
including comparable statistical data from 29 countries. The LIS data enables interna-
tional income comparisons both on the level of individuals and the level of households 
(for more information see http://www.lisproject.org.). The data from Finland from 
1970 and 1980 are derived from the Finnish Household Budget Surveys. The data is 
not totally comparable with LIS data, but all in all it enables us to get a glimpse of 
in-work poverty in Finland in the beginning of the 1970’s and 1980’s. More detailed 
descriptions of the data can be found in Appendix 1.
A few remarks about the LIS data should be made. Firstly, the observation interval is 
as long as 10 years. The actual observation years vary between countries as data has 
been collected in different years. For example data referring to 1970 is collected in 
1967 in Sweden, 1973 in Germany, 1969 in the United Kingdom and in 1974 in USA. 
Secondly, it should also be noted that the German data from 1970, 1980 and 1990 are 
data from West Germany and the data from 2000 is from the unified Germany as 
it is today. This should be kept in mind when analysing the results. West Germany 
and East Germany were very different societies in many ways – including in terms of 
their labour market systems. 
The restrictions of the data sets used are tried to notice as thoroughly as possible in 
empirical sections – especially when interpreting results. It is very hard to estimate 
how much the use of different data sets, missing data, small number of cases or panel 
attrition blurs the results. The picture of in-work poverty in the studied countries is 
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drawn as accurately as possible, but there is certainly a plenty of room for interpreta-
tion in the results.
4.3  Methodological definitions and research setting
Earlier, it was highlighted how problematic the term “working poor” is. The main 
problem of conceptualisation is that when we are talking about the working poor, it is 
often quite unclear what it is that we are actually talking about. Both parts of the term 
“working poor” are debatable. Questions such as “how much work should a person 
do to be defined as working?” or “how do we measure who is poor?” are extremely 
important and we must be very careful with definitions; we must also be very aware 
of what consequences the chosen definitions have for results. Due to different datasets 
in different chapters of the empirical sections, definitions also vary. Therefore, next 
we will present the methodological definitions and research settings of each research 
question. Methodological choices are summarised in Appendix 1.
4.3.1  Definitions, research setting and methods of Chapter 5
 
There are various datasets in use, and they are mainly derived from the Luxembourg 
Income Study. LIS data is weighted with each data provider’s household weight. In 
addition, Finnish Household Budget Surveys are used. They are weighted by multiply-
ing basic weights by the household’s size. This weighting is practical when measuring 
poverty at the individual level, as is the case in this study. The common practice in 
poverty measuring has been to use the household level, but in recent years the indi-
vidual level has become more and more common (see Atkinson et al. 2002, 93–94). 
An age range of 18–64 years is used consistently in empirical chapters. There are many 
ways to define age range of the working (active) population. O’Connor and Smeeding 
(1993) suggested that the prime age population ranges from 25 to 55 (see also Goodin 
et al. 1999, 113). Atkinson et al. (2002, 149) recommended ages 18–59 or alternatively 
18–64. The age range 18–64 is used in this study because it is in line with the Euro-
pean employment strategy, which aims – among other things – to increase the level 
of employment among the older population (ages 55–64).
The criterion for “working” varies due to the limitations of the data. The main criterion 
that is used as often as possible is that a person is considered as working when she/he 
has worked for at least 27 weeks during the previous 12 months, either full time or 
part time. This criterion is based on how the U.S. studies have defined working. If this 
criterion can not be executed, then the criterion is based on weekly work hours on 
Eurostat’s recommendations (Marlier and Ponthieux 2000), according to which 30 or 
more work hours a week is defined as full-time work and 15–29 hours a week is defined 
as part-time work. However, even this criterion cannot be used on all data. Therefore, 
we are obliged to use the respondents’ subjective definitions of their working status. 
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Fortunately, only the oldest data is affected by this restriction. Moreover, in those days 
most people worked full time. The OECD started to separate statistics for full-time 
and part-time working only at the beginning of the 1980’s. Thus, we can assume that 
persons who defined themselves as “working” were full-time workers. More detailed 
definitions of how working is defined in each dataset are in Appendix 2. 
Only households that have at least one 18–64-year-old full-time worker are included 
in the analyses in Chapter 5. The reason for the full-time worker restriction is that it 
frames our research setting in a way where the studied households must have definitive 
involvement in labour markets. Moreover, the projects of the European Commission 
programs aimed at preventing social inclusion have highlighted the need to create 
indicators that measure in-work poverty in ways that account for situations in which 
poverty is not caused just by lack of work (unemployment periods, not enough working 
hours etc.), but also account for situations in which the poor households have a fairly 
steady position in the labour markets (Atkinson et al. 2005). A household’s additional 
workers could be working either full time or part time.
The poverty measurement method used is the relative income measure. The selection 
of incomes as a measurement tool can be defended by the fact that it is practicable 
and applicable when making international comparisons. It is also an especially widely 
recognised measure in European poverty literature, and it was recommended as a 
Level 1 indicator of social inclusion in the European Union by an expert team (see 
Atkinson et al. 2002). Therefore, it is almost impossible to exclude a measure that is 
so influential and traditional in European comparative poverty research. The relative 
income method is defined in such a manner that the recommendations of Eurostat 
(2000) are used, which means that the poverty line is set at 60 percent of households’ 
median equivalent disposable incomes. 
The concept of relative income poverty poses a question of whether the poverty line 
for working poor should be drawn by using only working households as a basic group. 
In this way we could compare relative economic distances between different groups 
of the working population (see e.g. Mitchell 1991, 35). In this way the poverty line 
would be much higher because the non-working population (retirees, unemployed, 
students etc.) would be excluded when setting the poverty threshold. The advantage 
of this kind of poverty line would be that it would show what proportion of working 
households are clearly in a much worse economic situation than median working 
households. The disadvantage is that the poverty line might be set at such a high 
level that many working households with at least decent disposable incomes could 
be labelled as poor. Thus, the whole population is used in setting the relative income 
poverty line. In this way we can be quite sure that working poor households are really 
suffering from inadequate incomes. 
Different family sizes are made comparable with equivalence scales. Different 
equivalence scales give different weights for the persons who compose a household 
unit. The predominantly used scale, which is also systematically in use in this study, 
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is recommended by Eurostat, the EU’s statistical office. The scale is the so-called 
OECD-modified scale, where the first adult receives a weight of 1.0, every additional 
person aged 14 or over has a weight of 0.5 and children under 13 receive a weight 
of 0.3. For example, a single adult household’s disposable incomes are divided by a 
weight of 1.0, whereas the disposable incomes of a couple with two children are di-
vided by a weight of 2.1 (1.0 + 0.5 + 0.3 + 0.3). In practice this means that the couple 
with two children require income a little over two times higher than that of a single 
adult. Other frequently used equivalence scales include, for example, the traditional 
OECD scale (or “Oxford scale”) and the square root of the number of household 
members (or “Atkinson scale”). Different scales have different weights, which increase 
or decrease the number of poor and affect the composition of the poor population. 
(See Hagenaars 1986, 15–37; Callan et al. 1989, 18–20; Atkinson et al. 2002, 98–99.) 
Use of the modified OECD scale is not possible on certain data (see Appendix 2). All 
persons under 18 have the weight 0.3 in these data. In practice this means that in 
these datasets the poverty rate will be slightly lower than it actually is. This should 
be remembered when analysing the results.
The effectiveness of income transfers in Chapter 5 is measured by comparing post-
transfer poverty rates to pre-transfer poverty rates. Post-transfer incomes include pre-
transfer incomes after state interventions (taxation and public transfers) that convert 
incomes to buying power (see e.g. Korpi 1980, 301–302). It is referred to as disposable 
incomes. Pre-transfer incomes include only so-called market or factor incomes (paid 
wages and salaries, entrepreneurial income and property income). Statistical analyses 
are made with descriptive methods (cross-tabs, profile analysis).
4.3.2  Definitions, research setting and methods of Chapter 6
Data is derived from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) from 2001. 
ECHP data is weighted by multiplying household cross-sectional weight with house-
hold size. Again, this is done to make data representative at a household level. The 
definition of “working” is similar to the definition used by Eurostat (see Marlier and 
Ponthieux 2000). According to these criteria, a person is defined as a worker if she/he 
works at least 15 hours per week and primary self-defined activity status during the 
previous year has been “working”. In this way, households that have only marginal 
involvement in labour markets (less than 15 hours of work per week or where the 
primary activity during the previous year has been “non-working”) are defined as 
“non-working”. 
Three measures of poverty are used: relative income measure, subjective measure 
and deprivation index. The definition of the relative income method is same as was 
presented in the previous chapter. A deprivation index is generally based on asking 
respondents whether they possess a specific item or participate in a certain activity. 
The deprivation index used here is based on a proposition of Atkinson et al. (2002, 
120–121) for a weighted deprivation index that takes into account the average standard 
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of living in respective countries. The summary deprivation index takes into account 
33 questions from the ECHP regarding possession of goods and services (the list of 
items is in Appendix 3). It is obvious that there are also various other goods – besides 
the ones presented in the ECHP – that also cause deprivation when they are lacking, 
but in this study we are not able to analyse other goods or services.
The deprivation index is constructed in such a way that each one of the 33 items is 
weighted by the percentage of people that are not deprived of that particular item in 
the country in question. The weight of each item is divided by the sum of all weights. 
This gives us the relative proportion of the total deprivation for each item. When all 
proportions are summed up, we have an index that has a value between 0 (household 
is not deprived of any of the items) and 1 (household is deprived of all of the items). 
The threshold of deprivation is set in such a way that if the household’s deprivation 
index is 0.1 or higher, the household is defined as poor. This way, the deprivation 
measure is in line with the income and subjective measures, which have their own 
cut points of poverty. The mean value of overall deprivation in EU countries varied 
between 0.065 and 0.032 during the years 1994–2001. Therefore, the cut point of 0.1 
is set in a much higher level than average deprivation. Thus, we have good reason 
to assume that households with a deprivation index of 0.1 or higher really do have a 
serious lack of goods and services. Naturally, we could treat deprivation index as an 
continuing variable and analyse for example mean deprivation values in different 
countries. That treatment does not change country rankings compared with analyses 
made of deprivation threshold (see Airio 2006c). 
In deprivation studies, the lack of goods and services experienced by respondents is 
usually involuntary (Halleröd 1994). Only a few items in the ECHP allow us to examine 
the involuntary nature of lack of resources. Consequently, in this study the lack of a 
resource – involuntary or not – is a sufficient criterion of deprivation. This naturally 
leaves much room for interpretation since we cannot be sure to what extent the lack 
of resources is actually involuntary (see also Halleröd et al. 2006). 
There are great differences between the different ways of composing and/or weighting 
deprivation indexes. Consensual methods, where lack of a certain amount of goods 
and services is used as a threshold of poverty, might give very different results than 
weighted indexes (see e.g. Bradshaw and Ritakallio 2006). Also, countries where almost 
all goods and services are lacking make the weights of items small. It might lead to a 
situation where in a certain country households could lack several goods and services 
but they are not defined as poor, whereas in some other country even a lack of one 
basic necessity might be a sufficient criterion of poverty.  
The use of the deprivation index is nonetheless justified since it can be argued that 
households everywhere – even in EU countries – try first and foremost to protect 
and fulfil the most basic needs. Therefore, it can be concluded that the goods house-
holds do not severely lack are presumably the goods that are the most important for 
the household in terms of everyday life. Hence, it is very likely that the lack of these 
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goods is involuntary, whereas the lack of goods lacked by most households may be 
more voluntary. The weighting of items is a convenient way of taking into account 
this different nature of lack of different resources. As a consequence, the most basic 
resources have a greater impact on the summary deprivation index than the goods 
and services that are not so important for households. 
The third method of measuring poverty is a subjective method. The relative income 
method and deprivation index are objective in their nature. It means that the researcher 
makes the judgement on whether the household is poor. A subjective measure gives us 
information on the satisfaction of people and provides us valuable information against 
which the information from objective measures can be compared (see Moisio 2004, 
46). Objective measures tell us about the amount of resources (income) households 
have and what is their access to the goods and services that enable them to participate 
fully in the life of community. A subjective method completes the picture by giving a 
yardstick of economic well-being to informants themselves. In this study, subjective 
poverty is measured with the question: “In terms of the total monthly income of your 
household, is your household able to make ends meet?” Households that answered either 
“with great difficulty” or “with difficulty” are defined as poor. Similar definitions are 
used also in other studies (see e.g. Bradshaw and Ritakallio 2006). 
The research setting is built in such a way that the first part concentrates on general 
methodological issues of poverty measurement: how measures overlap and what 
happens to in-work poverty rates when different measures are utilised. In the latter 
part, poverty is analysed by using different background factors to demonstrate how 
poverty risk changes between measures.
The background variables are level of education, type of household, age, work contract 
and type of work. All of these have found to be connected to in-work poverty (see 
Peña-Casas and Latta 2004). Education is divided into three categories by using the 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) codes: low educated (less 
than second stage of secondary education, ISCED 0–2), medium educated (second 
stage of secondary education, ISCED 3) and highly educated (recognised third level 
education, ISCED 5–7). Type of household is divided into four categories: childless 
couples, couples with children, single parents and single adults. Age of worker is non-
categorised (age range is 18–64 years). Work contract is divided into two categories: 
permanent workers (permanent employee or work contract that has total length of 
more than one year) and temporary workers (fixed-term, short-term or casual em-
ployee or work contract that has total length of less than one year). Type of work is 
divided into two categories: full-time workers (30 work hours or more per week) and 
part-time workers (15–29 work hours per week). 
Using micro indicators as background variables is common in poverty research (see 
Nolan and Whelan 1996; Kangas and Ritakallio 1998). It is also a much-used approach 
in working poor studies (see Marlier and Ponthieux 2000; Peña-Casas and Latta 2004;). 
Micro indicators are used to analyse the incidence of poverty in different population 
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groups, but the focus is also on the issue of whether different poverty measures identify 
different groups as the main groups at risk of in-work poverty.
4.3.3  Definitions, research setting and methods of Chapter 7
The data used are derived from ECHP from year 2001. Because of the lack of compa-
rable data, some countries have been excluded from analyses or definitions have been 
slightly modified. There is no data for part-time working in 4 countries (Germany, 
Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and Sweden) and no data for unemployment peri-
ods in 2 countries (the Netherlands and Sweden). These countries are excluded from 
the analyses of the effect of labour market problems. Also, the low-wage thresholds 
of Sweden and Luxembourg are calculated from yearly net earnings and not from the 
monthly gross earnings like in other countries. These adjustments blur the results 
and they should be kept in mind when interpreting the results.
Definitions used are as follows: 
Definition of working
–	 Criterion for working: current activity status is “working”.
–	 Working population age range is limited to 18–64 years.  
–	 Definition of full-time employment is more than 29 work hours a week; 
definition of part-time employment is 15–29 work hours a week.
Low-wage work
–	 A full-time employee with main activity status in previous year as working, whose 
gross hourly earned income is less than two-thirds of the national median of 
full-time employees’ gross hourly earned incomes (see Atkinson et al. 2002, 149). 
(For Luxembourg and Sweden the low-wage level is calculated from net monthly 
incomes.)
Part-time employment
–	 People who provide some kind of an answer to the question “Main reason for 
working less than full-time in principal job?” and worked 15–29 hours a week. 
(For Germany, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom and Sweden this data is not 
available as the question was not included in the surveys in these countries.)
Unemployment periods
–	 The respondent (or the respondent’s spouse) has been unemployed for at least 
one month during the previous 12 months. (No data for The Netherlands or 
Sweden.)
–	 In cases of couples: if one person’s current status is “working” and the other 
person’s is “unemployed”.
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Household context
–	 Household structure: couple without children, couple with children, single adult, 
single parent.
–	 Working intensity: a) all adults in household work (2-earner couples and work-
ing single adults/single parents) b) not all adults in household work (1-earner 
couples).
Low-wage workers are defined in a manner that they are full-time workers with the 
main activity status in the previous year as “working” and whose gross hourly earn-
ings are under two-thirds of the gross hourly median earnings of full-time, full-year 
workers in their respective countries. Similar approaches are widely used (OECD 
1996; Nolan and Marx 1999; Marlier and Ponthieux 2000). 
Part-time work is often divided into voluntary and involuntary part-time working (see 
e.g. U.S. Department of Labor 2006). Separating voluntary part-time workers from 
involuntary workers is a difficult task; in Europe, especially, it is almost impossible. 
The reason for this is that practically all part-time work in EU countries is done “vol-
untarily”. According to ECHP data, in 2001 just 11 percent of all part-time workers 
were working part-time involuntarily. Therefore, it seems that voluntary part-time 
working is much more common in EU countries. It could be argued that in Europe 
part-time working is more of a “second best” solution that enables households to earn 
extra money in a situation where working full time is problematic due to studying, 
children etc. Therefore, the connection between in-work poverty and all kinds of 
part-time working is studied regardless of the nature of part-time work. 
The case in which a person is unemployed for a certain period and employed for another 
period during the same calendar year also poses a lot of questions. Is a person who works 
for some part of the year, but is unemployed for another part, working poor? Should 
there be a limit – or should some kind of a limit be set – as to how many unemployment 
days per year a person can have before her/his income problems are simply attributed 
to unemployment? Usually studies have excluded from the working population those 
people that have been unemployed for more than half of the previous calendar year 
(for example Peña-Casas and Latta 2004; U.S. Department of Labor 2006).
 
Here the criterion is not that strict. If a person’s current status is “working”, the person 
is included in working population – regardless of how long she/he has worked without 
periods of unemployment. We have to be very careful when using the fluctuation of 
employment and unemployment periods as an indicator of working poor. The tem-
poral characteristic of the issue is highly important. There is a big difference between 
workers who have been unemployed for 11 months during the calendar year and work-
ers who have been unemployed for just one month during the same calendar year. 
The short temporal perspective (12 months) eases this problem a bit as only a marginal 
proportion of all workers have experienced unemployment periods. It is, therefore, 
unlikely that the long periods of unemployment influence the results very much. Also, 
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it must be noted that in Europe labour market positions have normally been quite 
stable (Taylor-Gooby 2004, 1–2). The working-age population is to a large extent either 
steadily employed (and not poor) or unemployed (and at greater risk of being poor).
It was stressed previously that the connection of in-work poverty and unemployment 
could be twofold. Person may have periods of unemployment, which might lead to a 
situation where annual incomes may be insufficient. Unemployment may also have an 
indirect effect if a spouse’s unemployment leads to a situation in which the household’s 
total income is insufficient despite the other person working. In the empirical section 
we use the concept “unemployment periods” to embody both of these cases. 
The last part of Chapter 7 concentrates on estimating what would happen to in-work 
poverty in EU countries if low wages were to be lifted to low-wage levels. The estimation 
is constructed in such a way that gross hourly wages are modified into annual earnings 
by multiplying them by weekly working hours (we use 30 hours/week) and weeks of 
the year (52 weeks). Gross annual earnings are converted to net annual earnings by 
using the same ratio between gross and net earnings as in the original data. 
The poverty indicator used in Chapter 7 is the relative income method. It is defined in the 
same manner as was presented in Chapter 4.3.1. Statistical methods are descriptive.
4.3.4  Definitions, research setting and methods of Chapter 8
Data is derived from the ECHP from years 1994–2001. Definitions are same as in 
Chapter 6 except the data is unweighted because analyses are longitudinal. Thus, a 
person is defined as a worker if she/he works at least 15 hours per week and her/his 
primary self-defined activity status during the previous year has been “working”. 
Those who are working temporarily (under 15 hours per week) are excluded from the 
analysis, as are those persons who have spent most of the time out of the labour force 
during the previous year. No distinction between full-time and part-time working 
is made. The measure of poverty is the relative income method and the age range of 
workers is 18–64 years.
In first part of the chapter, persistence of poverty and inflows to and outflows from 
in-work poverty are analysed. Statistical methods are descriptive mobility tables. 
The latter part of the chapter is dedicated to analysing what are the exit- and entry 
routes of in-work poverty. The yearly shift for 2000 and 2001 is studied. Mobility is 
tested by analysing how change of individual earnings affects the household’s pov-
erty status. We take arbitrary lines of 10 percent improvement (positive change) or 
10 percent worsening (negative change) of earnings compared to the previous year 
as a measure. We also analyse the effect of possible changes in the household. These 
include change of household’s labour market status (some change for better or worse in 
the household’s working patterns during the studied years) and change in household’s 
size (see Table 3). 
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Table 3. Variables explaining changes in poverty status.
Variables “Positive change” “Negative change”
Earnings Over 10% increase of individual earnings 
from year 2000 to 2001
Over 10% decrease of individual earnings 
from year 2000 to 2001
Working intensity More workers in household and/or change 
from part-time work to full-time work
Less workers in household and/or change 
from full-time work to part-time work
Household size Number of adults in household increases 
and/or number of children decreases
Number of adults in household decreases 
and/or number of children increases
Changes that have occurred in earnings, working intensity and/or household’s size 
enable us to analyse what are the reasons for exit from, entry to or staying in poverty. 
We can observe changes in poverty status related to changes in earnings, changes in 
labour market status or changes in household composure and how much there are 
“unexplainable” factors behind mobility.
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5  ChANGES IN IN-WOrK POvErTy IN WELFArE STATES 1970–2000
We start the empirical section by analysing in-work poverty over a long time span. 
Six OECD countries (Finland, Sweden, Germany, UK, Canada and USA) are selected 
to represent different types of welfare states. According to Esping-Andersen’s welfare 
state typology, Finland and Sweden represent the social democratic/Nordic welfare 
regime, Germany the conservative/Central European regime and the United Kingdom, 
Canada and the United States the liberal/Anglo-Saxon regime. Firstly, the extent of 
in-work poverty compared to poverty in general is examined. Secondly, the effective-
ness of income transfers is taken into consideration. The last part of the chapter seeks 
an answer to the question of how in-work poverty has changed over time in different 
labour market and family type combinations.  
5.1  Trends of in-work poverty from a comparative perspective
Working is a good way to secure one’s well-being. That wisdom is put under empirical 
scrutiny throughout the analyses. Comparing in-work poverty to overall poverty (Table 
4) is the first step in analysing how good a protection from poverty working is. 
Poverty rates among working households are much lower than poverty rates of all 
households in all six studied countries in all measurement points. This is not any 
surprise. On the basis of odd ratios we can estimate that in 2000 the poverty risk of all 
households was 1.6 times greater in the USA and in Canada and almost 4 times bigger 
in Finland than the respective poverty rates of working households in these countries. 
In this sense working is a very good form of protection against poverty. On the other 
hand, in-work poverty has been especially high in the USA and in Canada (approxi-
mately 10–15%). This is a fact that has already been disclosed by earlier research (see 
e.g. Levitan and Taggart 1983; O’Connor and Smeeding 1993; Acs et al. 2000). 
Table 4. Poverty rates (%) 1970–2000: all households / working households, odd ratios in parentheses. 
1970 1980 1990 2000
Finland 13.2 / 9.9 (1.3) 11.0 / 6.1 (1.8) 13.4 / 1.9 (7.1) 11.8 / 3.0 (3.9)
Sweden 16.7 / 8.9 (1.9) 9.4 / 5.8 (1.6) 12.8 / 4.4 (2.9) 12.7 / 4.4 (2.9)
Germany 18.2 / 4.8 (3.8) 13.1 / 7.2 (1.8) 13.6 / 4.8 (2.8) 14.6 / 6.3 (2.3)
United Kingdom 15.5 / 9.0 (1.7) 17.7 / 5.1 (3.5) 23.2 / 6.3 (3.7) 19.7 / 6.5 (3.0)
Canada 25.2 / 13.0 (1.9) 20.6 / 13.2 (1.6) 17.1 / 8.8 (1.9) 18.0 / 11.3 (1.6)
USA 22.8 / 10.8 (2.1) 23.2 / 15.9 (1.5) 24.8 / 14.1 (1.8) 24.3 / 15.1 (1.6)
Source: LIS, own calculations.
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It should be stressed that poverty rates of all households reflect for example the gener-
osity of pensions and their impact on poverty. Thus, generous pension systems reduce 
poverty in old-age and hence overall poverty. There is a potential bias in the cross-
country comparisons: Generous pension systems and lower overall poverty might be 
showing up as a smaller in-work poverty impact. This should be kept in mind when 
analysing the odd ratios of Table 4. 
It is hard to find any common trends of in-work poverty. The theory of Europe sliding 
towards the Anglo-American working poor situation does not get much support from 
the results. The most evident trend (UK excluded) is the fact that in-work poverty 
diminished during the 1980’s, but it started to rise again in the 1990’s. This lends 
support to recent notions that in-work poverty is an increasing social problem. Dif-
ferences between European countries and Canada and the USA are easily perceived. In 
Europe in-work poverty rates have been much more lower, and the time trend suggests 
that in-work poverty has, overall, diminished in Europe whereas in the USA and in 
Canada it has stayed pretty much at the same level for decades. It should nonetheless 
be emphasised that although in-work poverty has been a subject of debate in Europe 
in recent years, it cannot really be considered as a totally new social risk. According 
to Table 4 it was already common in OECD countries in the 1970’s and the 1980’s.
5.2  Working poor and income redistribution 
Welfare states have their own impact on how wages are converted to buying power 
(see e.g. Korpi 1980). Next we will analyse how income redistribution mechanisms 
(taxation, social insurance programs etc.) have affected the incidence of in-work 
poverty. Table 5 shows poverty rates of working households before and after income 
redistribution. Poverty reduction achieved by welfare states’ interventions is also 
introduced. Equality of pre-transfer income distribution shows again that four Euro-
pean countries have had much less in-work poverty before transfers than the USA and 
Canada. For example, cut points of 1990 and 2000 show that in European countries 
pre-transfer poverty was between 4–9 percent, whereas in the USA and in Canada 
poverty rates were 11–14 percent.
 
The effect of income transfers varies from country to country. In Finland and in Swe-
den (excluding the year 1980) in-work poverty was reduced significantly. In the year 
2000, redistribution halved the rate of in-work poverty. The extensive social security 
systems of the Nordic countries effectively help working households that would be 
poor if they had to rely only on market incomes. 
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Table 5. Poverty rates (%) in working households in 1970–2000: before income transfers / after income transfers, 
reduction of poverty (%) in parentheses. 
1970 1980 1990 2000
Finland 14.9 / 9.9 (–34) 12.5 / 6.1 (–51) 5.1 / 1.9 (–63) 5.9 / 3.0 (–49)
Sweden 12.3 / 8.9 (–28) 5.0 / 5.8 (16) 6.3 / 4.4 (–30) 8.7 / 4.4 (–49)
Germany 3.9 / 4.8 (23) 4.5 / 7.2 (60) 4.3 / 4.8 (12) 7.0 / 6.3 (10)
United Kingdom 11.0 / 9.0 (–18) 7.5 / 5.1 (–32) 6.2 / 6.3 (2) 6.3 / 6.5 (3)
Canada 14.1 / 13.0 (–8) 15.8 /13.2 (–16) 11.3 / 8.8 (–22) 13.4 /11.3 (–16)
USA 11.4 / 10.8 (–5) 15.8 / 15.9 (1) 12.7 /14.1 (11) 14.4 / 15.1 (5)
Source: LIS, own calculations.
At the other end of the spectrum is Germany, where poverty of working households 
actually increased after redistribution. This is probably due to the fact that working 
households in Germany pay more taxes and other social expenses than they receive as 
benefits. However, traditionally many social benefits are included in salaries in Central 
European countries, which means that they have been included in the analyses before 
social income transfers. That explains the very low rates of in-work poverty before 
income redistribution in Germany and the ineffective redistribution.
In the UK in-work poverty reduced to some extent in the 1970’s and in the 1980’s, 
but the last two cross-section points show that it has stayed the same despite income 
transfers. In Canada the welfare state managed to reduce poverty of working house-
holds to a certain extent, but the system cannot be regarded as very effective. In 
the USA poverty rates have even increased after social transfers. Both the USA and 
Canada have a large amount of working households with inadequate incomes, but 
the welfare state has been ineffective in improving their situation. Earlier studies of 
welfare states have emphasised the ineffectiveness of welfare state systems in Anglo-
American liberal regime countries (see e.g. Mitchell 1991; Goodin et al. 1999). These 
studies receive further support from the results of Table 5.
The cross-section from 2000 shows that in-work poverty rates of the four European 
countries are pretty much the same before transfers. Redistributive systems of welfare 
states are the factors that separate Finland and Sweden from Germany and the UK. It 
should be kept in mind that when we are evaluating the effectiveness of welfare states 
we should not only look at outcomes, in this case the reduction of in-work poverty, 
but also consider inputs used. Proportions of social costs of the GDP are somewhat 
higher in the Nordic countries and in Germany than they are in the Anglo-American 
countries (see e.g. OECD 1992; OECD 2001a).
The large inputs of the Nordic countries reduce in-work poverty very effectively. On 
the other hand, the inputs of Germany did not reduce poverty rates quite so effec-
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tively. But again, we have to remember that many benefits in Germany are already 
included in wages. This has an effect on poverty before transfers, which is extremely 
low in Germany. In the Anglo-American countries’ inputs are small, and so are out-
comes. It is very difficult to find signs of convergence among welfare states’ ability to 
reduce in-work poverty. The Nordic countries have effectively reduced labour-market 
related poverty during the whole 30-year time span, but in other countries poverty 
has been reduced only slightly or not at all. Retrenchment of welfare states, which 
was discussed in Chapter 2, seems to have a very minor affect on the effectiveness of 
Nordic welfare states.   
5.3  Working poor and family structures
The affect of different family structures on the incidence of in-work poverty is 
presented in Table 6. Working households have been grouped by number of adults, 
number of wage-earners and whether household have children or not. According to 
our research setting, households without at least one full-time worker are excluded 
from the analysis. There are also no detailed analyses on the statuses of the non-active 
spouses of the single-earner couples. It is clear that in terms of household’s overall 
incomes, it would be interesting to know whether the other spouse is unemployed, 
retired, a student, on parental leave etc. Especially the negative effects of unemployment 
on household’s disposable incomes have been emphasised in previous studies (see e.g. 
Gray 2004). Therefore, it is likely that the poverty within single-earner couples has a 
strong variation. This should be kept in mind when analysing the results.
Taking country by country, we see that in Finland childless two-earner couples had 
an almost non-existent poverty risk. Two-earner couples with children had quite a 
high poverty risk (10%) in the beginning of the 1970’s, but in the 1990’s their poverty 
risk decreased to a very low level. Their poverty risk increased again slightly during 
the 1990s, but it was still much lower than the poverty rate of all households (11.8%) 
or poverty of all working households (3.0%). Moreover, the situation of working 
single parents in Finland has improved clearly during the three decades under study. 
In Sweden – like in all 6 countries – childless two-earner couples had a very low 
poverty rate during the whole time span. The same features that were characteristic 
of Finland are also evident – to some extent – in Sweden as well. 
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Table 6. Post-transfer poverty rates (%) in 1970–2000 in different combinations of working households.¹
2-earner 
couple, no 
children
2-earner 
couple 
with 
children
1-earner 
couple, no 
children
1-earner 
couple 
with 
children
Single 
adult in 
full-time 
work
Single 
parent in 
full-time 
work
Total 
working 
poor rate
FIN 1970 5.0 10.1 9.5 9.8 6.1 23.7 9.9
FIN 1980 2.8 4.2 7.1 12.4 7.6 11.7 6.1
FIN 1990 0.1 0.2 2.6 2.8 3.1 2.0 1.9
FIN 2000 0.7 2.1 2.7 5.4 4.1 3.9 3.0
SWE 1970 4 7.7 9.1 13.8 5.5 11.1 8.9
SWE 1980 1.3 4.1 8.4 19.4 3.2 7.6 5.8
SWE 1990 1.8 2.7 3.7 6.7 7.5 2 4.4
SWE 2000 1 1.4 6.7 8.7 6.8 6 4.4
DEU 1970 0.3 1.9 1.8 8 4.2 13.4 4.8
DEU 1980 2.3 5.9 1 13.2 3.6 14.1 7.2
DEU 1990 0.9 2.1 2.2 7.8 3.3 9.9 4.8
DEU 2000 0 1.4 4 7.7 4.5 18.2 6.3
UK 1970 0.2 3.9 0.7 20.4 2 27.6 9.0
UK 1980 1 3.6 4.3 9.8 3.3 6.9 5.1
UK 1990 1.2 2.7 6.2 14.3 5 6.4 6.3
UK 2000 1.8 3.9 8.4 18.4 3.8 7 6.5
CAN 1970 2.5 8.7 6.5 18.4 14.6 20.0 10.8
CAN 1980 1.4 7.7 8.4 24.6 14 34.9 15.9
CAN 1990 2.5 5 6.8 14.7 9.5 18.6 14.1
CAN 2000 3 7.8 9.8 21.5 11.4 16.9 15.1
USA 1970 2.3 6.6 7 14.9 6.2 29.6 13.0
USA 1980 3.3 13.2 9.1 26.9 12.1 43.2 13.2
USA 1990 3 8.7 11 29.4 9 28.4 8.8
USA 2000 2.7 9.3 13.8 32.1 10.9 32 11.3
Source: LIS, own calculations.
¹ Unit of analysis in SWE 1970, SWE 1980 and SWE 1990 is a tax unit.
In Germany, two-earner couples with children had a very low poverty risk during the 
whole time span, while single parent households have had clear difficulties in main-
taining an adequate level of living. For example, in the year 2000 the poverty rate of 
full-time working single parents was higher than the poverty rate of all households. 
72Change of Norm? In-Work Poverty in a Comparative Perspective
In the UK, single-earner couples with children had a very high poverty rate during the 
whole time span. One could say that in the beginning of the 1970’s in-work poverty 
affected practically only single-earner couples with children and single parents. In 
the USA and in Canada, in-work poverty is very clearly a problem of single-earner 
couples with children and single parents. It should be noted that the poverty rate of 
all households has been around 20 percent in Canada and around 25 percent in the 
USA. On the other hand, the in-work poverty rate has been 10–15 percent in both 
countries. When we compare the poverty rates of childless two-earner couples with 
these figures, we could argue that these groups are extremely well protected from 
poverty. On the other hand, working single parents in the USA have had much higher 
poverty rates than all households in all cross-sections. 
In all six countries, two-earner couples with children have become the group with the 
second lowest poverty rates. At the same time, one-earner couples and single adults 
have lost their “ranking positions”. In the beginning of 1970’s one-earner couples and 
single adults had approximately the same or even lower poverty rates than two-earner 
couples with children. In 2000 positions have changed. Change in family structures, 
which have increased the number of (young) single adult households, certainly ex-
plain some part of this shift. But there is no doubt that having one wage is not as good 
insurance against in-work poverty as it used to be. 
If we compare two “typical” household types, namely one-earner couples with chil-
dren and two-earner couples with children, we can see that since the beginning of the 
1970’s in Nordic countries, in-work poverty among two-earner couples with children 
has decreased much more than poverty among one-earner couples with children. In 
the USA and in Canada in 2000 poverty among one-earner couples with children was 
much more common than among two-earner couples with children when compared 
to the situation of the early 1970’s. In the UK and in Germany the vast difference has 
stayed approximately the same. Thus, the UK and Germany are countries where no 
change of norm has happened, but on the other hand, the superiority of two wages 
over one across the 30 year time span has stayed the same. 
We really should emphasise that when comparing in-work poverty rates across decades 
it should be remembered that employment structures have changed quite radically. The 
number of workers working in primary production (farmers etc.) or as entrepreneurs 
or in blue-collar jobs was much higher in the 1970’s and 1980’s than nowadays. The 
people working in these fields have incomes that are very difficult to measure and 
poverty measures indicate these people quite easily as poor. This supposedly explains 
some part of the quite extensive in-work poverty in the 1970’s and 1980’s. If we could 
analyse only those people who had regular wages, the differences between decades 
may be significantly reduced.  
What, then, is the effectiveness of welfare states in preventing and diminishing poverty 
in different family type combinations? As the overall level was analysed in Table 5, 
now we should compare poverty rates of different family type combinations before 
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(Table 7) and after (Table 6) income transfers. In Table 7 poverty line is calculated 
from market incomes (incomes before transfers).
Table 7. Poverty rates (%) in 1970–2000 before social transfers in different labour markets and with different family 
type combinations.
2-earner 
couple, no 
children
2-earner 
couple 
with 
children
1-earner 
couple, no 
children
1-earner 
couple 
with 
children
Single 
adult in 
full-time 
work
Single 
parent in 
full-time 
work
Total 
working 
poor rate
FIN 1970 6.1 14.4 16.1 18.3 6.0 29.4 14.9
FIN 1980 3.5 7.7 20.2 31.2 8.1 25.6 12.5
FIN 1990 0.1 0.4 5.8 12.9 4.3 13.3 5.1
FIN 2000 0.3 2.1 9.0 15.5 5.8 12.0 5.9
SWE 1970 5.2 10.3 13 19.9 8 15.1 12.3
SWE 1980 0.9 2.3 14.2 18 3.3 5.5 5.0
SWE 1990 1.4 3.3 12.4 15.5 7.7 12.4 6.3
SWE 2000 0.9 6.8 14.4 20.3 8.1 21.8 8.7
DEU 1970 0.2 1.1 4.3 4.8 5.3 18.9 3.9
DEU 1980 0 2.2 5.4 6.4 1.9 15.1 4.5
DEU 1990 0.9 1.2 1.4 6.9 2.4 15 4.3
DEU 2000 0.1 1.4 5.2 8.8 3.5 19 7.0
UK 1970 0.5 4.7 4.2 19.2 11.1 50.4 11.0
UK 1980 0.9 4.9 6.2 11.2 4.9 14.7 7.5
UK 1990 0.8 2 5 11.7 4 17.9 6.2
UK 2000 1 2.1 6.4 13.1 2.5 14.3 6.3
USA 1970 2.4 5.5 8.8 14.8 6.2 34.3 14.1
USA 1980 3.9 10.7 12.8 25 13.1 47.2 15.8
USA 1990 2.2 5.9 10.8 26.1 6.4 30.2 11.3
USA 2000 1.9 7.3 14.8 30.2 8.7 36 13.4
CAN 1970 2.7 9.9 7.6 19.1 16 24.2 11.4
CAN 1980 2.7 9.4 12.2 25.8 17.4 43.4 15.8
CAN 1990 3.3 6.3 10.6 18.7 10.9 24.1 12.7
CAN 2000 3.4 7.4 14.4 23.8 12.6 29.8 14.4
Source: LIS, own calculations.
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In Finland the welfare state’s redistribution of incomes has reduced poverty among 
single-earner households and single parents very effectively. Similar trends are evident 
in Sweden too. In Germany the welfare state has been able to reduce poverty among 
single-earner households and single parents to some extent, but on the other hand the 
poverty of two-earner households and single adults has increased after social transfers. 
We should again keep in mind that labour markets themselves are effective in keep-
ing people out of poverty. Poverty among childless two-earner couples is practically 
non-existent before transfers, and it increases only slightly after transfers. 
In the UK the poverty of childless single-earner couples and single parents reduces with 
social transfers, but with the other groups there has been a clear shift in the 1980’s, 
which has led to a situation in which welfare state redistribution systems cannot really 
decrease poverty any more. In the USA the redistribution of incomes decreases poverty 
only for single parents. However, the effect is very small and poverty of single parents is 
at a very high level before and after transfers. On the other hand, the poverty of other 
groups increases after transfers. In other words, the welfare state’s redistribution of 
incomes does not really reduce in-work poverty in the USA. In Canada poverty does 
decrease after transfers, but the effect is weak. In addition, poverty in Canada is high 
before transfers, and despite the fact that the welfare state reduces in-work poverty 
to some extent, poverty rates remain at a high level.
5.4  Profile of working poor
The great transformation of family types and women’s labour force participation 
should have had some kind of impact on development of in-work poverty. Therefore, 
the question is how has in-work poverty changed between different labour market and 
family type combinations? This question is answered by analysing the profile of work-
ing poor in different family type combinations (Table 8). Profile analysis tells us the 
proportions of different population groups among all working poor households. Table 
8 also indicates how these proportions have changed throughout the years.
There has been a clear change in the profile of working poor in Finland. In the 1970’s 
and 1980’s the working poor consisted mainly of couples with children, but since the 
beginning of the 1990’s single adults have become the biggest group within working 
poor households. It should be kept in mind that the change of employment struc-
tures has been massive in Finland. In the beginning of the 1970’s, a large proportion 
of working households were couples with children who were farmers or blue-collar 
workers doing odd jobs. The change of employment structures explains both the rather 
high in-work poverty rates of the 1970’s and the very high proportion of (two-earner) 
couples with children when profiling working poor households. 
In the year 2000 single adult households constituted 43 percent of all working poor 
households in Finland. This indicates that the number of single adult households has 
increased during the decades and, thus, they have also increased as proportion of all 
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working poor households. The two-earner model was already typical in Finland in 
the early 1970’s. That is the reason why two-earner couples’ proportion of all working 
poor households was very large in 1970. Almost two-thirds of working poor house-
holds were two-earner households.
Table 8. The profile of working poor (%) in 1970–2000 in different labour market types and family type 
combinations.¹
2-earner 
couple, no 
children
2-earner 
couple 
with 
children
1-earner 
couple, no 
children
1-earner 
couple 
with 
children
Single 
adult in 
full-time 
work
Single 
parent in 
full-time 
work TOTAL
FIN 1970 3 60 4 23 3 7 100
FIN 1980 4 41 6 34 9 5 100
FIN 1990 0 16 0 21 58 5 100
FIN 2000 3 10 17 20 43 7 100
SWE 1970 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
SWE 1980 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a n.a
SWE 1990 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
SWE 2000 5 11 7 16 52 9 100
DEU 1970 0 6 6 71 10 6 100
DEU 1980 3 3 8 69 10 7 100
DEU 1990 4 6 6 31 40 12 100
DEU 2000 0 6 3 16 57 17 100
UK 1970 0 1 9 80 2 8 100
UK 1980 4 8 14 61 8 6 100
UK 1990 5 13 10 40 20 13 100
UK 2000 8 12 14 37 20 9 100
USA 1970 3 8 12 43 17 18 100
USA 1980 4 5 23 27 18 24 100
USA 1990 4 6 14 31 23 21 100
USA 2000 3 7 15 28 25 23 100
CAN 1970 2 6 8 57 26 1 100
CAN 1980 2 6 14 37 27 14 100
CAN 1990 5 9 14 31 31 11 100
CAN 2000 5 8 18 21 35 12 100
Source: LIS, own calculations.
¹ Unit of analysis in Sweden is a tax unit in the years 1970–1990, which does not allow comparable profile analysis. 
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In Sweden the profile analysis is possible only for the year 2000. We can see that the 
profile from that year is quite similar in Sweden and Finland, a fact supported by 
earlier studies as well (for example Fritzell and Ritakallio 2004). We could suppose 
that the changes occurring in Sweden during the years 1970–2000 had quite similar 
features to those of Finland. 
The profile in Germany in 2000 was very similar to that of the Nordic countries. 
Single adult households constituted over half of all working poor households. This 
supports the fact that family types have converged in industrialised countries and that 
the numbers of both single adult households and two-earner couples have increased. 
The traditional Central European trend of supporting one-earner families can be 
seen especially in the large amount of single-earner couples among all working poor 
households in 1970–1980. In 1980 approximately 70 percent of working poor house-
holds in Germany were single-earner families with children while in 2000 their share 
of all working poor households was only 16 percent.
In the UK and in the USA single-earner households have accounted for most of the 
working poor households during the whole time span. However, in the UK the pro-
portion of this household type of all working poor households has decreased consis-
tently. The proportion of single adults, on the other hand, has increased. Again, this 
highlights the great transformation of family structures and labour force participation. 
In the USA in-work poverty is shared quite evenly between different family types. 
However, all single-earner households are well represented in the profile of working 
poor. Thus, the profile analysis shows us that lack of work seems to be a significant 
factor behind the working poor phenomenon in the USA. 
In Canada the profile of working poor used to resemble those of its Anglo-American 
partners. Recently Canada has shifted towards the Nordic countries and Germany, at 
least according to the profile analysis. Single adults were the biggest group of working 
poor in Canada in 2000, just as they were in the Nordic countries and in Germany. 
As a result, it can be stated that Canada seems, to some extent, to have diverged from 
the Anglo-American model and shifted towards the European model. 
The profile analyses in Table 8 do not give very much support to the “change of norm” 
hypothesis. Only in Finland has the proportion of two-earner couples decreased and 
the proportions of one-earner and single adult households increased. This suggests 
that in all the other countries where a change of in-work poverty profiles could be 
identified, this change has happened in a way that one-earner households’ proportion 
of all working poor households has decreased and single adults and single parents 
proportion has increased. Thus, it is not completely right to say that there has been a 
change of norm where one-wage households’ poverty has increased when compared 
to two-wage households. Instead, it seems that one-earner couples have turned into 
two-earner couples and decreased their risk of being working poor. On the other 
hand, the increase of single adult and single parent households during the last two 
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decades has meant that those family types are well represented in the profile of work-
ing poor households.
So, according to poverty rate analysis and profile analysis, it is clear that we could 
exclude two-earner couples when we are seeking to identify the groups at risk of be-
ing working poor. Depending on the country, about 15–25 percent of all working 
households belong to this group. In addition, childless single-earner couples are also 
marginal among the working poor both in terms of poverty rates and the share of the 
total amount of working poor households. Consequently, this means that nearly half 
of working households could be excluded when we are considering which households 
live in the “danger zone”. Therefore, effective tackling of the working poor problem 
should concentrate on improving the conditions for single parents, single adults and 
single-earner couples with children. These are the groups that have the highest pov-
erty rates in practically all six countries studied, and they constitute the majority of 
working poor households. 
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6  IN-WOrK POvErTy IN Eu COuNTrIES by DIFFErENT POvErTy MEASurES 
This chapter concentrates on the measurement of in-work poverty. The “semi-official” 
poverty measure of the EU – the relative income method – is supplemented by two 
other measures (subjective and deprivation). The main question that this chapter is 
seeking the answer to is: How does the picture of poverty among working households 
change in EU countries by different poverty measures? The main concern is that the in-
come method gives too restricted and one-sided a view of the problem. Understanding 
this issue is essential not only for effective anti-poverty policy but also for the general 
public debate of working poor. 
6.1  Overlap of poverty
Previous results on the overlap of poverty measures have suggested that it is very 
limited (Kangas and Ritakallio 1998; Bradshaw and Finch 2003). Different measures 
identify different groups as poor. We start our analysis by asking the question: How do 
different poverty measures overlap among working households? Table 9 illustrates how 
income poverty, subjective poverty and deprivation in working poor households are 
cumulated. There are 12 countries included in the analyses. Germany, Sweden and 
Luxembourg are left out because not all measures could be compiled. Weak overlap 
between measures could be noticed very easily. Approximately 70 percent of poor 
households are poor only by one measure. Thus, previous results on weak overlap 
of poverty measures are supported. Poverty is a multidimensional problem even in 
working poor households.
 
When measuring in-work poverty with different methods, it certainly seems to be 
the case that different households are captured. The most common way of measur-
ing in-work poverty – incomes – excludes the vast amount of households that have 
problems in making ends meet and/or suffer from deprivation. Thus, Table 9 indicates 
that the normal way of analysing in-work poverty – by incomes – is capturing only a 
certain side of a larger problem. 
Variation between countries is also very large. In the Netherlands (59%) and in the 
UK (43%) income poverty constitutes a very large proportion of all working poor 
households. On the other hand, in Greece there are very few households that suffer 
only from income poverty (6%). The same trends of variation are also visible with 
subjective poverty and deprivation. In Denmark the vast majority (61%) of poor 
households have difficulties in making ends meet, whereas in the Netherlands the 
share of subjectively poor is relatively small (18%). The deprivation measure indicates 
that in Finland, Belgium, Greece and Ireland deprivation is much more common than 
on average in EU countries. On the other side of the scale are Denmark, Spain and 
Portugal, where the share of working households that suffer only from deprivation 
is almost non-existent.
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Table 9. Overlap of poverty measures 1 in working poor households in EU12 countries in 2001 (%).
INC SubJ DEPr
INC + 
SubJ
INC + 
DEPr
SubJ + 
DEPr
INC + 
SubJ + 
DEPr TOTAL
Finland 23 38 21 3 1 9 6 100
Denmark 14 61 4 16 0 3 2 100
Netherlands 59 18 6 13 2 1 1 100
Belgium 18 23 37 5 4 13 0 100
France 33 29 11 8 4 7 8 100
Austria 27 40 9 12 3 6 3 100
United Kingdom 43 24 19 5 4 4 1 100
Ireland 34 25 12 7 14 5 3 100
Italy 30 30 6 20 2 6 6 100
Greece 6 45 10 14 1 17 7 100
Spain 30 42 3 17 0 3 5 100
Portugal 14 47 3 20 1 9 6 100
EU12 23 38 9 15 2 8 5 100
Source: Eurostat 2003 (ECHP). Note: Germany, Luxembourg and Sweden are not included. 
1 INC = income poverty, SUBJ = subjective poverty, DEPR = deprivation.
Cumulating of measures is quite low. Only 30 percent of working poor households 
in the studied countries were poor by at least two measures. The finding that raises 
concerns is the fact that income poverty, by itself or together with other measures, 
constitutes 45 percent of those working households that could be labelled as poor by 
the measures used. Thus, there seems to be a very large share of working households 
in EU countries that have difficulties in making ends meet and/or are deprived, but 
nevertheless they have adequate incomes and they are not captured by the EU’s “semi-
official” measure.
6.2  Poverty by different methods in EU countries
The extent of in-work poverty in EU countries is the next issue we are seeking an-
swers to. In-work poverty rates of EU countries in 2001 are illustrated in Table 10. 
The heterogeneity of EU countries is very visible. The extent of in-work poverty has 
unique characteristics in almost every country. The overall view of in-work poverty 
in EU countries indicates that subjective poverty, i.e. difficulties in making ends meet, 
is a very common problem. The subjective in-work poverty rate is on average 17.2 
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Table 10. Poverty (%) by different indicators among working households in EU countries in 2001.
INC SubJ DEPr
Finland 5.7 9.6 6.3
Sweden 5.8 n.a. n.a.
Denmark 4.6 11.8 1.3
Germany 7.0 n.a. n.a.
Netherlands 10.2 4.4 1.3
Belgium 4.9 7.4 9.9
Luxembourg 14.1 8.4 n.a.
France 10.4 10.3 6.1
Austria 8.4 11.5 4.0
United Kingdom 9.0 5.8 4.5
Ireland 10.8 7.4 6.3
Italy 17.9 19.1 6.2
Greece 14.6 44.1 18.9
Spain 15.4 20.1 3.6
Portugal 17.6 35.7 8.2
EU 11.4 17.2 6.5
Source: Eurostat 2003 (ECHP).
percent in those 13 countries where it can be measured. This means that every sixth 
working household in the observed countries has continuous subjective worries over 
how to make ends meet. Subjective poverty rates between countries vary from the 
Netherlands’ 4.4 percent to the staggering 44 percent in Greece! Southern European 
countries and Nordic countries have high subjective poverty rates when between-
country differences are observed. 
Overall the income poverty rate is also high (11.4%), but variation between countries 
is again large, just like previous studies have indicated (Peña-Casas and Latta 2004; 
Bardone and Guio 2005; Airio 2006c). Esping-Andersen’s welfare state regime typology 
is probably the most visible with this measure. Nordic countries have their own low 
poverty (4–6%) cluster, Central European countries and the liberal regime’s representa-
tives (UK and Ireland) have approximately the same average poverty rates (9–10%), 
and Southern European countries together form a high poverty (14–18%) cluster. If we 
compare income poverty rates of the USA (15%) and Canada (11%) from the previous 
chapter to those of EU countries, the USA could be clustered with Southern European 
countries whereas Canada could be clustered with the UK and Ireland. 
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Within-country analysis shows at least two findings that need to be mentioned. Firstly, 
in the UK and in Ireland (= liberal regime countries) income poverty rates are higher 
than those of the other two measures. Secondly, in the Netherlands in-work poverty 
seems to be very much gathered around income poverty, just like the poverty overlap 
already indicated. In-work poverty when measured with subjective poverty (4.4%) or 
deprivation (1.3%) is modest, but the income poverty rate is quite high (over 10%). 
The deprivation index tells pretty much the same story as the two other measures. 
Variation between countries is extremely large (1.3%–18.9%). However, with Greece 
excluded the variation would be much smaller between countries. Deprivation rates 
are in many countries much smaller than poverty rates of other measures. Only in 
Belgium is the deprivation rate higher than other measures. It should be kept in mind 
that straightforward comparisons between measures are difficult because, for example, 
the cut point of deprivation is set more or less arbitrarily. 
6.3  In-work poverty risk in different population groups
The last sub question that is answered is: How do different poverty measures affect dif-
ferent population groups? Analyses showed that poverty measures have only a partial 
overlap and poverty rates between and within countries have enormous variation. 
What about the risk of being poor then? Are different measures also identifying dif-
ferent population groups as working poor? Country-specific logistic regressions from 
2001 are in Appendix Tables 4a, 4b and 4c. Logistic regressions were made only for 
those 12 countries that had all three measures in use (Germany, Sweden and Luxem-
bourg were excluded). 
All countries have many interesting details, but instead of picking up all findings 
we concentrate on a few overall results. First of all, the question of would different 
methods bring out different risk groups has a simple answer: No. Overall there are 
very few dramatic changes in poverty risks when different methods are utilised. There 
are lots of changes where statistical significance varies between measures; these can 
be found in practically all countries. But the changes where the incidence of poverty 
is totally opposite between measures are very rare. Results are quite well in line with 
results of previous poverty studies (e.g. Nolan and Whelan 1996; Kangas and Ritakallio 
1998) as well as with previous in-work poverty studies (e.g. Klein and Rones 1989; Acs 
et al. 2000; Bardone and Guio 2005). Poverty-enhancing indicators are very much the 
same when measuring poverty in general or in-work poverty.
If we take an indicator-specific view, we will see that education seems to be quite 
a stabile indicator of in-work poverty, regardless of the poverty measure used. The 
overall trend is clear: High education equals smaller risk of being working poor. 
Overall, the relative income method shows the clearest signs of differences in poverty 
risks between different levels of education. Other measures even out these differ-
ences; deprivation, especially, does not have the same kind of connection with level 
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of education in Belgium, UK, Italy, Spain, Austria and Finland. These results could 
indicate that deprivation is measuring longer-lasting economic hardship, and even 
though low-educated workers might have low incomes they still have access to basic 
goods and services. 
Household type shows great variation between countries. The only common feature 
is that the risk of poverty is especially small among childless couples by all measures. 
There are a couple of major changes in poverty risks between measures in some coun-
tries. In the UK working single parents have a high income poverty risk, but their 
deprivation risk is much smaller compared to that of the reference group, which is 
single adults. In Ireland the same kind of change happens with couples with children. 
High income poverty risk is supplemented by a small deprivation risk. Single parents 
in Austria are also worth mentioning. Their income poverty risk is not statistically 
significant compared to the single adults (reference group), whereas their subjective 
poverty risk is multiple but their deprivation risk is only one fifth of single adults’ 
deprivation risk. 
Results clearly show that spotting in-work poverty risk in different household types 
is a hard task because variation between countries is large. The use of three poverty 
measures makes this task even more difficult. Overall, working households with two 
adults are better protected from poverty than single adult households. The existence 
of children has some variation between countries. In countries with vast welfare states 
(especially in Nordic countries) children have a very small – if any – effect on poverty 
risk. Although the analysis does not separate two-earner and one-earner couples, the 
results surely indicate that two-adult households have smaller risk of poverty than 
single adult households. Only in Denmark are couples with children worse off than 
single adults when measured with the subjective poverty method and in Ireland when 
measured with the income method. 
When using age as an indicator of poverty, the income method indicates that in 
many countries young age is a factor that increases the risk of poverty. This result is 
again in line with the findings of poverty research in general. (See e.g. Kangas and 
Palme 2000). Statistical significance between income poverty and young age could be 
found in 6 countries (no significance in the other 6 countries). The subjective method 
gives a quite different picture of in-work poverty. Only in two countries (Ireland and 
Portugal) is young age a risk-enhancing factor, whereas in 4 countries (Denmark, 
Belgium, France and Greece) it is older workers’ households that have a high risk of 
subjective poverty. The deprivation method supports the view of the income method. 
In 7 countries young age is a risk-enhancing factor, and there is no statistical signifi-
cance between age and deprivation in the other 5 countries. 
To summarise: Subjective views of making ends meet seem to concern more older 
workers’ households, whereas inadequate incomes and deprivation of goods and ser-
vices are more of a problem of young workers’ households. The multidimensional na-
ture of in-work poverty is highlighted in two countries, namely in France and Greece. 
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In both countries there is no connection between age and income poverty, whereas 
subjective poverty is concentrated on older workers and deprivation on younger 
workers. These findings make it difficult to suggest any policy recommendations. 
Policies directed at younger workers might ease their (income) situation, but they do 
not help older workers’ subjective poverty problems.
Temporary work contract seems to be much more of a poverty risk-enhancing factor 
than part-time working. This is possibly due to the fact that part-time working is 
largely a way of supplement the household’s total incomes (see Nolan and Marx 1999), 
whereas temporary work contract might indicate troubles to connect in labour mar-
kets. All measures give quite similar results. Temporary work contract increases the 
risk of poverty in all 12 countries when measured with income or subjective method 
and in 8 countries when measured with deprivation. Part-time working increases 
income poverty risk in 6 countries (Denmark, France, Ireland, Spain, Portugal and 
Finland), subjective poverty risk in 5 countries (Denmark, the United Kingdom, Italy, 
Greece and Portugal) and deprivation risk in 4 countries (Belgium, Ireland, Austria 
and Finland). Thus, incidence of deprivation, especially, is not very closely connected 
to part-time work. 
Although different poverty measures have a limited overlap and change over time 
is varied, they still identify quite well the same population groups as risk groups of 
in-work poverty. To some extent, age and household type turned out to be indicators 
that identify different risk groups with different methods. The careful conclusion is 
that using just one measure of poverty is not that big a problem when it comes to the 
identification of risk groups of in-work poverty. 
It seems that differences are more depending on country-specific features than they 
are a product of different measures of poverty. For example, in the Netherlands part-
time working is a very common labour market arrangement and part-time workers’ 
risk of poverty is approximately the same than that of full-time workers (no statisti-
cally significant differences can be found). In the same manner, low-education is a 
really important risk-enhancing factor in Southern Europe, where labour markets 
are especially precarious. And in the Nordic countries (Denmark and Finland), the 
welfare state’s redistribution systems effect is visible, for example, when we are look-
ing at single parent households’ income poverty risk. They do not come up as a high 
poverty risk group as they do in almost all other EU countries. 
The dominance that the income method has shown in poverty research in recent 
years was questioned in our analysis. We could conclude our comparisons of differ-
ent poverty measures by saying that when it comes to the extent of poverty, measures 
have very limited overlap and within country variance between measures is in some 
cases very large. This is an issue that should be taken account of in future in-work 
poverty research. But on the other hand, measures give a very similar picture of who 
are the working poor in the EU. In that sense, one-dimensional poverty research is 
justified. 
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7  FACTOrS bEhIND IN-WOrK POvErTy IN Eu COuNTrIES
Working poor research in the USA has documented well the importance of labour 
market problems (low wages, part-time work and unemployment periods) behind 
in-work poverty (see e.g. Klein and Rones 1989; U.S. Department of Labor 2006). In 
Europe, however, the connections have not been that clear-cut (see e.g. Strengmann-
Kuhn 2004). In this chapter, the relationship between labour market problems and 
household context (working intensity and household structure) is taken into considera-
tion. The main question to which we are seeking answer is: What are the factors behind 
in-work poverty in EU countries? Can the factors be traced back to labour markets or 
are the primary reasons connected to other factors? 
7.1  Working poor and labour market problems
Analyses are started by examining how different labour market problems affect the 
poverty of working households in EU countries. In the USA approximately 80 percent 
of working poor households suffer from some of the three labour market problems 
(U.S. Department of Labor 2006). In Europe the importance of labour market prob-
lems has not been found to be as significant (see e.g. Strengmann-Kuhn 2004). Table 
11 shows poverty rates of different groups of the working population in EU countries 
in 2001. Countries are combined to avoid too small a number of cases. Each country’s 
Table 11. Working status and labour market problems in EU countries in 2001.
Status 
Proportion of working 
poor households (%) Poverty rate (%)
Overall working poor rate 100 10.7
No low-wage employment, part-time employment or  
unemployment periods 52.3 8.9
Only low wages 27.5 17.3
Only part-time employment 9.4 10.2
Only unemployment periods 3.9 13.4
Low wages + part-time employment 2.9 14.6
Low wages + unemployment periods 2.6 27.0
Part-time employment + unemployment periods 1.0 19.4
Low wages + part-time employment + unemployment 
periods 0.4 43.8
Source: Eurostat 2003 (ECHP).
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poverty rate is weighted with the country’s share of total employment in EU coun-
tries. In this way, countries’ individual poverty rates are taken into consideration 
when combining countries. The overall income poverty rate of working households 
is 10.7 percent. However, the significant variance between countries should not be 
ignored (see Chapter 6, Table 10). 
The challenges working poor pose for EU countries are indicated clearly by the second 
row of Table 11. If we look at households that have not suffered from any of the three 
labour market problems (no low-wage employment, no part-time employment and 
no periods of unemployment) during the last 12 months, we see that the poverty rate 
for this group is still as high as 8.9 percent. Moreover, over half of poor households 
(52%) have not suffered from any of the labour market problems. This result supports 
Wolfgang Strengmann-Kuhn’s (2004) findings, according to which other factors than 
labour market problems are also important when explaining in-work poverty in EU 
countries. It seems that there is quite a considerable amount of households that have 
a steady position in labour markets but nonetheless live in poverty. 
All three factors have their own effect on in-work poverty, which is also indicated in 
Table 11. The greatest labour market problem is low wages. A little over a quarter of 
working poor households contain a low-wage worker(s). In-work poverty rates among 
households experiencing labour market problems support the findings of previous 
studies. Labour market problems increase the risk of being poor, but this does not 
necessarily mean that households suffering from labour market problems are poor 
(see Nolan & Marx 1999). Four out of five households with low-wage workers are not 
poor. Moreover, the majority of part-time employment households and unemploy-
ment period households are above the poverty line. 
The last rows of Table 11 show poverty rates according to different combinations of 
labour market problem factors. Two things are particularly noticeable. Firstly, pov-
erty rates increase quite dramatically in cases of multiple labour market problems. 
Secondly, the number of households with multiple problems is quite small (about 7% 
of all working poor households). This is partly due to the fact that the data takes into 
account only the last 12 months, which is a very short period of time in terms of work 
history. Analysing the accumulation of problems would require a longer time span. 
Country-specific proportions of poor households with no labour market problems, 
those with low wages and those with other labour market problems (part-time work, 
unemployment periods, combinations of labour market problems) are presented in 
Table 12. Only those 10 countries in which we are able to analyse all three labour 
market problems are presented. We can see that the most “American” countries in 
the EU are Finland and Ireland, where more than half of working poor households 
had at least some of the labour market problems. In other countries more than half 
of working poor households do not have labour market problems.
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Table 12. The proportions of working poor households by occurrence of labour market problems in 2001 (%).
No labour 
market problems Only low wages
Other labour 
market problems Total
Italy 72 16 12 100
Greece 70 19 11 100
Belgium 64 12 24 100
Denmark 59 13 28 100
France 58 31 11 100
Spain 58 21 21 100
Austria 58 18 24 100
Portugal 55 27 18 100
Finland 43 29 28 100
Ireland 43 16 41 100
EU10¹ 61 22 17 100
Source: Eurostat 2003 (ECHP).
¹ Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg and Sweden are excluded.
The heterogeneity of EU countries is visible. The Southern European countries Italy 
and Greece have the largest shares of working poor households without labour market 
problems. On the other hand, precarious jobs, small firms and self-employment are 
common in these countries, and they are tricky subjects when analysing labour market 
problems because wages, work hours etc. are not measurable in the same manner that 
they are in regular work. Low wages is a sizeable factor behind in-work poverty in 
France, Finland and Portugal. Other labour market problems and their accumulation 
are particularly sizeable in Ireland but also in Denmark and Finland. Overall, there 
are plenty of working poor households in all EU countries that are poor regardless of 
the fact that they do not have labour market problems. Thus, we also need to include 
the effects of other factors in our analyses. 
7.2  Labour market problems and household context
Interaction between labour market problems and other problems is something that 
needs to be analysed to get a clearer picture of the factors behind working poor. The 
question is how does the poverty rate change between different combinations of labour 
market problems, household structure and working intensity? Different household 
combinations are presented in Table 13. Households are characterised with number 
of workers (working intensity), existence of children (household structure) and in-
cidence of labour market problems. It is clear by analysing poverty rates that all “di-
mensions” (number of workers, number of children and incidence of labour market 
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Table 13. Reasons for in-work poverty in EU countries in 2001.
reason for poverty
Poverty rate 
(%)
Share of all poor 
households (%)
2-earner childless couple, no 
labour market problems
- 1.9 1.6
2-earner childless couple, one has 
labour market problems
Labour market problems 5.0 0.6
2-earner childless couple, both 
have labour market problems
Labour market problems 7.2 2.6
2-earner couple with children, no 
labour market problems
Household structure 1.7 2.4
2-earner couple with children, one 
has labour market problems
Labour market problems + house-
hold structure
15.0 4.0
2-earner couple with children, both 
have labour market problems
Labour market problems + house-
hold structure
11.7 8.2
1-earner childless couple, no 
labour market problems
Working intensity 8.9 8.2
1-earner childless couple, labour 
market problems
Labour market problems + working 
intensity
15.2 3.7
1-earner couple with children, no 
labour market problems
Working intensity + household 
structure
18.3 26.2
1-earner couple with children, 
labour market problems
Labour market problems + working 
intensity + household structure
37.1 14.2
Single adult, no labour market 
problems
- 5.4 2.8
Single adult, labour market 
problems
Labour market problems 17.3 4.5
Single parent, no labour market 
problems
Household structure 15.3 2.3
Single parent, labour market 
problems
Labour market problems + house-
hold structure
30.8 3.1
Other household, no labour market 
problems
(Working intensity + household 
structure)
13.7 8.8
Other household, labour market 
problems
(Labour market problems + 
working intensity + household 
structure)
20.0 6.8
TOTAL 11.3 100
Source: Eurostat 2003 (ECHP).
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problems) affect the risk of poverty. The smallest poverty rates are in households 
that have two workers and no labour market problems; the highest poverty rates are 
among one-earner couples with children where the working person has some kind of 
labour market problem. Single parents who have labour market problems have nearly 
as high poverty rates. 
There are two features that need to be addressed. First of all, the tricky “other type 
of household” category has quite a large amount of working poor households, and 
their exact composition is hard to define. Secondly, when it comes to, for instance, 
two-earner childless couples, the income-supplementing nature of low wages and 
part-time working is evident. If we compare in-work poverty rates of two-earner 
childless couples to the overall in-work poverty rate of the EU (10.7%), we see that 
even those two-earner couples where both have labour market problems still have a 
smaller poverty rate (7.2%).
Labour market problems are the sole reason behind in-work poverty in about 8 percent 
of all working poor households. Labour market problems with interaction of other 
factors constitute another 40 percent of households. Thus, labour market problems 
themselves seem to explain only some of the composition of working poor households 
overall. In the same manner, working intensity (8%) and household structure (5%) 
by themselves explain only a fraction of the reasons behind in-work poverty. So, it 
seems to be the case that in-work poverty most commonly occurs when different 
factors accumulate. 
Thus, in-work poverty is a multifaceted problem, which is in many cases a result of 
intertwined factors. The incidence of labour market problems with other reasons 
increases poverty risk enormously. Although labour market problems themselves 
are rarely reasons behind poverty, combined with other reasons they are significant 
factors behind in-work poverty in the EU. The same finding is also true for working 
intensity and household structure: When problems pile up in the same household, 
the risk of poverty increases.  
7.3  Low wages and working poor 
Now we should turn to the third and last question of this chapter: What would hap-
pen to poverty rates if low wages were to be lifted to low-wage level (i.e. gross hourly 
earned income is 2/3 of the national median of full-time employees’ gross hourly earned 
incomes)? In Table 14, the current (year 2001) poverty rates in low-wage households 
are presented as well as estimated poverty rates if all low wages were lifted to the level 
of low wage. Gross hourly wages were modified into annual earnings by multiplying 
them by weekly working hours (30 hours/week) and weeks of the year (52 weeks). 
Gross annual earnings were converted to net annual earnings by using the same 
ratio between gross and net earnings as used in the original data. The relative income 
poverty line was the same before and after conversion. 
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Table 14. Current and estimated in-work poverty rate among low-wage households in EU countries (%).
Current poverty rate Estimated poverty rate
Denmark 6.8 5.0
Belgium 6.8 5.3
Ireland 10.2 10.2
Germany 10.8 6.8
Austria 11.9 11.3
Portugal 14.7 13.8
United Kingdom 15.0 11.7
Netherlands 16.8 9.9
Sweden¹ 16.8 11.5
Finland 18.7 5.9
Greece 23.2 20.7
France 23.4 16.5
Spain 26.2 23.9
Luxembourg¹ 30.5 20.8
Italy 30.9 28.6
EU15 18.6 14.6
¹ Low-wage level calculated from net annual earnings.
The overall poverty rate of low-wage households would drop four percentage points if 
gross hourly wages of low-wage workers would be raised to the low-wage level. Differ-
ences between countries are very large. Countries with low minimum wages (see Table 
1) have, overall, high poverty rates. In those countries lifting low wages would not have 
a big impact on poverty because minimum wage levels are at such a low level. On the 
other hand, for example, in Finland low-wage workers’ poverty would decrease from 
18.7 percent to 5.9 percent. In the Netherlands and in Germany the in-work poverty 
of low-wage workers’ households would also decrease quite significantly. In Ireland 
the low-wage level is so high that the situation of poor low-wage households would 
not be improved even if the wages could be lifted to the low-wage level. 
In-work poverty among low-wage households would remain at a relatively high level 
even if low wages could be erased. There are two things that need to be stressed. First 
of all, the analysis clearly demonstrates that the majority of low-wage workers are in 
households that are already above poverty line. Like Brian Nolan and Ive Marx (1999, 
23) have noticed, “Any policy aimed at improving the earnings of the low paid as a 
group will directly benefit only a minority of poor households.” In addition, Wolfgang 
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Strengmann-Kuhn’s (2004) results showed that the reason for poverty among low-
wage households is not so much a result of (low-wage) workers individual earnings 
but the household’s total disposable income. Therefore, it seems that erasing poverty 
by wage-setting systems would require either very selective policy methods aimed 
exactly at poor low-wage households or large steps backwards to the old “wage-earner 
welfare state”, where adequate level of living by earnings would be secured by vast 
consensus among government and labour organisations. 
The second thing that should be stressed is that the estimation was done assuming 
that wages would be raised but other things would remain the same. It is clear that 
taxation, social benefits etc. would also change when earnings change. Therefore, the 
estimation gives a very “positive” picture of the situation of low-wage households. 
This is supported further by the fact that the poverty line was kept at the same level 
before and after estimation. In that sense, the change of poverty rate from 18.6 percent 
to 14.6 percent is not that big. All in all, we could conclude that the policies aimed at 
in-work poverty should really be a part of broader anti-poverty programme rather 
than selective measures.  
To summarise the findings of this chapter, it is obvious that the three studied labour 
market problems have their own significance on the incidence of in-work poverty, 
but that is not the whole explanation. The reasons behind working poor are clearly 
multifaceted. The true reasons why some households have working members but 
inadequate disposable incomes could be traced to a bundle where labour market 
problems, working intensity and household structure are interacting. This interaction 
of problems is causing in-work poverty. 
It is difficult to solve a problem that has so many layers. An experiment was made to 
examine what would happen if low wages could be lifted, but the results were incon-
clusive. Overall, in-work poverty in EU countries would merely improve instead of 
being totally eradicated if low wages could be lifted to the level of low wages. In some 
countries (e.g. Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden and Luxembourg) in-work poverty 
could be decreased quite drastically among poor low-wage households. In some other 
countries this change would have practically no effect at all. Thus, solving in-work 
poverty in EU countries really needs a wide array of methods. 
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8  DyNAMICS OF IN-WOrK POvErTy IN Eu COuNTrIES
In this chapter we seek an answer to the question: What is the nature of in-work poverty 
dynamics in EU countries? This question is analysed from different angles. First of all 
the issue of working households living in constant poverty is clarified. Then we analyse 
in-work poverty inflows and outflows. Finally the questions of how effectively “bad 
jobs” work as career ladders to better jobs and how common it is to slide from working 
non-poor to working poor are examined. First we hypothesise that in-work poverty 
mobility flows are supposedly not high because most of the workers are well-protected 
from poverty. Secondly we hypothesise that large between-country differences in in-
work poverty mobility flows can be found because previous cross-sectional studies 
and previous results in this study have shown large variation in in-work poverty rates 
between countries. 
8.1  Income poverty dynamics of working households
In previous chapters the focus has been on time-trends of in-work poverty, differ-
ent poverty measures and the reasons behind in-work poverty. The first question 
we address in this chapter is: How persistent is in-work poverty? ECHP data offers 
a chance to observe poverty dynamics in EU countries during the years 1994–2001. 
Consecutive years of being in in-work poverty are presented in Table 15. Households 
with more than one multi-year poverty spells are classified by the longest spell. About 
every fourth working household (23%) in the panel has experienced poverty at least 
once. This is a rather high figure. The result gives support to the often referred argu-
ment that the working age population in particular is facing new social risks such as 
increasing insecurities of working life and problems of reconciliation of work and care 
responsibilities (Esping-Andersen 1999; Bonoli 2002; Taylor-Gooby 2004). Quite a large 
amount of working households have had difficulties in reaching sufficient incomes. 
So, the hypothesis that the total number of passengers on the “bus of working poor” 
is low is not completely true. 
On the other hand, it should be noted that by its nature in-work poverty is a temporary 
problem. Approximately two-thirds of working poor households had experienced 
poverty only once (64%). Thus, the other part of the “bus hypothesis” seems to be true. 
Poverty spells are relatively short in most of the cases. Of the households that have 
experienced consecutive years in poverty, a vast majority escape after two consecutive 
years. There seems to be a group of working households that are “destined” to be in 
poverty year after year, although the size of this group is very small. Only 2 percent 
of working poor households had 4 years or more in consecutive poverty.
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Table 15. Persistence of in-work poverty in EU countries (1994–2001).
Consecutive years in poverty¹ Share of working households (%) Share of working poor households (%)
0 77 -
1 15 64
2 4 19
3 2 8
4 1 4
5 0.4 2
6 0.2 1
7 0.2 1
8 0.2 1
TOTAL 100 100
¹ Max. 7 consecutive years in Austria and in Luxembourg, max. 6 consecutive years in Finland, Sweden is excluded from analysis 
(no panel data available).
Source: Eurostat 2003 (ECHP).
How poverty dynamics of EU countries differ is presented in Table 16. There is a 
large variation in poverty experiences between countries. Being working poor is rare 
in Finland (although only 6 waves are applicable), Ireland, Luxembourg (7 waves) 
and Denmark. In these countries approximately every sixth working household has 
experienced poverty at least once. In-work poverty is most common in the Southern 
European countries, especially in Portugal and Greece, where nearly every third work-
ing household has experienced poverty at least once. Results are somewhat in line with 
the previous studies, where the lowest working poor rates are in the Nordic countries 
and the highest rates are in the Southern European countries (see e.g. Peña-Casas and 
Latta 2004; Bardone and Guio 2005; Airio 2006c). It must be stressed that Ireland’s 
ranking seems to be partly an empirical artefact because of panel attrition (see more 
in Chapter 4.2 and also Peracchi 2002; Lehmann and Wirtz 2003). 
If we look at the poverty dynamics, we will see that the countries seem to be divided 
into two groups: Those countries that have low incidence of in-work poverty and 
where it is more of a temporary problem and those countries where both being in 
poverty and experiencing consecutive years in poverty are much more common. 
The United Kingdom and Luxembourg are the only clear “outliers”. In UK being in 
poverty is common but it is very often only a temporary phase. In Luxembourg the 
situation is opposite. 
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Table 16. Income poverty dynamics in working households that have experienced poverty (%).
Share of households 
being in poverty at 
least once Poor once
Poor at least 2 
consecutive years 
Poor at least twice, 
but not consecutive 
years 
Finland 13.9 70 24 6
Denmark 14.5 69 23 8
Belgium 16.0 69 24 7
Ireland 14.1 63 28 9
Netherlands 17.4 63 29 8
United Kingdom 26.2 61 32 7
Germany 18.5 60 31 9
Spain 25.6 58 30 12
Austria 21.2 58 35 7
France 24.2 57 35 8
Luxembourg 14.4 56 37 7
Italy 27.4 51 40 9
Greece 32.1 48 41 11
Portugal 32.4 41 51 8
EU14 23.0 54 36 10
Source: Eurostat 2003 (ECHP).
Thus, it is not just that the incidence of working poor differs between EU countries 
– the persistence of poverty differs in the same manner. In the Nordic countries and 
certain Central European countries (the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany) working 
is a good protection from poverty. Few working households experience poverty in the 
first place, and even when they do fall into poverty it is often a temporary life phase, 
whereas in Southern Europe particularly, poverty affects more working households 
and it is more often perennial. 
8.2  Fluidity of in-work poverty
If in-work poverty is quite common but temporary, how do households move between 
positions? Therefore, our second research question is: How large is poverty fluidity 
among countries? In Table 17, in-work poverty fluidity is presented in a detailed way. 
The first row shows the proportion of households that stay in poverty in two consecu-
tive years. For example, in Germany 21 percent of working poor households from the 
year 1994 were poor also in 1995.
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The second row of the table shows ratio between those who moved out of poverty and 
those who moved into poverty between consecutive years. If the ratio is 1.0 flows were 
(approximately) the same size, i.e. the same number of households moved in and out. 
A ratio of 0.5 would mean that outflow was only half the size of inflow, and a ratio of 
2.0 would mean that outflow was twice as big as inflow. 
The third row shows poverty rates in different years. It should be noted that because 
of panel setting, the poverty rate is unweighted and therefore it is not by any means 
“official”. It mainly shows what the approximate level of in-work poverty is and what 
the effect of yearly fluidity on the poverty rate is. Of course, we should keep in mind 
that poverty rate is also dependent on yearly changes in the total size of the working 
households and panel attrition. 
If we take a closer look at staying in poverty, we will notice that, as Table 16 already 
suggested, yearly fluidity is much higher in every country than staying in poverty. 
Fluidity is highest in Denmark, where only 8–18 percent of poor households were poor 
at least two consecutive years. In other words, approximately 80–90 percent of work-
ing poor households in every year were “newcomers”. Finland and Belgium are other 
countries where the average share of yearly stayers was under 20 percent. The second 
“country cluster”, where the average proportion of staying was something between 
20–25 percent, includes the Netherlands, Spain, the UK, Ireland and Germany. Other 
countries (France, Austria, Luxembourg, Italy and Greece) had an even higher number 
of stayers, and Portugal seems to be the biggest outlier: On average, over 40 percent of 
working poor households stayed in poverty two consecutive years in Portugal. Between 
2000 and 2001, staying was almost as common as fluidity (48–52 percent). 
How, then, were overall outflow/inflow ratios developed? There seems to be two coun-
tries, the Netherlands and Finland, where inflow has been much more common than 
outflow. This has had an effect on the in-work poverty rate. In-work poverty increased 
in both countries during the studied years. The next group consists of Germany, Luxem-
bourg, Denmark and the United Kingdom. In these countries the course of fluidity has 
changed a lot during the years. There is no clear pattern to be found: In one year inflow 
has exceeded outflow and in another year outflow has exceeded inflow. In all the other 
8 countries outflow has been much more common than inflow. This group includes, 
for example, all four Southern European countries. Thus, overall patterns of fluidity 
give quite a positive picture of in-work poverty. Only two countries (the Netherlands 
and Finland) seem to have a real problem of constantly bigger inflows than outflows. 
If we analyse yearly differences of flow sizes we will see that nearly all countries have 
at least one yearly shift where difference between out- and inflow is quite big (where 
the difference is 30% or more). Denmark and Portugal are the only countries where 
differences of flows have been quite moderate in every year. Luxembourg and the UK 
are two countries where differences between flows have been large and the direction 
of fluidity has changed wildly. Belgium should also be mentioned because there have 
been very big outflows. 
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Big flows indicate that in-work poverty is a transient problem overall. Big outflows 
also indicate that in-work poverty, which became an important issue in the political 
agenda in EU countries in the 1990’s, is possibly not an increasing problem. Accord-
ing to results, only in a few countries (Finland and the Netherlands) does in-work 
poverty seem to have been an increasing problem during the latter part of the 1990’s. 
Although in-work poverty definitely is a serious social problem in the EU countries, 
there is not much evidence that the problem will “explode” in coming years.
8.3  Reasons for moving into and staying in poverty
Our third research question concerns what are the reasons for poverty mobility? 
There are two mobility paths that are observed. The first one is a path where changes 
in earnings cause mobility, and the second path is where other reasons cause mobil-
ity. Other reasons include changes in household’s working intensity and changes in 
household’s size. 
Variables that explain changes in poverty status were presented in detail in chapter 
4.3.4 (see Table 3). If there is a substantial increase or decrease (10% or more) of 
earnings between consecutive years, then we suppose that possible change in poverty 
status is a result of change of earnings. On the other hand, if number of workers or 
size of household changes between consecutive years, then we suppose that these 
other reasons are affecting the possible change in poverty status. It should be stressed 
that the poverty measure used – the relative income method – is sensitive to changes 
in a household’s composure or household members’ labour market statuses (see e.g. 
Halleröd 1994).
It should be noted that the variables used simplify reality a lot. For instance, changes 
in household size are analysed purely from the context of in-work poverty. Therefore, 
an increase in the number of adults and decrease in the number of children is defined 
as a positive change and decrease in the number of adults and increase in the number 
of children as a negative change. Thus, the terms “positive” and “negative” describe 
only changes in the care ratio within the household, and they should be interpreted 
only from that perspective. Subjectively speaking, change that is defined as “negative” 
could be happening in reality in a positive way – for instance, the number of children 
increases because of the birth of a child. 
First we look at exit routes from in-work poverty between the years 2000 and 2001 
(Table 18). All countries are combined because of the small number of cases in in-
dividual countries. Approximately half of those working poor households that were 
lifted over the poverty line had a positive change of workers’ individual earnings, 
but it should also be noted that almost as big a proportion of households that moved 
out from poverty did not have changes in earnings or other studied reasons (work 
intensity, family size). The reasons for this are manifold. It is possible that the step up 
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Table 18. Reasons of moving into or staying in poverty.
Poor in 2000  non-poor in 2001 N = 853
Positive change of earnings 46.4
Positive change of earnings, change in other reasons 6.2
Change in other reasons 3.5
No change / negative changes 43.9
TOTAL 100
Non-poor in 2000  poor in 2001 N = 834
Negative change of earnings 29.7
Negative change of earnings, change in other reasons 4.8
Change in other reasons 5.5
No change / positive changes 60.0
TOTAL 100
Poor in 2000  poor in 2001 N = 1396
Negative change of earnings, change in other reasons 0.6
Negative change of earnings, no change in other reasons 9.0
No change of earnings, change in other reasons 2.6
No change of earnings, no change in other reasons 68.2
Positive change of earnings, change in other reasons 1.4
Positive change of earnings, no change in other reasons 18.2
TOTAL 100
Source: Eurostat 2003 (ECHP).
in career ladders could have been taken earlier but the effects are only seen much 
later on. Another reason could be that some major improvement of welfare benefits 
could have occurred, which again improves a household’s disposable income. There 
is also a possibility that a poor household is situated near the poverty line when even 
small increases of incomes could lift the household over the poverty line. There are 
many other possible explanations. Interestingly enough, the effect of “other reasons” 
is rather small. This could be explained by the fact that two observation years is a 
rather short time span for occurrence of major changes in life events such as working 
intensity and family size. 
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The story changes a little bit when we analyse those households that entered into 
poverty. About 30 percent of those households experienced a decrease of earnings. But 
a vast majority of households (60%) did not experience any of the studied features. 
Reasons for this could be again manifold. We could reverse the earlier explanations of 
why households move out from poverty without any major change in life events. For 
example, a drop in the career ladders could have occurred earlier but its effect is only 
seen later on. Decrease of welfare benefits could diminish a household’s disposable 
income to a level under the poverty line, and a small decrease of earnings or incomes 
could drop a household that lives near the poverty line under it. 
All in all, it should be noted that even though some evidence of “career ladders” 
could be seen, there is also a “downhill slide” in effect because 30 percent of those 
who moved into poverty experienced diminishing earnings. And if we continue with 
the symbolic rhetoric, there is a clear pattern of “revolving doors” when it comes to 
those households that have experienced mobility but no visible change in their life 
situation. It seems that revolving doors throw, more or less randomly, households in 
and out of in-work poverty. 
The last rows of Table 18 describe households that stay in poverty. The majority of 
stayers (about 70%) consist of households that have no changes in earnings. This group 
could hope that revolving doors eventually throw them out from poverty. If they man-
age to climb over the poverty line, the question is: Can they stay away from poverty? 
The results of mobility from non-poor to poor indicate that without improvement of 
life situation there is always a danger that they end up back in poverty.
About 20 percent of persistently poor households have witnessed an improvement 
of earnings, but nevertheless they are still under the poverty line. They have at least 
taken a step in the right direction, but it has not been big enough. And then there are 
a group of households (the last 10% or so) that were already poor in 2000 and their 
earnings are still deteriorated in 2001. These households are probably sitting on a bus 
of working poor for a long time.
Thus, if we summarise the findings of in-work poverty dynamics, we could say that 
the presence of in-work poverty is quite common. In every studied country there 
was quite a large share of working households experiencing poverty at least some of 
the time, although it should be noted that poverty spells are very often short. This 
can also be seen when analysing poverty fluidity. There are large in- and outflows 
in practically every country. Being working poor seems to be a short phase of life in 
many households. 
The processes of in-work poverty mobility were also analysed. The results left many 
things open for future studies. There is evidence that badly paid jobs work as career 
ladders to better paid jobs, but on the other hand there is evidence that a decrease 
of earnings could end up being a downhill slide from non-poor to poor. Finally, a 
big share of mobility occurred without visible changes in life events. Therefore, fully 
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understanding the dynamic processes behind in-work poverty mobility requires 
much more detailed and thorough research. The results of analyses used here clearly 
demonstrate the complex and multifaceted nature of (in-work) poverty, which still 
requires lots of further research. 
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9  SuMMAry AND CONCLuSIONS
Previous chapters were dedicated to the empirical analyses of in-work poverty in a 
comparative perspective. Temporal developments, different measures, the factors 
behind and the dynamic nature of in-work poverty were topics on which this study 
has tried to shed more light. This final chapter summarises the findings of previous 
chapters and then discusses what conclusions could be drawn and what the future 
might bring.
9.1  Summary of findings
The empirical part of the study was started with the question: How has in-work poverty 
developed during the years 1970–2000? There were six OECD countries that were com-
pared. Based on the results, the Nordic countries (Finland and Sweden) appeared to 
be countries where working was/is a good form of protection against poverty. Regard-
less of the amount of workers (one- or two-earner households) or whether there are 
children, working households had much lower poverty rates than households overall. 
The income redistribution systems of these countries effectively reduced poverty that 
would occur if only market-based incomes were taken into consideration. In other 
words, a large share of households (about half of them in the year 2000) that did not 
have an adequate level of living only with their market incomes were lifted above 
poverty line because of social income transfers. Results are very much in line with 
previous poverty studies, where Nordic countries have been seen as low-poverty and 
effective income redistribution countries (see e.g. Mitchell 1991; Goodin et al. 1999; 
Kangas and Palme 2000).
In Germany, which represented the Conservative or Central European regime, two-
earner couples, childless single-earner couples and working single adults clearly had 
smaller poverty rates than households overall. Working single parents, on the other 
hand, had a higher poverty risk than all households. The income redistribution system 
in Germany did not reduce in-work poverty. In fact, it actually increased poverty to 
some extent. However, in Germany many benefits are earnings-related and they are 
already included in salaries. This explains both the very low rates of in-work poverty 
before transfers and the welfare state’s ineffective income redistribution. It should 
be stressed that estimation of welfare state impact is difficult because the effective 
incidence of social security levies on payrolls could not be analysed in detail. 
The countries of the Anglo-American regime – the United Kingdom, the United 
States and Canada – had one thing in common: Single-earner couples with children 
and working single parents were in a very bad situation. Their in-work poverty rates 
during the researched time span were between 15–43 percent. Similarly, only childless 
two-earner couples were properly protected against poverty. Their in-work poverty 
rates were between 2–3 percent during the 30-year time span. Other labour market 
and family type combinations had much higher in-work poverty rates. In addition, the 
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role of the welfare state in reducing poverty was very small. The initial market-based 
inequalities stayed the same even after the public sector’s income redistribution.  
The profile of working poor has undergone some changes over the decades. In Fin-
land, Sweden, Germany and Canada the biggest group among working poor in the 
year 2000 were single adults. In the early 1980’s couples with children were the biggest 
group among working poor in these countries. In the USA and in the UK single-earner 
couples with children were the biggest group of working poor in 1980 and they still 
were in 2000, although their share of all working poor households had decreased. The 
increase of single adult households has been one of the major changes in household 
structure during the last decades. This change is reflected in the profile of working 
poor. Most working poor households nowadays consist of only one adult. 
Children increase the risk of poverty of two-earner couples, but the risk is nonetheless 
pretty low. On the other hand, the poverty risk of single adults is approximately the 
same as the overall in-work poverty rate in all countries. The hypothesis suggesting 
that the costs of living are determined by a norm of two-earner households, which 
causes economic difficulties for households with one wage, is supported. According 
to results, two-earner couples are very well protected from poverty in all six studied 
countries whether they have children or not. One might think that households in 
which all adults work (in other words two-earner couples and working single adults) 
should have a similar risk of poverty because working intensity is 100 percent in both 
household types. This does not seem to be the case: Two adults and two wages is better 
protection from poverty than one adult and one wage. 
One of the main ideas was also to analyse whether there has been any convergence 
between the countries of different welfare regimes. If we look at the issue from the 
perspective of the whole 30-year time span, we can say that there has been no signifi-
cant convergence. If anything, the changes have actually been rather more divergent. 
In-work poverty rates in different countries were most similar in the early 1970’s. 
Different labour market policies have surely produced different results. In Europe 
in-work poverty has been at a much lower level than in Anglo-American countries. 
There has been a desire to shift inflexible European labour markets towards more 
flexible Anglo-American labour markets. The results, however, showed that the 
European countries have done well in preventing in-work poverty, although some 
countries have had to pay for this through high levels of unemployment. In addition, 
the Nordic welfare regime significantly reduces poverty that market-based incomes 
cannot erase. Same kinds of effects of welfare states’ actions cannot be found in any 
other regime. The Anglo-American labour market model may have kept unemploy-
ment rates lower than European models, but at the same time labour markets have 
divided people into two camps: Those who do well and those who suffer from seri-
ous financial problems and live in poverty. Working single parents and single-earner 
couples with children have an extremely high risk of poverty – even when compared 
to the overall poverty risk of all households. 
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It was also questioned whether in-work poverty is such a “new social risk” – as it is so 
often described in public debates. Results do not really lend support to the view that 
the working poor problem is new in Europe. It is true that the number of working 
poor has grown during the 1990’s. But if we take a longer temporal perspective, we 
can see that in-work poverty was as common in the 1970’s and 1980’s – or even more 
common – than it is nowadays.
The second empirical chapter focused on comparisons between different poverty meas-
ures. The main question was: How does the picture of poverty among working households 
change in EU countries by different poverty measures? One of the main objectives was to 
use other poverty measures to supplement the income method, which is the most widely 
used and almost an official poverty measure in the EU, and then analyse how in-work 
poverty rates change. The first additional measure was the subjective method, which 
gives every respondent a chance to be a “poverty expert” and self-evaluate whether 
her/his household is poor or not. The other additional method was the deprivation 
index, which measures the household’s participation in the life of society.
Results indicated that overlap of poverty measures was limited in working poor 
households. This finding was in line with earlier poverty studies, which have clearly 
demonstrated that poverty measures have a weak overlap (see e.g. Bradshaw and 
Finch 2003). Different working households suffered from different forms of poverty. 
Therefore, using just one measure captures only a certain fraction of households that 
have difficulties living a life that is customary in the society to which they belong. 
Weak overlap of poverty measures indicated that there are many working households 
in EU countries that have either inadequate incomes, difficulties making ends meet 
or they have a serious lack of goods and services.
Comparisons of poverty rates of different measures gave some causes for concern. 
Firstly, poverty among working households was quite extensive. The income poverty 
rate was approximately 11 percent. This means that every tenth working household 
in EU countries had inadequate incomes. On the other hand, the subjective measure 
showed that there was an even more sizeable amount of working households that had 
difficulties making ends meet (approximately 17%). All this makes poverty among 
working households an awkward problem in the EU countries since high poverty 
rates contradict the notion that working is the best protection from poverty. In-work 
poverty really is a major social problem, especially in the Southern Europe. In other 
countries differences were not that large.  
Analysing the risk of poverty in different population groups indicated that the income 
measure was capturing relatively well the same risk groups as the two other measures. 
Risk groups differed from country to country, but some part of these differences could 
be explained with country-specific characteristics. In that sense, using only one meas-
ure (the relative income method) is not that big a problem. All measures showed that 
anti-poverty policies should be directed especially at low-educated workers who have 
labour market insecurities such as part-time work or temporary work contracts. 
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In Chapter 7, the purpose was to examine how labour market problems (low wages, 
part-time employment and periods of unemployment) affect the working poor in EU 
countries. The main question was: What are the factors behind in-work poverty in EU 
countries? Naturally, the poverty risks of households that suffered from one or some of 
these three factors were high. Nonetheless, a significant proportion of these households 
were above the poverty line. In addition, over 50 percent of working poor households 
in EU countries did not suffer from any of the three labour market problem factors 
in 2001, but the poverty rate of these households was still approximately 9 percent. 
These results suggested that the reasons behind working poor were also indicated 
by other factors. We included two additional factors, namely working intensity and 
household structure, in the analyses. 
Labour market problems were the sole reason behind in-work poverty in about 8 
percent of all working poor households. Household structure and working intensity 
themselves also explained a very small part of the incidence of in-work poverty (5–8%). 
A very large share of in-work poverty in EU countries is a result of the interaction of 
different factors. Thus, labour market problems combined with other factors have a 
significant role behind in-work poverty in the EU. 
The latter part of Chapter 7 was devoted to question: What would happen to poverty 
rates if low wages were to be lifted to low-wage levels? The main result was that in-
work poverty among low-wage households would remain at a relatively high level even 
if low wages could be erased. Analysis showed that the majority of low-wage workers 
were living in households that were already non-poor. Tackling the issue of low wages 
would certainly decrease the number of working poor households in the EU, but we 
would still be far from solving the entire problem.
Finally, we shed some light on the issue of in-work poverty dynamics in EU countries. 
The fourth and last main question of this study was: What is the nature of in-work 
poverty dynamics in EU countries? Insufficient incomes did not seem to be a stranger 
in working households. Nearly every fourth (23%) working household had been in 
poverty at least once during the time span of research (1994–2001). On the other 
hand, the dynamic approach indicated that in-work poverty was quite temporary 
in many cases. Approximately two-thirds of working poor households experienced 
poverty in just one year. 
The country-specific analysis showed that countries could be separated into two 
groups. The first group contained countries that had a small proportion of working 
households that had experienced poverty and where in-work poverty was more of a 
temporary problem. Countries in this group were Finland, Denmark, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Germany and – keeping large panel attrition in mind – Ireland. The 
second group contained Spain, Austria, France, Italy, Greece and Portugal. They 
had more in-work poverty-stricken households, and poverty was more persistent. 
The UK and Luxembourg were outliers. These findings supported the results that 
cross-sectional poverty analyses have shown. The extent of in-work poverty has a 
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large variation in EU countries. In Nordic countries and in some Central European 
countries in-work poverty is not a major problem, whereas in Southern Europe it 
really is a serious social problem. The persistence of poverty keeps dividing countries 
even further. Countries with high in-work poverty also have to deal with a more 
persistent poverty problem. 
The last research question was to examine what are the reasons behind moving in 
and out of poverty or staying in poverty. The “no-changers” group was biggest among 
stayers, but the majority of those who had moved into poverty had also not experi-
enced changes in their life situation. A large proportion of those who moved out from 
poverty had also experienced no changes. This mobility without visible reasons could 
be based on purely coincidental events, but it is much more likely that the dynamic 
approach used here could not capture the long-term processes that eventually cause 
mobility. Instead of rapid and visible changes, the process of mobility is, supposedly, 
in many cases slowly moving forward and is therefore difficult to observe.
The ultimate goal of this study was to take an internationally comparative view of one 
of the most debatable social policy issues – in-work poverty. The issue was approached 
from different angles – historically, methodologically, searching the factors behind it 
and clarifying its dynamic nature. The results were quite well in line with previous 
studies when it comes to the extent and background indicators of in-work poverty. 
Low education and, in some cases, young age and lack of full-year, full-time work 
are major background indicators behind in-work poverty. The EU15 countries are a 
very heterogeneous group when we take an internationally comparative view. In-work 
poverty rates have large variation between countries. Heterogeneity has certainly 
increased even more with 10 new Member States joining in 2004. It is important to 
address in-work poverty at an “overall EU level”, but at the same time the level of the 
problem in individual countries should not be forgotten. 
9.2  Conclusions
There are many reasons why in-work poverty has been “discovered” on a larger scale 
only in recent years in Europe. Firstly, for one reason or another, the subject has become 
relevant enough to be publicly debated. Economic downturns, the recession in the 
beginning of the 1990’s, unemployment, globalisation and the European integration 
process are a few examples of macro-level social policy issues that have controlled the 
debate. Only in the latter half of the 1990’s – partly because of the issues mentioned 
above – has the debate over new social risks really surfaced. Consequently, in-work 
poverty has also been more widely noticed. 
Secondly, the standard of living in OECD countries has increased enormously after 
World War II. This increase has been rapid and, regardless of a few economic down-
turns, it has been rather constant. It is natural that in times of positive economic de-
velopment the concerns over the population’s well-being are concentrated on groups 
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other than the employed. As results from previous studies as well as results of this 
study indicate (see e.g. Table 4), the true risk groups in terms of poverty – at least in 
Europe – can still be found from outside the working population. 
Thirdly, it may be that the Anglo-American working poor debate has simply been 
transferred to Europe as such, without thorough empirical research of the issue be-
forehand. This might be a bit dangerous. One of the dangers is that the problem is 
presented before it is empirically tested. In European poverty research, in-work pov-
erty is not traditionally considered a major problem – for instance if compared to the 
poverty of the unemployed. It is clear that working still is a good form of protection 
against poverty. One might even argue that we should have been much more worried 
about in-work poverty in the beginning of the 1970’s than we are nowadays.
Even though there is no need to “over-dramatise” the current working poor problem, 
we really should not underestimate it either. In-work poverty is a serious problem 
that threatens social stability in many EU countries. It is impossible to point out one 
culprit for the presence of in-work poverty. Various changes have occurred that have 
all played their part. Labour market changes have made working life more precarious, 
increased instability, created atypical jobs, increased earnings inequality and so on. 
Persons belonging to marginal groups within working life, such as the less educated 
and less skilled workers, are at risk as both their employment and financial well-being 
are in great danger. Young adults just entering the labour markets also face similar 
risks. Unstable labour markets may cause them enormous difficulties in terms of 
establishing themselves in working life. 
On the other hand, welfare states’ redistribution systems have been, in some cases, 
ineffective and inadequate to supply the social benefits and services needed by those 
working households that are not able to secure well-being just with earned incomes. 
One reason for this might be that the traditional full-employment setting assumed 
that working-age households required only marginal welfare state interventions. The 
current situation seems to be quite different. Even working households need welfare 
states’ redistribution systems more and more. Everywhere in industrialised countries 
work to recalibrate the welfare state to support the needs of the active-age population is 
still in progress. And when we add changing family patterns (e.g. increase of one adult 
households) and a macro-economic environment where countries operate (increased 
openness of international trade and capital market, i.e. globalisation) to the picture, 
we have various explanations why some groups of workers have extreme difficulties 
in making a decent living even in highly industrialised EU countries. 
It is clear that the incidence of poverty particularly threatens those workers who are 
not in “typical” jobs, which traditionally has meant well-paid, full-year and full-
time jobs. But, like the analyses showed, there are a lot of households in EU coun-
tries with family members in well-paid, permanent jobs, but regardless of that these 
households may live in poverty. Thus, European in-work poverty seems to have its 
own characteristics that separate it from its Anglo-Saxon equivalent. The working 
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poor phenomenon in the USA is based to a great extent on the fact that minimum 
wages are totally inadequate to secure a decent living for millions of workers who are 
in relatively stable jobs, and it is accompanied by ineffective social security systems 
(for example, non-existent healthcare). In Europe the working poor phenomenon’s 
origins seem to be based on the one hand on old family types – especially one-earner 
households – which are still relatively common, but they have lost their ability to 
secure well-being with only one wage, and on the other hand on problems of young 
adults of integrating into increasingly precarious labour markets.  
If the “American way” of solving poverty is to create new low-wage jobs and let poor 
people help themselves by filling these jobs, the “European way” has clearly relied 
more on the collaboration of labour markets and welfare states. The results indicate 
that teamwork between labour markets and welfare states has worked quite well in 
EU countries – Southern European countries excluded.  
One popular way to defend low-wage and low-skilled jobs is that they are just a tem-
porary phase of life. Mobility will eventually take care of working poor problem by 
lifting workers into better jobs. The theory of working poor jobs as career ladders 
received some support in our analyses. Dynamic analysis of in-work poverty showed 
that poverty spells are usually short in EU countries, which supports the mobility 
hypothesis. Also, quite a sizeable amount of households that moved out from poverty 
had witnessed a positive change in workers’ individual earnings. The bad news was 
that a sizeable amount of households that moved into poverty had also witnessed 
a deterioration of worker’s earnings. Thus, in-work poverty does not seem to have 
a self-healing nature. The problem is not solved by counting on the fact that many 
households escape from poverty by increased earnings because there are also a lot 
of households that fall into poverty because of decreased earnings. In addition, a 
relatively high number of European households have experienced in-work poverty, 
and high in- and outflows indicate that European labour markets are in a state where 
insecurities are quite common. 
So, we could conclude that the recent working poor phenomenon is mainly caused 
by (new) social risks and the roots of the problem can be traced to welfare states’, 
labour markets’ and families’ decreased ability to secure one’s well-being. That still 
leaves us with the question of how this problem should be tackled. It is obvious that 
welfare states have an enormous role in this. Income equality has never been one of 
the top priorities of labour markets. On the contrary, pre-transfer poverty rates have 
been high in practically every industrialised country for decades (see e.g. Mitchell 
1991, 46–52; Bradshaw and Ritakallio 2006). To rely only on labour markets’ ability 
to solve the in-work poverty problem would be a bad idea. Therefore, welfare states 
should take the responsibility. 
Heterogeneity of EU countries is a feature that came up in country-specific analyses. It 
is really casting a shadow of doubt over the efforts of building a common programme 
of fighting against in-work poverty in the EU. Some of the countries have very well-
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functioning institutional networks that keep in-work poverty at a relatively low level. 
Especially the Nordic countries and some of the Central European countries belong 
in this group. On the other hand, some countries, especially in Southern Europe, have 
a serious working poor problem to deal with.
Although EU countries differ, the basic platform of a society where well-being of 
citizens is best secured is the same everywhere. It is a society where able-bodied and 
active-age persons are working and their households have adequate incomes. This 
platform benefits welfare state’s cost containment because the working population 
increases tax revenues and they use very little social benefits. Thus, the first step to-
wards a well-functioning society is to increase the employment rate. 
Welfare states have tools to improve employment. Firstly, active labour market policies 
should be developed in order to help people – especially those in the most vulnerable 
positions – get employed and stay employed. However, active measures are often inef-
fective, and there is also a danger that the development of active measures takes place 
at the expense of passive measures (for example by cutting down unemployment bene-
fits). These kinds of actions further weaken the position of unemployed persons. 
Secondly, services targeted at young adults are vital in reducing in-work poverty. The 
problems of reconciliation of work and family life and the problems of establishing 
a steady position in unstable labour markets are issues that particularly affect the 
younger generations. Improvement of the welfare state’s services (childcare services, 
active labour market measures targeted at young adults, improving social security and 
income redistribution systems etc.) is the best way of solving these problems. 
Traditionally, in some countries – especially in the Nordic countries – the large public 
sector has employed a large share of the population. This has enabled women’s par-
ticipation in the labour force by creating possibilities to reconcile work and care re-
sponsibilities and by creating work opportunities for women. The pressures for welfare 
state retrenchment are great obstacles for enlargement of the number of public sector 
jobs. Therefore, the U.S.-style creation of private sector (service) jobs seems to be the 
most obvious choice for increasing labour force participation in EU countries. 
There have been demands to accelerate job growth in private sector service jobs by 
tearing down policy impediments. All this can be justified by saying that it is a dif-
ficult task to increase the employment rate, but at the same time it is vital for affluent 
countries. Removing policy impediments enables the creation of private sector jobs 
and it increases the employment rate. 
The difficult task of increasing employment has an added extra difficulty: If improve-
ment of the employment rate is not accompanied by a decrease of poverty, then we have 
achieved very little. If an unemployed poor person becomes a working poor person, 
not much (if anything) has improved in the life of that particular person. 
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One of the most troubling characteristics of current in-work poverty in EU countries 
is undoubtedly the fact that single adults and single parents have a high poverty risk. 
If one wage is not enough to secure a single adult household’s economic well-being 
– and this is what the situation sometimes seems to be – there is something structur-
ally wrong, and the solution lies in the hands of labour markets and governmental 
institutions. In this regard, inflation-adjusted minimum wages and taxation play a 
very important role. Those are direct ways to secure the purchasing power of one-
earner households. 
But perhaps there should be possibilities for other kinds of adjustments as well? The 
world seems to be built more and more on the basis of large families and two earners. 
Housing costs, food etc. are proportionally more expensive for single adults. Maybe 
cutting down the “family-size thinking” could prevent the scary scenario that in-work 
poverty is to some extent caused simply by the fact that single adult households also 
need two wages to make ends meet. All in all, labour markets are unlikely to return 
to the “golden age” – when even low-educated and low-skilled persons managed to 
land permanent, well-paid jobs. The heavy burden of solving the problem of working 
poor, therefore, seems to fall primarily on the welfare state. 
Solving the problem is hard if we think how complex an issue we have in hand. There 
are many examples to demonstrate the complex and sometimes even confusing nature 
of in-work poverty. For example, a working poor person who becomes unemployed 
escapes from in-work poverty but we really cannot say that an improvement in her/
his life situation happens with that shift. The “essence” of the problem – poverty 
– remains; only the labour market position changes. Analysis of dynamic processes 
indicated that changes are small and long term, which means that processes need to 
be traced over a long time span. Possibly the best solutions to in-work poverty could 
be created when the puzzle of dynamic processes is solved. Effectiveness of exit routes 
could be improved and, on the other hand, entry routes could be blocked. Now it 
seems that the “bus of working poor” is stopping every once in a while to let some of 
the passengers off. At the same time as these passengers step off, new passengers are 
getting on for a ride. 
Finally, what to expect from the future? Right now we are living in times where, for 
example, the USA’s biggest company is a retail enterprise that is constantly in the 
news because it pays low wages, its stores have poor working conditions, the enter-
prise has inadequate healthcare system and so on. At the same time, the revenues of 
that particular retail enterprise have skyrocketed. The same kinds of examples can 
be found from all over the world. In many ways, work has become a flexible tool or a 
commodity, which is used to help maximise profits. Some might hear echoes from the 
“pre-Bismarckian times”, to which the dawn of work society and the current trends 
of labour market development are compared. 
Work society managed to build a compromise between profit-oriented markets and 
decommodification-oriented welfare states after the World Wars, but it is uncertain 
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what will be the future of that compromise.  Maybe the biggest concern over the future 
is that labour markets are moving in the direction of ever-growing individualisation, 
flexibility, insecurity and disappearance of full-time employment. Ulrich Beck (2000) 
has used a phrase that labour markets in highly developed countries are in a process of 
“Brazilianization”, which means that they are benchmarking labour market systems 
that are common in developing countries – like in Brazil. In practice this means that 
risks are pooled away from the state and the economy towards working individuals.
The future does not necessarily have to be that bleak. Population ageing is certainly 
one decisive factor in how the future of paid work will be moulded. There are scary, 
looming visions of lack of an active-age working population in practically every indus-
trialised country. Thus, if we put it harshly, workers are now a commodity that lowers 
profits, but in the near future the lack of workers might be a reason for low profits. In 
the meantime, the losers of the current economic battle, such as the unemployed and 
the working poor, need the security that welfare states bring possibly more than ever. 
What the level of that security will be and how many working poor will be craving 
for it in the near future is a question that only time will answer. 
The title of this study contained a question of whether there has been a change of 
norm where 2-earner households have become a yardstick that dictates costs of liv-
ing. Results indicated that there has certainly been a shift away from the traditional 
one-earner model, but it is difficult to say whether we can refer to that shift as a major 
institutional change of the status quo. But, if it is true that there really has been 
a change of norm in societal settings, then we have all the reasons to assume that 
similar changes can happen in the near future. And the next change of norm could 
be a change towards a society where there is less poverty and working is a sufficient 
condition to secure well-being for all households.  
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10  yhTEENvETO
Tutkimuksen tausta ja kysymykset
1980-luvulla Yhdysvalloissa havaittiin, että lähes puolet köyhistä kotitalouksista 
oli sellaisia, joissa oli työssä käyviä perheenjäseniä. Ilmiötä alettiin kutsua nimellä 
”working poor” (työtä tekevät köyhät). Aiheesta on sen jälkeen tullut keskeinen osa 
angloamerikkalaista köyhyystutkimusta. Vuonna 2004 Yhdysvalloissa oli virallisten 
tilastojen mukaan 7,8 miljoonaa työtä tekevää köyhää. Keskustelu työtä tekevien 
köyhien olemassaolosta on lisääntynyt 1990-luvun loppupuolelta alkaen myös Eu-
roopassa. EU15-maissa on tutkimusten mukaan noin 11 miljoonaa työtä tekevää 
henkilöä, jotka asuvat köyhissä kotitalouksissa. Yhdysvaltojen ja EU-maiden vertailu 
on vaikeaa, sillä käytössä on eri köyhyysmittarit. Yhdysvaltojen virallinen köyhyysraja 
on huomattavasti matalampi kuin EU-maissa yleisesti käytössä olevan tuloköyhyys-
mittarin köyhyysraja. 
Tässä tutkimuksessa työtä tekevien köyhyyttä tarkastellaan kansainvälisesti vertai-
levasta näkökulmasta. Tarkastelu keskittyy pääosin niin sanottuihin EU15-maihin, 
mutta myös valikoituja OECD-maita (Suomi, Ruotsi, Saksa, Iso-Britannia, Kanada ja 
Yhdysvallat) tarkastellaan pitkällä aikavälillä. Työtä tekevien köyhyyttä tarkastellaan 
eri näkökulmista. 
Muuttuvat työmarkkinat ja muuttuvat hyvinvointivaltiot
Työmarkkinoilla ja hyvinvointivaltioilla on ollut merkittävä rooli työikäisen väes-
tön köyhyyden torjunnassa. Hyvinvointivaltiollinen kehitys toisen maailmansodan 
jälkeen vastasi nopeasti ja tehokkaasti sotia edeltävän ajan työväestön ongelmiin. 
Perinteisesti työväenluokka joutui elämään jatkuvassa köyhyyden ja sosiaalisen tur-
vattomuuden tilassa. Hyvinvointivaltioiden kehittymisen myötä tuli uusia, vahvoja 
sosiaalisia turvamekanismeja, jotka olivat sidottuja työmarkkina-asemaan. Hyvin-
vointivaltioissa oli käytössä normi, jonka mukaan keskiverron (mies)työntekijän 
tuli ansaita sellaista palkkaa, että hän pystyi sillä turvaamaan perheen taloudelliset 
velvoitteet. Toisin sanoen palkalla piti pystyä elättämään myös vaimo ja lapset. Työstä 
maksettu palkka ei ollut ”yksilöllinen” vaan enemmänkin ”perhepalkka”. Tällaista 
järjestelmää on kutsuttu palkansaajien hyvinvointivaltioksi. 
Kapitalismin kultaisen kauden vakauden tila alkoi heiketä 1970-luvulla öljykriisien 
myötä. 1990-luvulta lähtien työmarkkinoiden ja hyvinvointivaltioiden kehitystä voi-
daan kuvata lisääntyneiden epävarmuuksien ajaksi. Työllisyysasteen lisäämisestä on 
tullut merkittävin keino, jolla torjutaan hyvinvointivaltioiden kustannusten laajene-
mista. Tämä takaa samalla sukupolvien välisen niin sanotun sosiaalisen sopimuksen 
säilymisen. Sosiaalisen sopimuksen mukaan kukin sukupolvi on vuorollaan sosiaa-
lietuuksien saajina (lapset ja eläkeläiset) ja maksajina (työikäinen väestö). Työllisyys-
asteen lisäämisessä on se ongelma, että työmarkkinat tarjoavat yhä enemmän vain 
epävarmuustekijöitä. Paineet työttömyyden vähentämiseen ovat suuria. Tavoitteeseen 
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pyritään jopa sen kustannuksella, että työtä tekevien köyhyys lisääntyy samalla, kun 
työllisyysaste paranee. 
Viimeaikainen työtä tekevien köyhyydestä käyty keskustelu EU-maissa on selvästi 
osoittanut, että perinteiset työmarkkinoita kuvaavat käsitteet, kuten ”palkansaajien 
hyvinvointivaltio” ja ”mieselättäjämalli”, ovat menettämässä yhteiskunnallista merki-
tystään. Edelleen monissa maissa vanhat rakenteet ovat ainakin ajatustasolla olemassa, 
mutta todellisuus, jossa työmarkkina- ja hyvinvointivaltiojärjestelmät toimivat, on 
muuttunut. Perinteinen mieselättäjämalli ei enää turvaa samalla tavalla kotitalouden 
taloudellista hyvinvointia kuin aikaisemmin. Hyvinvointivaltiot rakentuvat yhä enem-
män sen varaan, että kotitalouksissa on kaksi työssä käyvää aikuista aikaisemman 
yhden sijaan. Tämä näkyy paitsi palkkauksessa myös elinkustannuksissa. 
Työtä tekevien köyhyys on oire vakavista yhteiskunnan tukirakenteiden ongelmista. 
Työmarkkinat ja hyvinvointivaltio eivät toimi niinkuin niiden pitäisi, jos työtä te-
kemällä ei tule toimeen. Työtä tekevien köyhyyttä pidetäänkin uutena sosiaalisena 
riskinä, joka on haastanut vanhat turvajärjestelmät.  
Mitä tarkoitetaan työtä tekevien köyhyydellä?
Työtä tekevien köyhyys on käsitteenä monitahoinen. Kokopäiväisen ja ympärivuotisen 
työskentelyn sijaan monien työtä tekevien köyhien työhistoria sisältää epätyypillisiä 
työsuhteita, kuten osa-aikatöitä tai erilaisia pätkätöitä. Käsitteen monitahoisuus tulee 
esille myös tarkasteltaessa siirtymiä eri työmarkkina-asemien ja köyhyyden välillä. 
Työtä tekevien köyhyydestä voi päästä eroon siten, että kotitalouden käytettävissä 
olevat tulot nousevat köyhyysrajan yli tai työmarkkina-asema vaihtuu työntekijästä 
esimerkiksi työttömäksi. Tällöin työtä tekevästä köyhästä tuleekin työtön köyhä. 
Tutkimuksissa on korostettu työtä tekevien köyhyyden kohdalla sitä, että tutkitta-
villa henkilöillä tulee olla kiinteä suhde työmarkkinoille. Tämä vaatimus on otettu 
huomioon tutkimalla OECD-maiden vertailuissa vain niitä kotitalouksia, joissa on 
vähintään yksi kokopäivätyöntekijä, ja EU15-maiden vertailussa tutkimalla vain 
henkilöitä, jotka työskentelevät yli 15 tuntia viikossa ja joiden pääasiallinen työmark-
kina-asema tutkimusta edeltävänä vuonna on ollut ”työssä”.
Mitä tutkimuksessa havaittiin?
Tutkimuksen tulokset osoittavat, että on vaikea löytää yhteisiä kehityssuuntia työtä 
tekevien köyhyydelle. Teoria, jonka mukaan Euroopan maat ovat ajautumassa kohti 
angloamerikkalaista työköyhälistöä, ei saa kovinkaan paljon tukea tuloksista. Työtä 
tekevien köyhyys on tulosten mukaan ollut yleistä OECD-maissa jo 1970-luvulla, joten 
sitä ei voi pitää sellaisena ”uutena sosiaalisena riskinä”, jollaisena se usein esitetään. 
Yhdysvaltojen köyhyysaste nousee huomattavasti maan virallisesta köyhyysasteesta, 
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kun köyhyysmittarina käytetään EU-maissa yleisesti hyödynnettyä tuloköyhyysmit-
taria, jossa köyhyysraja on asetettu 60 prosenttiin kotitalouksien käytettävissä olevien 
tulojen mediaanista. Tulosten mukaan työtä tekevien köyhyyden torjumisessa tulisi 
keskittyä parantamaan yksinhuoltajien, yhden aikuisen kotitalouksien ja yhden elättä-
jän lapsiperheiden asemaa. Näillä ryhmillä on suurin köyhyysriski ja ne muodostavat 
suurimman osan kaikista työtä tekevien köyhien kotitalouksista. 
Eri köyhyysmittarit ovat EU15-maissa vain osittain päällekkäisiä ja työtä tekevien 
köyhyyden variaatio on suurta. Tuloköyhyys vaihtelee Tanskan 4,6 prosentista Italian 
17,9 prosenttiin. Kuitenkin eri mittarit identifioivat melko hyvin samoja väestöryhmiä 
köyhyyden riskiryhmiksi. Erot maiden välillä johtunevat enemmän maiden yksilöl-
lisistä piirteistä kuin köyhyysmittareista. Ikä ja kotitaloustyyppi ovat jossain määrin 
indikaattoreita, joiden kohdalla eri mittarit identifioivat eri ryhmiä köyhyyden riski-
ryhmiksi. Vain yhden köyhyysmittarin käyttäminen tutkimuksissa ei näin ollen ole 
kovinkaan suuri ongelma paikannettaessa työtä tekevien köyhien riskiryhmiä.
 
Työtätekevien köyhyyden taustalla olevien tekijöiden analyysi osoittaa, että yli puolet 
köyhistä kotitalouksista ei ole kokenut mitään työmarkkinaongelmaa (matalatasoiset 
palkat, osa-aikatyö, työttömyysjaksot). Pelkästään työmarkkinalähtöiset ongelmat 
ovat köyhyyden taustalla noin kahdeksalla prosentilla kaikista köyhistä työtä te-
kevien kotitalouksista. Työmarkkinaongelmat yhdessä muiden ongelmien kanssa 
(työintensiteetti ja kotitalouden rakenne) ovat köyhyyden taustalla 40 prosentilla 
kotitalouksista. Myös työintensiteetti (8 %) ja kotitalouden rakenne (5 %) selittävät 
itsessään vain pienen osan työtä tekevien köyhyydestä. Syy köyhyyteen matalatasoista 
palkkaa saavilla kotitalouksilla ei näin ollen riipu niinkään (matalatasoista palkkaa 
saavan) työntekijän henkilökohtaisista tuloista, vaan kotitalouden kaikista käytettä-
vissä olevista tuloista. 
Työtä tekevien köyhyyden dynamiikan analyysi osoittaa, että noin joka neljäs koti-
talous oli kokenut köyhyyttä ainakin yhtenä vuotena tutkimusvuosien (1994–2001) 
aikana. Siltikin työtä tekevien köyhyys osoittautui luonteeltaan väliaikaiseksi ongel-
maksi. Noin kaksi kolmesta kotitaloudesta oli kokenut köyhyyttä vain yhtenä vuonna. 
Vuosittainen liikkuvuus on kaikissa maissa paljon yleisempää kuin köyhyydessä py-
syminen. Köyhyydestä poistumisreittejä tutkittaessa selviää, että noin puolella niistä 
työtä tekevien köyhien kotitalouksista, jotka olivat nousseet köyhyysrajan yläpuolelle, 
oli tapahtunut (yli 10 %:n) korotus ansiotuloissa (”uraportailla eteneminen”). Vastaa-
vasti niistä kotitalouksista, jotka olivat pudonneet köyhyysrajan alapuolelle, noin 30 
prosentilla oli tapahtunut ansiotulojen väheneminen (”liukumäkivaikutus”). 
Päätulkinta tulosten pohjalta on, että työtä tekevien köyhyys on monilta osin seurausta 
siitä, että yksi palkka ei ole kaikissa tapauksissa riittävä turva kotitalouden taloudelli-
selle hyvinvoinnille. Yksinhuoltajien ja jopa yhden aikuisen kotitaloudet tarvitsisivat 
joissain tapauksissa kaksi palkkaa. Kahden ansaitsijan mallista näyttää tulleen uusi 
työnteon normi, joka heijastuu elinkustannuksiin ja palkkatasoon. Samalla kun 
työmarkkinat epävakaistuvat ja yhden aikuisen sekä yksinhuoltajakotitalouksien 
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määrä lisääntyy, kotitalouksien toimeentulon takaamiseen tarvitaan yhä enenevässä 
määrin kaksi ansaitsijaa.
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APPENDICES
Appendix 1. Methodological choices of the study.
question 1 question 2 question 3 question 4
unit of 
analysis
Individual Individual Individual Individual
Poverty 
measure
Relative income method Relative income 
method, deprivation 
index, subjective 
method
Relative income 
method
Relative income 
method
Definition of 
working
See Appendix 2 Employed at least 
15 hours per week, 
most frequent 
activity status 
in previous year: 
“working”
Employed at least 15 
hours per week, most 
frequent activity 
status in previous 
year: “working”
Employed at least 
15 hours per week, 
most frequent 
activity status 
in previous year: 
“working”
Age limit of 
working 
population
18–64 18–64 18–64 18–64
Data LIS, Finnish HBS (see 
Appendix 2)
ECHP 2001 ECHP 2001 ECHP 1994–2001
Weights LIS: hweight, Finnish 
HBS: basic household 
weight (variable kora in 
HBS71, variable pkakoq 
in HBS81) x household’s 
size (variable jluk)
Household cross-
sectional weight 
(variable hg004) 
x household size 
(variable hd001)
Hg004 x hd001 No weight
Statistical 
analyses
Descriptive statistical 
analyses
Descriptive sta-
tistical analyses, 
logistic regression
Descriptive statistical 
analyses
Descriptive mobility 
tables
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Appendix 2. The definitions of work in the data.
Data: The variables used in defining working:
The weight in 
used equivalence 
scale
FIN 1970 Household Budget Survey 
1971
Variable: ATOL (The number of workers, 1 = one worker in the 
household, 2 or more = two workers in the household)
Under 18 years 
weight = 0.3
FIN 1980 Household Budget Survey 
1981
Look FIN 1970 Look FIN 1970
FIN 1990 LIS-data Finland 1991 Full-time work: Reference person/spouse at least 27 weeks/
year in full-time work (Variables: WEEKHDFT and WEEKSPFT) 
Part-time work: Reference person/spouse at least 27 weeks/
year in part-time work (Variables: WEEKHDPT and WEEKSPPT)
Modified OECD-
scale
FIN 2000 LIS-data Finland 2000 Look FIN 1990 Look FIN 1990
SWE 1970 LIS-data Sweden 1967  Labor force status of head: Variable LFSHD,  labor force 
status of spouse: Variable LFSSP (1 = working)
Look FIN 1970
SWE 1980 LIS-data Sweden 1981 Look SWE 1970 Look FIN 1970
SWE 1990 LIS-data Sweden 1992 Look FIN 1990 Look FIN 1990
SWE 2000 LIS-data Sweden 2000 Status in employment – head: Variable ACTIVHD, status in 
employment – spouse: Variable ACTIVSP (1–11 = working)
Look FIN 1990
DEU 1970 LIS-data Germany 1973 Look SWE 1970 Look FIN 1990
DEU 1980 LIS-data Germany 1981 Head type (status) of worker group: Variable D18, spouse 
type (status) of worker group: Variable D19 (1 or 2 = working)
Look FIN 1970
DEU 1990 LIS-data Germany 1989 Look FIN 1990 Look FIN 1990
DEU2000 LIS-data Germany 2000 Look FIN 1990 Look FIN 1990
UK 1970 LIS-data United Kingdom 1969 Look DEU 1980 Look FIN 1990
UK 1980 LIS-data United Kingdom 1979 Full-time work: Reference person/spouse working at least 30 
hours/week Part-time work: Reference person/spouse 
working 15–29 hours/week (Variables HRSHD and HRSSP)
Look FIN 1990
UK 1990 LIS-data United Kingdom 1991 Look FIN 1990 Look FIN 1990
UK 2000 LIS-data United Kingdom 1999 Look UK 1980 Look FIN 1990
USA 1970 LIS-data United States 1974 Look FIN 1990 Look FIN 1990
USA 1980 LIS-data United States 1979 Look SWE 1970 Look FIN 1970
USA 1990 LIS-data United States 1991 Look FIN 1990 Look FIN 1990
USA 2000 LIS-data United States 2000 Look FIN 1990 Look FIN 1990
CAN 1970 LIS-data Canada 1971 Look UK 1980 Look FIN 1970
CAN 1980 LIS-data Canada 1981 Look DEU 1980 Look FIN 1970
CAN 1990 LIS-data Canada 1991 Look FIN 1990 Look FIN 1990
CAN 2000 LIS-data Canada 2000 Look FIN 1990 Look FIN 1990
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Appendix 3. Items used in deprivation index.
HF003	 Can the household afford keeping its home adequately warm?
HF004	 Can the household afford paying for a week’s annual holiday away from home?
HF005	 Can the household afford replacing any worn-out furniture?
HF006	 Can the household afford buying new, rather than second-hand, clothes?
HF007	 Can the household afford eating meat, chicken or fish every second day, if wanted?
HF008	 Can the household afford having friends or family for drink or meal at least once  
a month?
HF009	 Has the household been unable to pay scheduled rent for the accommodation  
during the past 12 months?
HF010	 Has the household been unable to pay scheduled mortgage payments during  
the past 12 months?
HF011	 Has the household been unable to pay scheduled utility bills, such as electricity,  
water, gas during the past 12 months?
HF012	 Has the household been unable to pay hire purchase instalments or other loan  
repayments during the past 12 months?
HA008	 Does the dwelling have separate kitchen?
HA009	 Does the dwelling have bath or shower?
HA010	 Does the dwelling have indoor flushing toilet?
HA011	 Does the dwelling have hot running water?
HA013	 Does the dwelling have a place to sit outside, e.g. terrace or garden?
HA014	 Does the accommodation have shortage of space?
HA015A Does the accommodation have noise from neighbours?
HA015B	 Does the accommodation have other noise from outside (traffic, businesses,  
factories, etc.)?
HA016	 Is the accommodation too dark / not enough light?
HA017	 Does the accommodation have lack of adequate heating facilities?
HA018	 Does the accommodation have leaky roof?
HA019	 Does the accommodation have damp walls, floors, foundations etc.?
HA020	 Does the accommodation have rot in window frames or floors?
HA021	 Is there any pollution, grime or other environmental problem caused 
by traffic or industry?
HA022	 Is there crime or vandalism in the area?
HB001	 Possession of a car or van (for private use)
HB002 Possession of colour TV
HB003	 Possession of a video recorder
HB004	 Possession of a microwave
HB005	 Possession of a dishwasher
HB006	 Possession of a telephone
HB007	 Possession of a second home (e.g. for vacation)
HB008	 Possession of a home computer
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